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The Paganini Project  
Focussing on selected key areas of the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and 
Technology, PAGANINI investigates the ways in which participatory practices contribute to 
problem solving in a number of highly contentious fields of EU governance. PAGANINI looks at a 
particular dynamic cluster of policy areas concerned with what we call “the politics of life”: 
medicine, health, food, energy, and environment.  
Under “politics of life” we refer to dimensions of life that are only to a limited extent under human 
control - or where the public has good reasons to suspect that there are serious limitations to socio-
political control and steering. At the same time, “politics of life” areas are strongly connected to 
normative, moral and value-based factors, such as a sense of responsibility towards the non-human 
nature, future generations and/or one‟s own body. In these areas traditional mechanisms of 
governance can be seen to hamper policymaking and much institutional experimentation has been 
taking place. 
The overall objective of the proposed research is 
 to analyse how fields of governance related to the “politics of life” constitute a new and 
particular challenge for citizen participation and the generation of active trust 
 to illuminate how citizens‟ participation in key areas of European research and technology policy 
that are connected to the “politics of life” can be made more effective and appropriate,  
 to investigate the changing role of civic participation in the context of multi-level governance in 
the European Union,  
 to contribute to institutional re-design in a the emerging European “politics of life”. 
 
Work package 3 – Genetic Testing 
Work package 3 set out:  
1. to investigate the effects of social controversy in the issue area of genetic testing on the 
emergence of new forms of civic participation in Denmark, Germany, Austria, the UK and on the 
EU-level and  
2. to analyse the mechanisms and rationales underlying these new forms as well as their effects. The 
goal is to increase our understanding of the effects of institutional crisis in the sphere of “politics of 
life” on the development of new forms of participatory governance.  
 
This report 
This report is the final report of work package 3.  
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1. Introduction 
 
“But the problem is that the critique has become an integral part of all the talking about human genetics. All 
research programs are promoting that you produce critical thoughts on them. (…) Under the umbrella of 
democracy and participation the contradictions become a little bit wiped out, smoothed and softened. In my opinion 
the reason for existence of these bodies is basically to keep the talk alive, to continuously keep things in the 
consciousness.” (Interview 26-3 2006) 
 
This case study discusses the recent and current transformations of the politics of genetic 
testing. It refers to three quite different applications of genetic testing in the area of health 
politics:  
o the practice of prenatal genetic diagnosis (PND) which by now has become a routine 
practice in antenatal care,  
o the practice of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) which is still prohibited in 
some countries and still very controversial in the countries under study, and  
o the field of genetic testing for diagnostic and prognostic purposes in health care, related 
to the paradigm of a “predictive”, “pre-symptomatic” medicine. 
The study focuses on Austria, Germany, UK, and at the European level, which are characterized 
by quite different discourses on human genetics, different institutional settings, different 
(participatory) governance arrangements, and different transformations of discourses, 
institutions and governance arrangements over time. These arrangements range from a 
“permissive” and highly reflexive advisory system in the UK marked by pragmatic approaches 
and by a quite established and centralised public consultation scheme, which we will address in 
this report as “participatory governance arrangements”, to a more restrictive system based on 
modern statecraft in Germany and Austria, where new participatory mechanism of citizens‟ 
participation are more disperse and marginalised by formal governance arrangements. The latter 
will be termed “participatory governance experiments” in this report. 
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Genetic testing as the most established application of human genetics is still a domain where na-
tional regulatory systems are comparatively dominant whereas in other fields of biotechnology 
such as “green” biotechnologies or stem cell research the supranational level is rather important. 
Within the EU institutional framework, health policy is not among the policy areas the EU has 
responsibility for but is still under the authority of national regulation and sovereignty. However, 
there are multiple indirect ways how EU policies are influencing the politics of genetic testing, 
for instance via research policies, or patent guidelines (Abels 2002). The Council of Europe with 
its Convention on Bioethics has also influenced the national debates on genetic testing in many 
ways. Moreover, there are various dimensions of the development of genetic testing that 
transgress national competences: Patients, tests, specimens, and related data are crossing 
national borders without regulation: There is a tendency towards treatment “tourism”, especially 
in the case of PGD, an “internationalisation” of genetic tests due to an international network of 
laboratories (OECD 2005), and the international supply of commercial tests via the internet. 
Genetic testing in the last decade, unlike most of the other areas of the politics of life studied by 
the Paganini project, is not a field marked by strong moments of rupture or dense dislocatory 
moments. It has not been characterised by strong controversial settings (as was the case with 
green biotechnologies), scandalous accidents (as in the case of nuclear energy) or strong crises of 
scientific frames (as in the case of BSE). Transformations of governance in the area of genetic 
testing have taken place in a context characterized by creeping changes and a simultaneous 
coexistence of different governance arrangements, discursive frames, and political subjectivities. 
Generally, the governance of genetic testing is based on an increasing public acceptance of 
human genetics as normal part of health care and health research (cf. narratives, chapter 3). 
There are strong indicators that Western European societies already have passed a process of 
“geneticisation”, a concept which we will discuss in chapter 2. The supposed determination of 
human health and behaviour by genes has become deeply rooted in popular knowledge, 
although “scientific uncertainties” are increasing (Fox 1999). This has not always been the case. 
On the contrary, there had been strong social movements against “genetic engineering” in the 
1980s when feminist and disability rights groups have developed a techno-sceptical discourse 
towards genetic testing. Some of the elements of this discourse, namely the metaphor of 
designer babies and the critique of genetic testing as a new form of eugenics, are still circulating 
today. Asides to these elements, conservative and pro life concerns referring to the status of the 
human embryo and to intervention in human nature underlie and frame debates on genetic 
testing today. These discursive heritages and frames are the ongoing reference points of certain 
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moments of public unease and concern expressed in the debates on “designer babies” or on the 
continuity of “eugenics”. 
However, and this is one important result of our study, today this unease does not take the form 
of acute public protest or opposition but is rather expressed within a pluralist, non-antagonistic 
setting where these oppositional arguments are not dominant, yet, nevertheless, vaguely and 
subliminally present. By “non-antagonistic setting” we mean a situation that is not characterized 
by an adversarial confrontation of two opposing “camps”, in this case a pro and a contra genetic 
technology “camp”, taking diametrically opposed views on the issue, each striving at defeating 
the other and making it politically insignificant. In today‟s constellation, techno-sceptic 
arguments have been disconnected from an antagonistic pro and contra constellation. They are 
circulating in a much more fragmented, sophisticated, professionalised, normalised, post-
euphoric and post-catastrophic debate - which is nevertheless a broad and vivid debate, a 
debate, whose focus has shifted toward the daily applications of technologies and daily 
experiences with genetic testing.  
The challenge for this work package was to understand the simultaneity of a non-antagonistic 
setting on the one hand, marked by the absence of antagonist conflict, and a “discourse intensi-
fication” on the other hand, incited and fuelled by participatory governance arrangements in 
different sites and settings – sometimes directly channelled from “above” by government-
sponsored consultation processes or consensus conferences, sometimes more disperse, connec-
ted to academic social or cultural research or to NGO-activities. 
Another specificity of genetic testing, distinguishing it to some extend from other issue areas 
within the politics of life, is that the perception and problematization of danger, risk, or 
uncertainty does not so much refer to unknown consequences of human intervention in biology 
or nature. It is not so much an irreversible or inappropriate interference into nature which 
makes genetic testing problematic in the view of its critiques. Genetic tests as diagnostic devices 
are not problematised as being risky because they would form invasive technologies, although 
repro-genetics are linked to very invasive procedures such as in vitro fertilisation (IVF) or 
amniocentesis. Also, there is still the promise of using genetic diagnostics for purposes of gene 
therapy, which would be a technology of intervening into the “nature” of people, in the future. 
Yet, what takes the centre stage in the perception of risks, dangers, or uncertainties with respect 
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to genetic testing is not so much its invasive character as the issue of potential social 
implications caused by its proliferation in society.  
A third difference, for example in comparison to stem cell research, is that genetic testing has 
become a routine practice already in the area of PND and has lost the character of “science 
fiction technology”, although in the realm of “pre-symptomatic medicine” widespread genetic 
screening practices are still “dreams of the future”. Today, genetic testing has become a practice 
nearly everybody has come in touch with or knows someone – especially someone female – who 
has used it. The motivations, interests, or pressures upon individuals to use these technologies 
and – in neoliberal health care settings – the idea of exercising individual self-steering and 
individual self-responsibility via genetic testing have become an important element of the 
debate. 
For all these reasons, in this case study we focus and reflect on the double dimension of “life” 
when we talk about “politics of life”: the dimension of zoe and the dimension of bios. This 
double dimension of “life” refers to Aristotle and the fact that the ancient Greeks had no single 
word for “life”, as Agamben has reminded us (Agamben 1998: 1), but these two different terms 
of zoe and bios. Zoe refers to what we call today the “biological” dimension of life which humans 
share with other living beings, whereas bios refers to the life you live as a social being, a citizen. 
The term “life” today can refer to both dimensions, however, in the context of the “life 
sciences” and the surrounding debates about it “life” tends to mean mostly zoe. As regards 
genetic testing, we hold, this would be too narrow a perspective. Genetic testing, in fact, today is 
at least as concerned with bios as with zoe, without, however that the two dimensions could be 
reduced to one another or have become “indistinguishable”, as Agamben suggests. On the one 
hand, genes as artefacts entering politics stand for the idea of an “essence of life”, of the 
ultimate “elements of life” in the sense of biological life (zoe). On the other hand – and this is 
one of our research results –the dimension of governing one‟s life in the sense of “bios”, of lived 
individual life, of biography has become more and more important under conditions of a 
geneticised idea of the self. Genetic testing is increasingly linked to ideas of self-responsibility, 
life style, perceptions of a good body and good health and linked to an increasing discourse 
production on individual motivations and the social embedding of the motivations to use or not 
use tests and to handle their outcome. The increasing importance of bios in the field of genetic 
testing in turn has to do with a paradigm shift in genetics away from the “single gene hypothe-
sis” to a more systemic focus on the interrelations between genes, genetic and epigenetic factors, 
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and genetic factors and the social environment and life style of a person. To the extend that the 
functions and the effects of “genes” are understood as expressions of multiple interactions 
between elements and subsystems some of which belong to zoe whereas others belong to bios, 
the study of bios is getting  more and more significant to the study of human genetics. 
What does all this imply for the relationship between risk and uncertainty? First of all, we need 
to emphasise that in our context we are not observing a linear transformation from risk regimes 
to regimes of uncertainty, but a change of these concepts themselves and their relation to one 
another. Second, in our context the term uncertainty does not refer to the uncertainty of 
scientific knowledge only (Jasanoff 2005; Wynne 2002), but also to the uncertainties of the 
governance of genetic testing, the uncertainty of economic prospects of the biotech industry (cf. 
chapter 2) and the uncertainty that we call the “uncertainty of the bios”. 
The idea of risk remains key within genetic knowledge production. In the context of genetic 
testing, “risk” refers to an individualised translation of statistical correlations within populations 
into individual probabilities of future illness or having “defect children”. The idea of risk 
therefore is permanently present as an indispensable epistemological element of knowledge 
production in the area of genetic testing. However, the dimension of the emotional, 
psychological, and social embedding of (possible) test results more and more moves from the 
margins to the centre of the knowledge production and governance of genetic testing. The 
question whether and how consumers and health markets respond to genetic tests, and to what 
extent a pre-symptomatic and individualised medicine on the basis of genetic tests will establish, 
is one of the uncertainties that are increasingly becoming the focus and the main challenge for 
governance – we could call this an “uncertainty of the bios”. This uncertainty increasingly incites 
reflections which in turn are present in the newer governance schemes. Therefore, we are 
observing a change from governance schemes in the 1980s that were based on the idea that 
experts can predict and evaluate the benefits and risks of genetic engineering for the society as a 
whole (as euphoric or apocalyptical settings of science fiction) to a situation where risk 
evaluations are handed over to the individuals while at the same time governance schemes are 
increasingly referring to “ethical aspects” of genetic testing – allowing a more pluralist 
conceptualisation of positions, values, and motivations toward these technological practices. In 
this sense the “ethicisation” of politics has a contextualising dimension. On the other hand, in 
the context of “regulatory ethics” we also observe a de-contextualising process of separating 
scientific facts from social concerns framed as “ethical”. The process of “ethicisation” in the 
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context of regulatory politics also serves as a political/juridical tool to make unruly conflicts and 
concerns negotiable in terms of “brokerage”. In the second part of chapter 4 on “politics of life” 
we will, however, show that these frames limiting and channelling the discourse on genetic 
testing not always take hold. There are still frames that consider the implications of genetic 
testing for the social order as a whole and transgress the fragmenting effects of ethicisation – as 
for example the concerns about the eugenic implications of genetic testing or about the 
possibility to create “designer babies”. Their incompatibility with the dominant features of 
current governance schemes might explain why there are considerable efforts to limit, channel, 
and discredit such perspectives. 
In comparison to the 1980s, the current discursive frames to govern genetic testing display a 
tendency to debate human genetics within a “post-euphoric” or “post-catastrophic”1 setting. 
The reductionist idea of single genes directly determining certain traits of the body or the 
behaviour of a person have been challenged by more complex approaches studying the interplay 
between genes, cells, and the environment (cf. chapter 2). In this context the specificity of 
human genetics itself in comparison to other forms of medical or biological scientific knowledge 
is at stake. In chapter 4 on “politics of life” we will therefore address debates on “genetic 
exceptionalism”, the specificity of “genetic discrimination”, and also on the continuities or 
discontinuities of the eugenics frame within the new settings. The transformations of “politics of 
time” are important in this context and will be considered in three dimensions – as separation of 
past and present, in the context of “post-euphoric” or “post-catastrophic” scenarios, and in the 
context of new forms of “colonisation of the future”. 
How do (participatory) governance arrangements or experiments react to and also 
produce/incite the situation of a “non-antagonistic” pluralism of positions, multiple dimensions 
of uncertainty and double dimensions of life politics concerning the three areas of genetic 
testing under research? We approach this question in chapter 5. First, we examine institutional 
ambiguities in a twofold sense. Generally, there is an institutional ambiguity between the 
mechanisms of modern statecraft and newer governance schemes. The mechanisms of modern 
statecraft are firmly at place in large parts of regulatory decision-making and with respect to the 
                                               
1 The term post-catastrophism was introduced by Jahn/Wehling to describe the change in ecological discourses from the 
apocalyptical concerns of the 1980s to the promises of regulating and governing environmental problems since the 
1990s. (Jahn & Wehling 1998: 81) 
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“hard issues” – such as research and patent policies, or the regulation of the health care system. 
These issue areas are often not influenced by newer governance schemes and are also 
marginalised by the discursive frames that actively influence the way how to publicly debate 
genetic testing. Second, there are mechanisms of professional self-regulation in research but also 
in medical care where guidelines of medical associations are the main regulatory force, for 
example, in the case of PND. This system of self-regulation in science and medicine is not really 
affected by newer governance schemes either. 
Hence, one instance of institutional ambiguity we find in the area of genetic testing concerns the 
separation of new forms of governance from governance schemes dominated by either 
professional self-regulation or classical modern state power. A second level of institutional 
ambiguities is to be found within the new settings, that is within the sites where participatory 
governance plays a role and where “publics” and forms of problematisation of genetic testing 
are incited, activated, and constructed in a complex and also heterogeneous way. To study this 
type of ambiguities, we focus on micro-political settings, on specific examples of participatory 
governance arrangements or experiments: In the UK we focus on the Human Genetics 
Commission (HGC), in Germany on the internet forum www.1000fragen.de and the Youth 
Conference “The next GENEration” in May 2006 in Leipzig. However, we also take into 
account other participatory experiments such as a dialogue project at EU level or a consensus 
conference in Austria. 
In this context, the dimension of performativity is crucial. In chapter 5 we will show which 
scenarios, which ways to communicate, and which political subjectivities are performed in the 
concrete settings of participatory governance practices. Thereby, we want to understand, how 
the “politics of life”, which we have analysed in a more discourse analytical sense in the previous 
chapter 4, are practiced – both in the sense of being performed and of being exercised - and are 
mise en scène. Here, we study the frames and forms of problematising “life”, but also the sites and 
scenarios in which they are performed, and the specific constructions of publics and political 
subjectivities that are addressed within these scenarios (Hajer & Versteeg 2005; Loeber et al. 
2005). 
In our work package, the dimension of discourse intensification in a situation of a non-
antagonistic setting, the permanent activation of debates and participatory mechanisms without 
a driving force of an underlying conflict are of special interest. We will show that practices of 
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“performing participation” are constructing publics and political subjectivities in a messy way: 
On the one hand there is a heterogeneous setting of technologies to construct different 
“publics” – especially elaborated in the UK case: “Abstract publics” (constructed via opinion 
polls), “pure publics”, that is formerly “ignorant” but then “informed” and “educated publics” 
(constructed, for example, via citizen juries), “expert publics” (a way especially “stakeholders” 
are categorised), and “affected publics”. These different participatory technologies are linked to 
a changing landscape of political subjects considered relevant for the debate: Generally, we are 
observing a trend towards two poles. On the one hand, there is an increasing limitation of what 
is considered a “affected public” – reduced to people with personal experiences with 
problematic “genetic conditions” and leaving out older “affected subjects” rooted in social 
movements such as feminist or disability movements. On the other hand, there is a preference 
to perform abstract publics as “citizens” or “lay people”, conceptualised as ignorant but 
nevertheless capable of being educated and providing ethically valid evaluations and opinions. 
In chapter 6 we will connect the two analytical parts of our research, the focus on the discursive 
setting of politics of life and the focus on performative dimensions of participatory governance. 
We will add general remarks and caveats about the current challenges of participatory 
governance in this sphere of current politics of life. 
Admittedly, the structure of this report requires some patience from the reader interested in the 
research results. Before analysing the specific PAGANINI questions and approaches it is 
necessary to expose and connect different historical, political, economic, and scientific events 
and transformations – in order to make our analysis transparent and base it in our empirical 
research results. Therefore, we will start the report in chapter 2 with an introduction into the 
techno- and econoscapes of genetic testing, the changing scientific knowledge production and 
technological practices of genetic testing, and the social visions and economic projects in which 
they are embedded. In chapter 3 we will try to order the politics of genetic testing in regard to 
the three fields, PND, PGD, and “predictive” medicine, as narratives, covering the time span 
from the 1980s through today. 
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2. Governing genetic testing: scientific and economic 
uncertainties, and dimensions of  geneticisation 
The social imaginary of genetic testing – once linked to science fiction imaginations such as the 
“total surveillance state”, the “gläserner Bürger” (vitreous citizen), or “designer babies” (Franklin 
2006) –, has changed in the last decades as genetic testing has turned into a widely accepted 
normal element of medical research and health care – above all in the area of ante-natal care. 
Nevertheless, the expansive possibilities of human genetics still evoke concerns and unease – 
some present from the beginning, some more oriented on the concrete applications of genetic 
testing in the context of health care, biotech research and industry as they have so far developed. 
In the following we will map the scientific and economic landscape of current genetic testing 
practices, its links to the knowledge economy, knowledge production, and social visions 
packaged within, as well as the connected production of subjectivities. We will briefly discuss the 
scientific uncertainties evoked by an increasing complexity of models in human genetics or 
“post-genomics”, the economic uncertainties a biotech-industry faces that is based on 
diagnostics without adequate therapeutic equivalents, and the psychosocial uncertainties inherent 
in the promotion of individual self-steering based on risk calculations and probabilities. 
We will first introduce the definitions of genetic testing and current technologies of testing and 
discuss the underlying scientific knowledge production and changing social visions based 
thereon. Second, we focus on the institutionalisation of genetic testing in health care systems 
and move on to the “econoscapes” of genetic testing, thereby linking it to research policies and 
its interconnections with the biotech-industry and the production of “biovalue”.2 
 
                                               
2 Catherine Waldby describes the term „biovalue‟ as “a simultaneous surplus of vitality and profit, where the reformulation of in vitro 
life translates into patentable entities (cell lines, GMOs, gene sequences, SNPs) which attract venture capital, and eventually, it is hoped, into 
globally marketable diagnostics or therapies” (Waldby 2005). 
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2. 1. Genetic testing: complex definitions, techniques and applications 
The definition of genetic testing itself is contested. The range of medical practices, to which the 
term “genetic testing” supposedly refers, is a discursive element we need to contextualise in our 
research (Kegley 2000). While some definitions limit genetic testing to the direct analysis of 
DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) sequences by molecular genetic techniques, the tests that ascribe 
genetic characteristics to individuals are much more complex and include tests on 
chromosomes, proteins and other biochemical markers (Hopkins & Nightingale 2004: 142). If 
defined even more broadly, “genetic testing” may also include the deduction of a “genetic 
condition” from certain physical features or from information about the family history of 
disease (Human Genetics Commission 2002b: 11). 
Currently this uncertainty concerning the exact definition of genetic testing is articulated in two 
different interpretations. Some critiques of “genetic exceptionalism” claim that DNA-analysis is 
not fundamentally different from other diagnostic procedures. They argue that it is the 
diagnostic outcome concerning a “genetic condition” that is relevant and not the diagnostic 
technique or procedure employed to achieve such a result. Others, in contrast, opt for an 
extended definition of genetic testing. The purpose of this latter approach is to cover a broad 
range of possible forms of genetic discrimination and thus cover a broader range of practices, 
whether based on DNA analysis or other methods, by potential protective measures against 
“genetic discrimination” (see below). 
Hence, genetic testing is a complex and heterogeneous set of technologies, applications, and 
purposes (Bayertz et al. 2001). In the following we focus on those forms of genetic testing that 
are integrated in medical practices and linked to changing ideas of corporality, health, disability, 
and disease (Kay 2000). We thus leave out forensic applications of genetic testing (criminological 
testing) and applications for identification purposes (e.g., paternity tests) and instead concentrate 
on three main fields of genetic testing in health care which have dominated the respective 
political debates in the last decades: First, pre-natal genetic diagnosis (PND), second, pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), and third, the field often summarised as “predictive 
medicine”, referring to post-natal testing to predict the expression of potential future “genetic 
conditions”. 
The first two applications pertain to the field of “reproductive genetics” aiming at the prediction 
of genetic characteristics of future children. Pre-natal genetic testing refers to various non-
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invasive and invasive testing practices in order test the embryo or foetus in the context of ante-
natal care, that is involving the pregnant woman (see below). Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis 
(PGD), in contrast, is applied on an embryo created through in vitro fertilisation (IVF). PGD 
means to remove one of its cells in order to test its genetic characteristics before either 
implanting the embryo in the woman‟s uterus or discarding it. It should be noted that another 
type of analysis has recently emerged, which is known as “polar body biopsy”. It involves the 
genetic analysis of the oocytes‟ polar bodies and allows to test the oocytes‟ DNA in the process 
of fertilisation before the emergence of “toti-potent” cells, thereby avoiding to test what is 
already considered an embryo, like in PGD (Nationaler Ethikrat 2004b). 
The third application of genetic testing under study here refers to tests that are summarised as 
“predictive medicine”. These are tests that predict future “late onset” inherited diseases or 
diagnose an increased probability or risk of getting ill by diseases some of which have only 
recently been conceptualised as being genetically conditioned. This transformation of diagnosis 
involves a transformation of the concept of disease itself by creating new perceptions of “still 
healthy” or “healthy ill” patients. There is also a broad field of practices to diagnose already 
manifest health conditions by genetic testing; yet, the social visions, promises, uncertainties, and 
political debates associated with “predictive” or “pre-symptomatic” medicine are the public 
energy field we are interested in. Therefore, we will confine our attention to this dimension of 
“post-natal” testing. 
The techniques to analyse chromosomes and DNA sequences have developed over time. In the 
early 1960s cytogenetic techniques entered into widespread clinical use in order to detect 
chromosomal alterations – such as the maybe most “emblematic” condition through today, the 
Down‟s Syndrome. In the mid-1980s it became medical practice to test “single gene disorders” 
with clear patterns of inheritance using molecular genetic techniques (as for example Chorea-
Huntington or cystic fibrosis). These so-called “high penetrance” conditions only included those 
with a very high probability to be “expressed” early or later in life or – in the case of recessive 
inheritance patterns – to be passed to children. In the light of such new possibilities it became 
standard routine in gynaecologic practice in a lot of industrialised countries to test such 
conditions by use of amniocentesis and chorionic villus sampling. Amniocentesis is normally 
performed between the 15th and 17th week of pregnancy. Through a needle into the uterus of the 
pregnant woman the physician collects amniotic fluid containing cells of the foetus. Chorionic 
villus sampling is performed earlier between the 10th and 12th week of pregnancy. A sample of 
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the chorionic villi, small projections making up part of the placenta, is taken through the cervix 
of the abdominal wall. 
These invasive testing practices imply a certain risk themselves – for example a 0.5 to 1% risk of 
suffering a miscarriage in the case of amniocentesis. Starting at the age of 35 this risk is 
calculated statistically minor to the possibility of a “positive” test result – a cynical argument in 
favour of establishing screening procedures for women of that age group (Bartram 2005; 
Nippert 2005b). Invasive testing practices are normally prepared by pre-selecting techniques, 
which are interpreted as “sieving technologies” by Barbara Duden (Duden 1996) because they 
integrate a wide range of women into risk assessment. An older “sieving technique” leading to 
very uncertain results is a blood test executed between the 15th and 18th week of pregnancy 
(German: Triple Test, English: MoM-Test – Multiples of Median), testing the concentration of 
three hormones in the blood of the pregnant woman. MoM-testing has been increasingly 
questioned because of high false rates, both negative and positive (Samerski 2002). Therefore, 
there this pre-selective method is increasingly replaced by the rapidly expanding technique to 
scan the embryo via ultrasound. This scan is performed in the 11th or 12th week, assessing the 
nuchal translucency thickness in order to identify a higher risk of chromosomal “abnormalities”. 
Nevertheless, this screening procedure yields, again, high rates of false negative and positive 
results (for example 20% false negatives) (Nippert 2005b). 
While PND has become a routine practice, PGD is still a rather rare procedure (see below), yet 
important for our research as an “interface between reproduction and genetics” (Fukuyama 
2002). PGD is a practice that links various concerns and topics in the current debates on politics 
of life. PGD consists of the extraction of one cell from a four to ten-cell stage embryo. Whether 
the cell at that stage still has the ability to develop into an entire embryo is contested. The fact 
that in order to perform PGD a “pool” of embryos are deliberately created only some of which 
are meant to be transferred to the uterus whereas those deemed “defect” or “superfluous” are 
destroyed or stored for research purposes is the main reason why PGD is considered to be 
prohibited by the German Embryo Protection Act of 1990 which bans the destruction of 
human embryos altogether. PGD as such, however, is not explicitly mentioned in the text of the 
Act. Another concern is that PGD could be performed on cells that are actually still “toti-
potent”, that is able to develop into an embryo and eventually a fetus – a reason why the 
artificiality of this cell and the question whether it is toti- or pluri-potent have become 
politicised. The status of the embryo is a frame that sets the basis to connect the discussion of 
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debates on PGD on the one hand and post-PND abortion on the other hand. The 
comparability results from the question whether an embryo or foetus can be discarded or 
aborted after specific genetic test results. Against this de-contextualised perspective on the entity 
of the embryo feminists have emphasised the difference between the situation of a pregnant 
women and the laboratory setting of PGD. 
The increasing complexity of genetic testing is due to the expanding range of health conditions 
researched by human genetics and translated into testing practices. Human genetics research is 
steadily increasing the number of diseases or “impairments” ascribed to genetic factors – 
currently calculated as more than 10,000 (OMIM 2006). Whereas initially only monogenetic 
diseases were tested for, in the 1990s tests on genetic conditions became available that are 
described as “low penetrance”. They are linked to such “genetic diseases” that are constructed as 
being caused by multiple, interacting factors rather than a single gene, based on the idea of an 
interaction between genetic and environmental or lifestyle factors. This type of genetic testing 
on genetic risk factors is the result of the expansion of human genetics research to cover nearly 
all most common diseases (in industrialised countries), as for example heart disease, diabetes, 
Alzheimer, and cancer (Hopkins & Nightingale 2004). Typical for this new field of “multi-
factorial genetic conditions” is the high uncertainty of test results with respect to the question 
whether one person will in fact develop or not develop the respective disease in the future. Tests 
on “low penetrance” genetic factors provide unclear, uncertain diagnostic information on risks 
thereby leading to the problem of falsely positive or falsely negative diagnosis. 
The innovation in this respect that has gained most public attention is the supply of genetic tests 
on familial breast cancer since the mid-1990s (Lemke 2003; Wagenmann 2003/2004). The tests 
on alterations in the BRCA 1 and 2 genes, which have been conceptualised as the familial breast 
cancer genes, are linked to a lot of uncertainties: First, they are only relevant to specific types of 
breast cancer, which make up less than 10 percent of all cases. Second, the probability of a 
woman with a positive test result to actually develop this type of cancer in the course of her life 
has been calculated with an increasingly less ratio and is currently estimated at less than 70 
percent. Third, test results do not reveal when a disease will break out and how the disease will 
develop. Fourth, a negative test result does not imply that a woman will not still develop a 
different type of breast cancer during her life (Lemke 2003; Wagenmann 2003/2004). 
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Until now genetic testing has been the only application of human genetics in actual medical 
practice (leaving aside its indirect use in genetic engineering of pharmaceutical products). The 
promises of gene therapy, although having been promoted by a lot of research projects, have 
not resulted in applicable therapies yet. Maybe this is one reason why in recent years there has 
been an increasing investment in the idea that genetic testing can be developed and expanded to 
predict individual susceptibilities to specific drugs and medical treatments. The idea of this field 
of research and applications, called pharmacogenetics (cf. GeneWatch UK 2003a), is to detect 
genetic characteristics that are linked to the degree of individual sensitivity or insensitivity to a 
drug, to allergic reactions, or to side effects. Pharmacogenetics are currently at the top of the 
publicly presented possible future applications of human genetics and of genetic testing. The 
Department of Health of the UK in 2003 promised in its report “Our Inheritance, Our Future”: 
“The greatest impact of genetics on healthcare in the shorter term is likely to come from pharmacogenetics (…) 
likely to become available within the next five years” (Department of Health 2003: 14). 
Until today, the molecular analysis of DNA sequences requires complex laboratory techniques 
that are time and money consuming. For the diagnosis of several “genetic conditions” a 
comprehensive search for a mutation by screening hundreds of possible mutations is required. 
An OECD study on “Quality Assurance and Proficiency Testing for Molecular Genetic 
Testing” in 18 countries explains: 
“Many molecular genetic tests designed to determine if specific mutations are present start with the amplification of 
specific segments of the genome by the Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) followed by mutation detection using a 
direct or indirect method. More comprehensive analysis of genes, particularly when the precise underlying mutation 
is unknown, is accomplished by sequence analysis (…) Laboratories use a wide range of approaches for mutation 
analysis and a majority develop and use reagents for these procedures produced in-house (81%) while only 14% 
are indicating they rely entirely on commercial test kit systems. Thus, most genetic tests are provided as services by 
laboratories that develop, assemble and perform their own tests” (OECD 2005: 6). 
Until today, these technological limitations of DNA testing impede a lot of screening projects of 
larger populations because they are too cost and time consuming. However, most observers of 
genetic testing technologies suppose that in the next decade these limitations will be 
transgressed by the development of DNA-Chip technologies. That would make genetic testing a 
lot cheaper and easier to apply (Schwerin 2002). The connection of molecular genetics with 
computer technologies will allow a drastic acceleration of sample evaluation and a high amount 
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of simultaneously tested DNA segments (Deutscher Bundestag 2000; Schwerin 2002; Zerres 
1999). 
 
2.2. (Post)Genomics? Scientific uncertainties and epidemiological self-
evidence 
On which knowledge about “life”, which concepts of “life” are the practices of genetic testing 
based? In order to understand the transformations in the governance of genetic testing, we hold, 
we have to look at the continuities and discontinuities of the gene paradigm as it has evolved 
since James Watson and Francis Crick established the model of DNA as a double helix in 1953 
to describe the structure of long chains of nucleotides containing deoxyribonucleic acid as 
“chemical of life” (Fox-Keller 2002; Kay 2000; Nelkin & Lindee 1995; Lock 2005). In the 
following years human genetics evolved around the idea later called the “deterministic model”, 
which deduces complex processes of organic systems from the simplest elements, the single 
genes. Van Dyck has noted that this approach also helps to construct an image of the geneticist 
as hero conquering new land– framing human genetics as permanent story of “discoveries” 
(Dyck 1998). The idea that one gene generally determines one aspect of the human phenotype 
or of human behaviour is a linear model starting from the smallest element following it upwards 
until complex characteristics of the organism can be framed (Conrad 1999; Köchy 2003). This 
“bottom-up” approach dominated the various efforts of mapping the DNA sequences during 
the last century (Kevles & Hood 1993). 
In the last decade various developments in human genetics research have contributed to 
shattering this model by introducing ever more complexities – but without completely giving up 
either the idea of a cause-effect relationship between genotype and phenotype or the 
informational model assuming that the genome contains the “programme” for life (Fox-Keller 
2001). Researchers started to analyse the DNA sequences in relation to mRNA synthesis, to the 
regulation of proteins, to the interaction with other genes, to its cellular environment, and 
generally to the question at what time genes are expressed, activated, or inactivated. These are all 
aspects of a research trend away from focusing on isolated genes toward a research sometimes 
summarised as “epigenetics” or – referring to the protein expression, “proteomics”, or more 
generally “post-genomics” (Rheinfelder 2003). The disciplinary boundaries between 
developmental biology and molecular biology have become blurred (Fox-Keller 2002) when 
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human genetics thus started to conceptualise genes less and less in isolation and instead rather in 
their interaction with other genes and with factors of the organic environment (cf. Duden & 
Zimmermann 2000).  
One important event that has strengthened this critique of simple determinist models was the 
publication of the Human Genome Project. The Project had resulted in a (nearly) complete 
sequencing of the human genome in 2000 (or at least what was later called a “working edition”). 
The result of this sequencing project was a total number of only 20,000 to 25,000 genes 
(International Human Genome Sequencing Consortium 2004), much less than had been 
estimated before – further eroding the hypothesis of all human characteristics being reducible to 
certain individual genes. In addition, researchers found out that what had been termed “junk 
DNA” and what makes up about 98% of the DNA probably plays a decisive role in steering the 
development of an organism (Lock 2005: 47). 
Margaret Lock concludes: “The result is that gene fetishism, never embraced wholeheartedly by all the 
scientists involved (…), is now clearly on the wane among many (perhaps the majority of) experts, and this decline 
is hastened by the undeniable fact that genomic “deliverables” are as yet few and far between. Only one new drug 
the development of which was based on information obtained from genomics has been marketed in 2003 (…).” 
(Lock 2005:48) 
New approaches in biology such as developmental system theory deliberately turn away from 
genetic determinism, arguing that epigenetic should be recognized as the effects of dynamic 
interactions among many variables with numerous possible outcomes. Genes, within this 
theoretical framework, form only one factor among many (Lock 2005). 
Nevertheless, the main investment of human genetics research today is not invested in such 
systemic approaches either, but in epidemiological studies and in the search for so-called 
biomarkers. Thereby, human genetics research is compensating the problems it still has on the 
level of theoretical models and systematic research, as well as the increasing uncertainties 
concerning the relationship between genotype and phenotype. 
Biomarkers are thought to be precursors of a specific disease under investigation long before 
any symptoms are recognized (Lock 2005: 52). Detecting such biomarkers, who may for 
instance indicate an increased probability to development Alzheimer´s disease or other complex 
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conditions, involves extensive monitoring of thousands of healthy people for signs that may or 
may not be significant predictors for future disease (Lock 2005: 55).  
Epidemiological strategies study statistical correlations between certain genetic characteristics 
and certain diseases or “conditions” in a certain population by trying to identify so-called risk 
factors. Risk factors as such do not necessarily cause a certain disease but rather indicate an 
increased probability. To take the example of late onset Alzheimer again, risk factors may 
include a wide variety of variables such as age, gender, education, family history, Down 
syndrom, head trauma, and, among other factors, a certain genetic variation (Lock 2005: 55). 
The correlations between such factors can then be translated into individual risks and attributed 
to an individual body as its “genetic disposition”. Therefore it is mainly epidemiological and 
“association studies”, as Martin calls them, that are increasingly relevant – especially as regards 
the search for genetic factors of multi-factorial diseases, “where there is no clear pattern on inheritance” 
(Martin 2001: 163). This research is a “data-driven research” highly dependent on the 
development of processing huge amounts of data, of bio-informatics, requiring high amounts of 
centralised data and DNA-samples in order to result in relevant risk calculations (Köchy 2003; 
Rheinfelder 2003). It is this research that is the main attractive, pragmatic site of intervention for 
biotech industry promising concrete results in the form of risk calculations for specific diseases.  
In short, investigating multi-factorial diseases requires a large scale involvement of healthy people, 
people  who do not or not yet have developed the disease under study. Research on complex, 
multi-factorial diseases thus is dependent on the participation of huge numbers of people, 
providing data which may or may not be useful to study a certain disease. The same holds true, 
as Anne Kerr notes, for developing and making use of biobanks as a research strategy (Kerr 
2003a). We will argue that actually this “need for participation” in genetic research, due the 
“eclipse” (Lock) of the single gene paradigm, forms a main element in the context of the 
increasing emphasis on civic participation in science – society deliberations (see chapter 5). 
Meanwhile, the pretensions of “post-genomics” or of complex conceptualisations of multi-
factorial diseases do not correspond to the development of theoretical and not even of adequate 
statistical models (Interview 26-3 2006) – and there are very little concrete research projects 
directly addressing the interplay between environmental and genetic factors (cf. www.ngfn.de; 
Lock 2005). Köchy explains that processing big amounts of data still remains the main “proof 
for scientific excellence”, but that today there are strong “deficits in the synthesis above all in 
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the level of theoretical reflection” (Köchy 2003: 16). Hence, although there is a trend towards 
integral systemic approaches to combine molecular with cellular, histological with organic, and 
biomolecular with social research, this systemic approach is not being translated into concrete 
research and theoretical models (Rheinfelder 2003). 
This dominance of data-driven epidemiological research in current human genetics makes clear 
that scientific uncertainties concerning the genotype-phenotype relationship are compensated by 
the alleged self-evidence of epidemiologic risk calculations. Observers of these developments 
express little doubt that the results of this research – for example being able to link a 15 percent 
increased risk of heart disease to a certain gene as a statistical correlation – will be the relevant 
kind of knowledge production for future health politics and the basis of a further expansion of 
genetic testing practices (Interviews 14-3 2006; 5-3, 2006). 
The concept of life based on the idea of the human genome as a “book of life” has therefore 
not been altogether de-legitimised by new scientific uncertainties. Rather, there is the idea of a 
more and more complex grammar of reading and interpreting this text or programme (Jacob 
2002; Kay 2000) in the context of systemic or multi-factorial models. Life is thereby 
conceptualised not simply as biological essence but as systemic totality of interactions between 
biological essences and statistically de-contextualised “ environmental”, “psychological” or 
“social” factors – as a systemic imagination without a suggestion of how to decipher it in the 
near future.  
However, in popular presentations of human genetics the systemic paradigm coexists with the 
deterministic idea of a gene for this and another gene for that. The deterministic model persists 
in research projects on genetic links to emotional, psychological or behavioural attributes3, e.g., 
homosexuality, nicotine addiction, alcoholism, obesity, schizophrenia, depression, or loneliness 
(Gen-Ethischer Informationsdienst 2003/2004: 29; Gen-Ethischer Informationsdienst 
2004/2005: 37; Gen-Ethischer Informationsdienst 2005: 33; Gen-Ethischer Informationsdienst 
2005/2006: 38). 
 
                                               
3 For example in February 1995 the Ciba Foundation organised a “Symposium of Genetics of Criminal and Antisocial 
Behaviour” in London together with the main shareholder of the British pharmaceutical enterprise Wellcome, the 
Wellcome Centre for Medical Science (cf. Bock & Goode 1996). 
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2.3. Dimensions of geneticisation 
Which social visions underlie the scientific agenda of human genetics (Shapin and Schaffer 
1985)? And how has science on the other hand influenced social ideas of the body, corporality, 
and disease? How is it itself shaped by such visions or more concretely by current economic and 
political projects? 
Some authors have proposed that we are experiencing a “geneticisation” of society (Koch 1993; 
Lippmann 1991; 1998), referring not only to medical practices but also to expanding knowledge 
patterns in daily life that establish a “genetic essence” of human beings and stabilise ideas of 
inheritance and biological determination of one‟s features – and futures. Genes as an essence of 
life have unquestionably become an artefact entering daily life. They are certainly linked to ideas 
of minor or higher values or qualities of life and connected to markers of social hierarchies, 
ideas which are reverberating albeit not repeating ideas of eugenics and Social Darwinism. 
However, two remarks need to be made in favour of a cautious interpretation of 
“geneticisation”. Firstly, it would be overhasty to assume a general hegemony of geneticisation 
in the societies under study. We have to keep in mind that the social realities of practicing 
genetic testing and the sites where these practices are performed are heterogeneous and disperse. 
They range from routine procedures such as PND to the project of “predictive medicine”, 
which basically remains a project for the future and, if realised, is performed above all in pilot 
screening programs and clinical experiments (see below). The expansion of these practices still 
remains uncertain; postulating “predictive medicine” as an already self-evident future constitutes 
a problematic “politics of time”, which we will address further below. Here, the “uncertainty of 
the bios” comes into play: The future of genetic testing depends on its appropriation by 
individual consumers, clients of health care systems or patients accepting the label of being 
genetically “at risk” or being affected by a “genetic condition”. Although in the case of PND 
there is certainly a broad acceptance, this is not necessarily the case for future applications of 
predictive genetic testing, given the gap between diagnostic and therapeutic possibilities. 
Furthermore, it is unclear how the free market for life style tests (for example for the 
susceptibility to nicotine addiction, for dietary advice etc.) will develop. Until now the 
experiences are limited to pilot experiments. The future of genetic testing depends highly on 
consumer behaviour, the change of health, body and risk perceptions and the spread of 
individual strategies to acquire knowledge and control about one´s individual “genetic risk”. This 
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explains in part  the generally increasing sensitivity for the contingent behaviours, motivations, 
or concerns of individuals or groups as (potential) users/consumers of genetic testing that more 
and more permeates the governance of genetic testing beyond the concern about the education 
and trust with respect to “pure” scientific knowledge. 
Second, when talking about “geneticisation” we need to take into account the change of 
knowledge regimes on genes as mentioned before. Authors from governmentality studies 
(Lemke 2000; Rose 2001; 2007) have emphasised that we do not simply deal with a biologisation 
of the social through genetic reductionism or genetic determinism today. This argument does 
not suffice to understand the expanding of the “Alltagsgen” (every day‟s gene) (Duden 2001) 
into current visions of health and the body. These scholars explain the attractiveness of 
individual risk calculation in the context of a neoliberal programmatic subjectivity that implies 
the norm to continuously, actively, responsibly and autonomously manage one´s own health 
care (Heath et al. 2004; Lemke 2004; Rose & Novas 2003). 
It is exactly the uncertainty prior to doing a test on monogenetic diseases, and even more so the 
uncertainty of risk calculations resulting from tests in the case of multi-factorial diseases that can 
contribute to the idea that individuals can develop active and autonomous strategies, whether, 
under what conditions, and when to do a test or not. Especially in the case of tests for multi-
factorial diseases, the uncertain and merely probabilistic character of test results may incite the 
development of individual strategies of self-care in order to reduce one´s individual risk to 
develop the disease through preventive measures or changes in individual life style. In this 
context, new uncertainties, new responsibilities, and also new forms of social pressure on the 
individual bring about a need to make decisions on how to individually access and manage this 
risk information and how to cope with it (Lemke 2004; Polzer n.d.). However, individual self-
technologies, strategies of self-care, individual responsibility and "autonomous" decisions and 
reproductive choices are embedded in institutional settings which should not be overlooked or 
underestimated. In the following we will offer some remarks on how these new subjectivities 
and paradoxes of hereditary destiny und individual responsibility are institutionalised in health 
care systems and genetic counselling. 
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2.4. Genetic testing and counselling in health care systems 
Genetic testing in the countries under study is mainly practiced and institutionalised within the 
health care systems where it has expanded in the recent decades – above all in the context of 
PND. In the beginning, genetic testing in Germany, Austria and the UK was embedded in 
specialised disciplines and isolated segments of health care and used to be governed by human 
geneticists and their counselling services – above all in human genetic institutes of universities 
and hospitals. 
The establishment of these specialised segments in the broader health care system took its time. 
In Germany, for example, only in 1993 the medical specialist for human genetics has been 
recognised as a medical specialisation among others (Deutscher Bundestag 2000: 22). In the last 
decade public health genetics have been promoted (Petersen 2003; World Health Organisation 
2002) as a normal and important part of the national health systems in general, thus 
“geneticising” the systems and building stronger linkages between public services, human 
genetics research, and the development of genetic tests by private research and biotech-firms. 
In the following we will show that the process of normalisation and de-specialisation of human 
genetics within health care systems is heterogeneous. While laboratories still need complex 
technologies especially in the area of molecular (not cytogenetic) testing, genetic counselling and 
the supply with tests – especially in PND – has become de-specialised and routinised. In general, 
there are tendencies of privatisation in all different areas of genetic testing under study. 
 
The internationalisation of complex laboratory networks as a challenge for multi-
level governance 
In the last decades, the amount of laboratories offering cytogenetic and molecular testing 
procedures has increased enormously. In Germany, the Journal Medizinische Genetik (not 
exhaustively) counted 27 laboratories in 1991 – nearly exclusively within Universities – 
compared to 104 laboratories in 1999 of which 32 were in private hands (Medizinische Genetik 
1999). In Austria, laboratories that carry out predictive genetic tests on humans have to be 
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licensed according to § 68 of the gene technology law. According to the Ministry of Health and 
Women in July 2006 53 laboratories had such a license.4 
Most genetic tests performed by laboratories today remain cytogenetic tests of chromosomal 
structures with a minor, albeit increasing, percentage of molecular DNA analysis. 5  At an 
international level, molecular genetic analyses have increased in 18 OECD countries from 
874,608 samples in 2000 to 1,401,536 samples in 2002 (OECD 2005: 5). Generally, cytogenetic 
tests and those molecular tests that are more common and based on stable technologies (for 
example tests for cystic fibrosis, fragile X syndrome, genetic hemachromatosis) have become 
increasingly privatised and commercialised, while more complex tests remain largely integrated 
into public hospitals and/or university research (OECD 2005; Samerski 2002). This still high 
level of centralisation and specialisation of laboratories could change in the context of DNA 
chip technology which would enable the passing of molecular genetic testing from human 
geneticists to general practitioners and non-human genetic experts (Deutscher Bundestag 2000; 
Zerres 1999). 
There are differences in how these services of laboratories are integrated into the respective 
national health care system and who will be the gatekeepers who organise access to the tests. 
While in Germany patients can acquire genetic testing directly from the laboratories and the 
process of privatisation of services is particularly high, 6  in Austria the intermediaries are 
physicians, and in the UK regional genetic centres are heterogeneously organising the access to 
genetic testing (Human Genetics Commission 2004; OECD 2005). 
Laboratories in general are specialising on certain tests so that no laboratory can offer all existing 
tests. Therefore there is an increasing interchange of specimens also across national borders. 
The OECD study speaks of this increasing circulation of tests, human samples, and related data 
as “internationalisation” of testing and interprets it as a challenge for multi-level governance 
because there is nor transparency or regulation with respect to quality standards (for example 
under which criteria potential tests are ready to move from the research phase to a clinical 
                                               
4 http://www.bmgf.gv.at/cms/site/attachments/8/9/5/CH0256/CMS1087982873584/__68_genanalyse-
einrichtungen_03_06.pdf, 20.10.2006 
5 In 1991 5,792 DNA-diagnostics were performed in Germany, whereas 1997 there already were 13,436 persons tested 
(Nippert 1997 quoted in Deutscher Bundestag 2000: 24).  
6 This high level of privatisation has to do with the German health care system being based on the state insurance 
reimbursement system, which works with private doctors within the public health care system (OECD 2005: 9). 
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laboratory setting), data protection, and informed consent concerning the samples crossing 
borders and being mostly collected and stored by the laboratories for an indefinite time (OECD 
2005). For example, over a third of all laboratories surveyed which conduct the especially 
sensitive pre-symptomatic or predisposition testing do not have any confidentiality policy 
(OECD 2005). 
 
PND: routine practice, precarious counselling and effects of privatisation 
While laboratories in molecular genetic testing mostly remain specialised and centralised entities, 
offering the test to clients as well as counselling before and after applying it, especially in the 
area of PND, is no longer restricted to specialised segments of professional expertise in human 
geneticists but more and more performed by general practitioners, since in reproductive genetics 
these tests have become integrated into the normal routine of gynaecological practice. This 
process of de-specialisation has given reason to conflicts and competition between professional 
human geneticists and general practitioners (Harper 1995). In Germany, for instance, there is the 
general trend that “with an increasing amount of tests offered and an increasing demand the offer shifts from 
human genetic institutions of universities to practicing physicians because of reasons of capacity alone” 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2000; cf. Schmidtke et al. 2005). The percentage of invasive PND 
(amniocentesis and chorionic villus sampling) performed by private practitioners, for example, 
has increased in Germany from 56% in 1991 to 76,7% in 1997 (Deutscher Bundestag 2000): 22). 
The trend of de-specialisation can also be observed in the UK and in Austria, while both differ 
from the German health care system in that in the UK and in Austria genetic testing is directly 
integrated into public health care (OECD 2005). 
The routinisation of PND has led to a situation where the boundary of human genetics being 
only of interest to specific persons, families, and couples affected by family histories of 
monogenetic diseases has been exceeded by far. Access to genetic testing has been expanded to 
virtually all pregnant women who are considered somehow “at risk” – above all because of the 
“age indication”. In Germany, for example, pregnant women have at first been categorised as 
being "at risk" when aged over 38, then when over 35 years old; but the number of so-called 
“psychological” indications for prenatal genetic diagnosis, irrespective of the woman´s age, has 
increased, too (Samerski 2002). Eva Schindele calculated as early as in the late 1980s that in 
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Germany up to 80% of all pregnant women were classified as belonging to some form of risk 
group and accordingly being offered some screening procedure or other (Schindele 1990: 37). 
In the UK, 30,000 amniocenteses and 8,000 chorionic villus sampling tests were performed in 
2003 (as reference: in 2003 there were 700,000 births in the UK) (Human Genetics Commission 
2004: 8). In Germany, the estimated current percentage is even higher with 130,000 invasive 
tests per year (Nippert 2005b) In 2001 in Germany, the chromosomes of more than 10% of all 
babies born have been tested (Spitzenverbände der Krankenkassen 2005). In a survey for 
Austria, Czypionka and others (2006: 237 ff.) found out that the number of chorionic villus 
sampling increased significantly from 1995 (118 tests) to 2004 (648). The number of karyotyping 
of amniotic fluid in the same period remained relatively constant from 1996 to 1999 (ca. 870 
tests), decreased in the next two years to 643 tests and increased again in 2004 to 749 test. The 
survey, however, does not cover all Austrian labs that carry out genetic testing. To put this 
numbers in perspectives, according to Statistics Austrian 78.190  babies were born alive in 
Austria in 2005. 7 According to Wiesner (2006: 174) a trend exists in Austria, that invasive 
methods of PND are used to a lesser extent, while the number of non-invasive methods would 
sharply increase and gain routine character. 
As already mentioned, invasive tests such as amniocentesis and chorionic villus sampling are 
normally preceded by pre-selective procedures. In Germany this trend is fostered by the 
privatisation of health care services. The first trimester ultrasound scan is not covered by the 
health insurance system but rather has to be paid for by the clients as an extraordinary service, 
and the effect of this expansion of “IGeL” (individual health services) is that the application of 
this “sieving” technique has expanded as source of extra-income for gynaecologists during the 
last years (Braun, A. 2005; Nippert 2005a). 
The routinisation of PND is embedded in practices of counselling before and after the testing 
procedure – albeit in a precarious way: In the UK, there is a very heterogeneous situation of 
counselling across health authorities (Wald et al. 1998) depending “on priorities of local providers and 
clinicians with an interest in particular screening technologies” (Kerr 2004), and observers generally 
criticise a lack of adequate counselling (Williams et al. 2002). 
                                               
7 http://www.statistik.at/statistische_uebersichten/deutsch/pdf/k14t_4.pdf, 20.10.2006 
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In Germany, the coverage of counselling is also very low. According to a study of Nippert, 
Neitzel, und Schmidtke, only in 20% of PND diagnostics any human genetic counselling is 
provided, mostly only after the communication of a specific test result. Only in 10% of the cases 
the study found counselling after a pre-selective result and before an invasive testing procedure 
(Nippert 2005a), although the German Society for Human Genetics (Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Humangenetik) and the Maternity Guidelines (Mutterschafts-Richtlinien) recommend 
counselling at least before invasive testing procedures (Bundesausschuss der Ärzte und 
Krankenkassen 2003; Samerski 2002). 
Another limitation of counselling is that after invasive prenatal tests there often is very little time 
between the communication of the test result and the abortion. In 81% of the cases pregnancy is 
terminated within 10 days after the information about a “positive” test result (Nippert 2005b) so 
that a lot of women decide in a traumatised moment without sufficient time for reflection 
(Rohde 2005). Even less established than human genetic counselling is the possibility of 
psychosocial counselling before and after PND, an option preferred by feminist networks and 
offered by NGOs and welfare organisations (Interview 5-3, 2006). However, gynaecologists 
generally do not inform women about these possibilities (Braun, A. 2005; Rohde 2005). 
The concept of counselling as institutionalised in these (precarious) offers of psychosocial or 
genetic counselling has changed in the last years. More and more the idea of individual self-
steering has taken ground. While in the beginning genetic counselling was conceptualised as an 
advise given by an expert to the ignorant patient, in the 1990s the model of a “non-directive process 
of communication between consulter and client” (Deutscher Bundestag 2000: 21)8 or as “psychologically 
embedded interactive information” took ground (Samerski 2002: 46; cf. Reif & Baitsch 1986). Techno-
sceptical voices expound the problem that there is an “increasing pressure to apply existing PND 
possibilities” and that in the context of increasingly sophisticated ultrasound scans it becomes 
increasingly difficult to ensure the “right not to know” (Rohde 2005). For the UK, the Human 
Genetics Commission acknowledges: 
“It has been shown that midwives and ultrasonographers may offer screening in such a routine manner that it 
becomes a default option, rather than a considered choice.” (Human Genetics Commission 2006: 12). 
                                               
8 The dilemma of “non-directive” is expounded by the statement of the German Ministry of Health‟s Advisory Board on 
Ethics in 2000: “The patients should not be patronised but neither should they be denied advice” (Ethik-Beirat beim 
Bundesministerium für Gesundheit 2000). 
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Samerski explains that PND results force women into a situation of decision-making “between the 
devil and the deep blue sea” (Samerski 2002), because the only active decision, the only 
“therapeutical” solution 9  is abortion – a situation where the practice of “tentative pregnancy” 
(Rothman 1992) has become hegemonic. For example, in both Germany and the UK today 
more than 85 percent of women recur to an abortion after the diagnosis of Down‟s syndrome, 
and even more after the diagnosis of neural tube defects (e.g., Spina bifida) (Nippert 2005b; 
People Science & Policy 2005: 23). 
While PND has become a routine practice in antenatal care, PGD remains a comparably rare 
practice. In our country cases it has only been allowed in the UK where between 2002 and 2003 
8 clinics conducted 155 PGD cycles (Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 2005a).10 
The biggest clinic in the UK, the Guy‟s and St. Thomas NHS Foundation Trust, for example, 
conducted 330 cycles of PGD from 1997 to 2005 resulting in 85 babies out of 60 deliveries 
(Lashwood 2006). The “success rate” of PGD is quite low: An international survey of the 
European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology estimates that only 14% of couples 
undergoing PGD actually become parents (Sermon et al. 2001). The level of privatisation of 
these services is quite high. In the mentioned UK clinic only 60% of the couples are funded by 
the NHS while the others privately pay about 5000 GBP for one cycle (Lashwood 2006). At the 
European level the fact that national regulations are very different from one another has led to a 
so-called “reproductive tourism” from countries prohibiting to countries allowing PGD – thus 
constituting another challenge for European politics when the aim is to homogenise health care 
and make multi-level governance consistent (Blyth & Farrand 2005). 
There are two types of PGD: the one excluding a certain genetic condition, while the other – 
also called Pre-implantation Genetic Screening (PGS) – is done in order to enhance the success 
rate of IVF for women who already had a number of “failed fertility cycles” or “IVF failures”. 
Via PGS, those embryos with the most potential to develop are selected and transferred to the 
woman´s uterus (Sermon et al. 2001). Alison Lashwood, a nurse working at the already 
mentioned large PGD clinic in the UK, explains: “That aspect is very big business in the UK” 
(Lashwood 2006). 
                                               
9 There are rare exceptions for therapeutic possibilities – for example medicinal treatment of the mother in the case of 
heart rhythm disorders of the foetus or blood transfusion in the case of incompatibility of rhesus factors.  
10 Meanwhile the number of clinics licensed to do PGD has been expanding permanently to 12 clinics in 2004 (Human 
Genetics Commission 2004).  
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The rare but nevertheless expanding practices of PGD and PGS lead us to the dimension of 
econoscapes of human genetics – as PGD and PGS need to also be situated in the context of 
the interests of scientific research to get access to eggs and embryos. This becomes especially 
important when we consider the trend to interpret PGD (where not prohibited by law) as an 
exchangeable technique with PND. PGD and PGS make it possible to extend the application of 
IVF beyond the “treatment of infertility”. Their promotion might thus broaden the couples 
using IVF in order to pre-select embryos and thereby has the potential to increase the 
production of surplus embryos accessible for research. In this sense, the contexture of PGD is 
also embryonic stem cell research, as work package 2 explores. 
 
2.5 Econoscapes of genetic testing: linkages between health care, human 
genetics research, and biotech industry 
The access to surplus embryos for research is only one indirect aspect in the “econoscapes” of 
genetic testing regarding the triangle of health care system, human genetics research, and biotech 
industry. The increasing interconnection between genetic diagnosis as intrinsic part of the public 
health care system, as means and as result of private and public human genetics research, as 
product of biotech-firms and pharmaceutical industry, and as product of public or private 
laboratories needs to be taken into account as the context of our research. Generally, the 
analysis of the governance of genetic testing needs to consider the interrelation between the 
commercialisation and privatisation in health care, neoliberal programmatic subjectivities and 
norms of self-management, and the potential of genetic testing to individualise risk profiles and, 
as in pharmacogenomics, medical treatment itself (Mykitiuk 2002; Petersen 2003; Sexton 2006). 
However, until today there have been few studies analysing the connection between neoliberal 
health care policies and human genetics and the existing ones are not based on empirical 
investigations into the application of genetic testing in “predictive medicine” but rather on 
speculative considerations, e.g. on “colonising the future” (Sexton 2006; Shalev 2006). By the 
term “colonization of the future”, technosceptical approaches indicate and reflect that their 
prognostics about the future might be based on the hypothesis of a continuous expansion of the 
use of genetic testing. This unproven hypothesis thereby is a “colonising” scenario of the future 
that influences the current debate on probable political challenges.  
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Similarly, the debate on the use of genetic testing by insurance companies and employers is to a 
large degree based on future scenarios rather than on empirical investigation. As we will show in 
our narrative analysis there are already cases of employers demanding genetic test results from 
their employees, and private insurance companies are currently paying a lot of attention to the 
future possibilities of checking health risks through genetic testing. Yet, the fact that insurance 
companies are prompted to sign moratorium agreements concerning the use of genetic tests 
indicates that the “econoscape” of genetic testing is to a large extend based on expectations 
about future developments in this area (Interviews 14-3 2006, 5-3 2006). However, this may 
change drastically with the development of DNA chip technology. 
When looking at the current econoscapes of genetic testing we have to focus, first, on the public 
health care system as the main market of genetic testing, second, on the interrelation between 
private and public human genetics research and the research interests into samples collected by 
biobanks, laboratories, and screening programs, third, on the development of patenting, and, 
fourth, on the uncertain economic prospects of biotech-firms. 
 
Public health systems as main market for genetic testing: 
Biotech and pharmaceutical firms are dependent on public health care systems because these 
still form the main market for genetic tests. In Europe, we do not yet have a significant “free 
market” for commercial tests as in the United States (Parthasarathy 2005). Hopkins and 
Nightingale show for the UK that nearly all tests are marketed through the channels of the 
NHS, while the marketing of direct over-the counter tests often failed because it led to a lot of 
public controversies and scandals (Hopkins & Nightingale 2004; see also Martin and Frost 
2003). For example, in the early 1990s, in the UK a cystic fibrosis test, marketed directly to the 
public, led to a lot of critique (House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 1995). 
In 2002, the project of The Body Shop and the UK company Sciona selling a genetic test in 
Body Shop stores as basis for dietary advice was quickly abandoned after a lot of protest 
(GeneWatch UK 2003c). More recently, there have been protests against a genetic test offered 
via internet that promised to diagnose nicotine addiction, marketed by g_Nostics Ltd., a “spin 
out” company from Oxford University (GeneWatch UK 2005). 
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Nevertheless, there are sporadic examples of commercial tests – above all by firms with strong 
linkages to academics. Their main interest is to market their research results – and less to 
actually actively develop stable markets for private clients of these tests. For example, in 
Germany there was the case of the enterprise DiaGen announcing a series of tests for disease 
predispositions – ranging from obesity, Alzheimer, osteoporosis, rheumatic diseases heart 
problems to diverse cancer risks diagnostics. 11  Another example is the biotech enterprise 
Adnagen, a spin-off of the “Fraunhofer Institut für Grenzflächen und Bioverfahrentstechnik” in 
Stuttgart together with the Institute for Microbiology of Hannover. Adnagen offers 
pharmacogenetic tests to detect “normal or rapid drug metabolisers” and the “susceptibility for 
environmental chemicals” and other “environmentally caused diseases” (Deutscher Bundestag 
2000: 29, cf. www.adnagen.com). 
A lot of directly commercialised test are offered via the internet – an international market 
without any regulatory control. It is often quoted as a challenge for international governance 
mechanisms. However, in the last years there has been no evidence that the European markets 
for tests would expand dramatically as a market beyond the health care systems. 
Generally, the trend is not to totally disconnect the market for genetic testing from the 
established medical system but to stay articulated at least for the part of counselling and possible 
treatments after the test (Parthasarathy 2005). Even more, until now the main form of marketing 
the tests remains directly through the public health care system. One important example of this 
way of commercialisation of tests is the case of Myriad Genetics, the firm that holds the patent 
for the tests for BRCA1 and BRCA2 familial breast cancer genes (Institut Curie 2005). It is 
obvious that the promotion of screening procedures within the public health care system have 
to be analysed as a very important future market for the commercial suppliers of genetic testing. 
In the case of the first larger genetic screening project in Germany, the screening of 
hemachromatosis performed by the medical insurance company Kaufmännische Krankenkasse, 
for example, observers have suggested to analyse the commercial interests of the supplier of the 
                                               
11 Legally, only the cancer diagnostics could be challenged by an investigation of the Medical Association (Ärztekammer) 
of North-Rhine-Westphalia (Deutscher Bundestag 2000: 28). 
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test involved in this project. For obviously the necessity of this test is highly contested within 
the scientific community.12 
 
Public and private research interests in genetic testing as basis for access to DNA 
samples 
Moreover, public and private research interests form part of the econoscapes of human genetic 
testing. The expansion of genetic testing practices is directly linked to research interests in the 
sense of access to genetic data produced by screening procedures. Furthermore, the expansion 
of genetic testing practices is necessary to legitimise human genetics research agendas in general 
and to stabilise the promises that investment in research will translate into the exploitation of 
“biovalue” in the future (Waldby 2000; Waldby 2005). 
The interrelationship between health care, research, and commercial interests is based on 
“hybrid” networks of research involving public and private, academic, and patient-oriented 
actors. The connection between public research and biotech firms increases with more and 
more academics founding spin-off firms and patenting gene sequences for future commercial 
interests (Martin 2001). There is also a “hybridisation” of research with new networks 
integrating public funding and research, biotech firms, and organisations of people with specific 
“genetic conditions”. For example, the German project “Kompetenznetzwerke” (networks of 
competence), which has been built up by the Ministry for Education and Research since 1999, is 
systematically integrating patient groups and biotech-firms into its research 
(www.kompetenznetze-medizin.de). Also the Genetic Interest Group in the UK, a relevant 
lobby organisation for genetic research, is not only a representation of self-help groups, but also 
a hybrid network of commercial and public research (www.gig.org.uk/members.htm; cf. Lemke 
2004). 
“Association” and epidemiological research on genetic risk factors, on which the development 
of genetic testing relies, depend on access to large collections of tissues, blood, or DNA-
samples. Hence, the current boom of new biobank projects forms another important context of 
                                               
12 Steindor shows that first, the predictability of the test is not very high: The tested HFE-gene mutation is only one 
genetic defect attributed to hemacromatosis. Second, only between one and fifty percent of those with a homozygotic 
HFE-mutation will really develop the disease during their life. Third, the diagnosis of the disease is easily performed 
through routine blood tests when there are manifest symptoms of the disease (Steindor 2005). 
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the regulation of genetic testing (GeneWatch UK 2001a; Gottweis 2005; Nationaler Ethikrat 
2002). Some biobank projects are building up new population-based collections (Gen-Ethischer 
Informationsdienst 2004/2005), for example the Biobank Project in the UK with its objective to 
collect half a million DNA samples in the whole population of Great Britain 
(www.ukbiobank.ac.uk), or on a smaller scale, the project Popgen in Germany that collects 
material from a regional population in Schleswig Holstein (Görlitzer 2004/2005; Wagenmann 
2004/2005). 
However, most research until now has depended on already existing collections within the 
public health care systems. For example, in Germany the already mentioned government project 
to build up networks of competence is investing into the integration and systematisation of 
existing samples of clinics and research projects focusing on certain diseases. The highly 
controversial biobank project in Iceland, organised by the Biotech-firm DeCode, is also based 
on already existing collections of samples in the Icelandic public health care system. Therefore, 
the current debate on genetic testing and screening is intrinsically linked to issues of 
confidentiality of data and informed consent concerning test results and DNA-samples resulting 
from the testing procedures (Feuerlein 2003/2004b; Nationaler Ethikrat 2002; Steindor 2005). 
Considering the great importance the public health systems‟ collections have for public and 
private research, it is easily understandable why access and use of genetic information is 
intrinsically linked to the debates on regulating genetic testing (Gen-Ethischer 
Informationsdienst 2004/2005; Human Genetics Commission 2002a; Nationaler Ethikrat 
2004a). Generally, there is little resistance within public health care systems against enabling 
such access. Furthermore, as already mentioned in the context of laboratories, the politics of 
laboratories are inconsistent with respect to the confidentiality of data or informed consent – 
and pose a challenge for governance of data protection and research policies: They often do not 
clarify whether they open their collections to research (OECD 2005). 
 
Patenting 
Patenting and its regulation are another important aspect of the “econoscapes” of human 
genetics. The possibility to patent DNA sequences has been a highly contested political issue 
since the 1990s, when the European Union‟s patent guidelines were debated and confronted by 
campaigns such as “no patent on life”. Nevertheless, in 1998 the European Parliament adopted 
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these guidelines (Directive 98/44/EC) followed by the UK government in 2000, and in a more 
restrictive version by the German parliament in 2004. 
Again, we need to distinguish between the direct perspective on patenting the respective genetic 
tests themselves, and the implications of patenting genetic data in a broader sense for policies 
surrounding genetic testing. According to Hopkins and Nightingale, using intellectual property 
rights in the marketing of tests is not a very widespread practice because public health systems 
are the main market of testing (Hopkins & Nightingale 2004). The most famous case is the 
already mentioned case of Myriad Genetics which patented the genes BRCA1 and 2 linked to 
breast cancer. This patent, with the license fees it implicates, has raised the cost for a single test, 
for example, in Germany from 1500 Euro to 5000 Euro (Institute Curie 2005).13 Despite of the 
relative reluctance to introduce patents on genetic tests until now, the recent OECD study 
observes an increasing availability of patents on genetic tests and “evidence that some genetic testing 
service providers are withdrawing some patented tests from the „menu‟ they make available” (OECD 2005: 11). 
A study of Schissel et al. shows that patents on tests themselves have negative impacts on 
access, cost, and quality of tests (Schissel et. al. 1999; referred to in OECD 2002: 69). 
However, more important in this context than the direct patenting of genetic testing procedures 
is the more general background that patenting human gene sequences is in fact a common 
practice in human genetics research. This background is important when considering the moti-
vations for doing broader screening procedures and storing samples from tests. The journal 
Science estimated in October 2005 that 4,382 of 23,688 genes registered by the National Centre 
for Biotechnological Information were patented in the United States alone, 63% of them by 
private companies. Various genes are covered not only by one but by various patents (Jensen & 
Murray 2005). 
The interest of health and research ministries to promote human genetics by spreading genetic 
testing in the health care system and thereby emphasising this type of medical knowledge needs 
to be linked to the economic promises of a growing biotech-industry, which is securing its 
future markets and possibilities by patenting genes. That is why laboratories and screening 
projects, as for example Popgen, are usually not explicitly abandoning the right to derive patent 
                                               
13 Another example is the patent on the gene linked to Chorea Huntington. In March 2003 the General Hospital 
Corporation (USA) gained the patent (EP 614977) and hence the right to license all applications of this gene in 
diagnostics and therapeutic products (cf. www.1000fragen.de/dialog/diskussion/pate.php?gid=68). 
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rights as possible outcome of research conducted on their collected samples (Feuerlein 
2003/2004a; Wagenmann 2004/2005). 
 
Biotech-industry as a vulnerable project 
To emphasise economic and commercial research interests as background of the promotion of 
genetic testing through the channels of public health systems does not mean denying the crisis 
moments of this industry. The trend of the 1990s, when there was a boom of biotech-firms 
which then merged into huge pharmaceutical and agrochemical corporations, has reverted since 
the change of the millennium and today we rather see a trend to decartelise the agro- and 
pharmaceutical sectors (GeneWatch UK 2002, 2003c, 2004b). Partly this trend might be 
interpreted as reaction to the increasing public mistrust concerning especially green 
biotechnologies and GM Food production (see work package 6). The future of genetic testing 
markets is by no means certain, on the contrary public mistrust in general, but also the 
increasing gap between diagnosis and therapy generate a certain sense of crisis. There is no 
imminent prospect of new therapies surfacing that correspond to genetic tests, and there has 
been a certain backlash in the “economies of hope” due to various scandals in gene therapy 
projects in the recent years. One of these scandals occurred in 2002 when a French gene therapy 
project led to two children developing leukaemia. Subsequently, critiques demanded more 
restriction and higher degrees of control of such experiments (Pollack 2003). Some years before 
in 1999, the death of eighteen year old Jesse Gelsinger as a human subject in a gene therapy trial 
had already caused a major crisis of public trust in medical trials and gene therapy in the US 
(http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/medicine/genetherapy.shtml). 
An indicator of such crisis is further the fact that biotech enterprises today often undertake “risk 
evaluations” before they market gene tests, trying to measure public mistrust in order to not 
cause scandals. For example, Hopkins and Nightingale explain the preference of genetic test 
producers not to market tests directly but mainly through the NHS as expression of such a risk 
avoiding strategy (Hopkins & Nightingale 2004). 
Despite the enormous problems in scientific knowledge production there are strong economic 
reasons for research to continue the “genohype” as genomics is still a terrain with high capital 
inflows and high state (on both national and European Union level) investment. However, the 
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future of these investments and the future of biotech industries are uncertain and contingent on 
the development of corresponding therapies and on the broad acceptance and implementation 
of individualised and “pre-symptomatic” medicine in future health care systems or privatised 
services. Therefore, the “colonisation of the future”, the production of future health care 
scenarios has itself become an important part of the governance of genetic testing (see “politics 
of time” in chapter 4). 
 
3. Narrative Topographies 
How to tell the story of the politics of genetic testing when there is a lack of strong dislocatory 
moments or disruptive events in which change culminates and can be studied in a focused way? 
How present an account of rather creeping changes and simultaneous heterogeneous settings? 
This heterogeneity concerns national settings, the different applications of genetic testing and 
different sites of governance. Comparative studies on the biotechnology regimes in different 
countries already have pointed out that there is a strong difference between the governance 
arrangements of biotechnologies in Germany and Austria, where regulatory state-led governance 
schemes are strong – and civil society organisations are operating rather separately from the 
state. In the UK, this separation is less clear – the flexible governance scheme of arm‟s length 
bodies integrates, centralises, and channels the efforts of civil society organisations to a greater 
degree (Dryzek et al. 2003). Jasanoff concludes that in the UK policies are more flexible, 
oriented on the “process”, while German policies are more governed by “program”, by more 
categorical lines (Jasanoff 2005). However, the following narrative has not been written as a 
national comparison in a strict sense, because commonalities and differences are cross-cutting 
national borders and also depend on the different applications of genetic testing (PND, PGD, 
or predictive medicine) and sites of governance. We will stress commonalities, but point out 
differences whenever necessary – which is especially relevant for the regulation of PGD. We will 
approach the construction of narratives in the following way. 
First, we subdivide the time scale into three historical phases concerning the governance of 
genetic testing and identify general changes between them: the 1980s, the 1990s, the millennium 
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change (with some more dense developments concerning PGD and new governance 
arrangements in Germany and the UK) and current policies. 
The second subdivision concerns the different areas of genetic testing we are studying: PND, 
PGD and “predictive medicine”. We begin the narrative with the 1980s general debate on 
“genetic engineering” considering all three topics combined. Following this, we will subdivide 
the narrative with respect to three different settings in order to account for the specialisation 
and segmentation of debates. 
The intensity of political debates, the regulatory schemes and the public energy fields with 
respect to these three different research topics have shifted over time. Therefore, we start the 
specific narratives in the 1990s with the governance of PND (and add remarks on its 
developments until today), because this was an important phase of routinisation and 
transformation of political approaches toward PND. Then we continue with the millennium 
change and the developments of the public energy field concerning PGD, because in this period 
PGD was subject of dense political discussions which in part generated institutional reforms 
too. Finally we conclude our synchronic/diachronic mix of narratives with the governance of 
“predictive medicine” because of the expanding political discourse regarding its regulation that 
has developed in recent years. 
These stories, however, are not neatly separated because the different debates overlap. The 
question of whether and how the processes we study are embedded in a “geneticisation” of 
health and body politics, of knowledge production on “life”, binds all the stories together. 
At the same time, the way of telling the story has been a contested political issue itself. For 
example, some stories present the development of PND and PGD as inseparably linked to one 
another, emphasising the common dimension of selection and excluding “genetic disorders” in 
the process of procreation, while other stories would clearly separate them. 
There are also a lot of overlapping dimensions in the three narratives with respect to regulatory 
events or formal governance arrangements, insofar as they concern the whole map of politics on 
human genetics. For example the reform of the advisory system in 1999 in the UK has affected 
all the political debates on human genetics. To some extent that was also true for the debate on 
a proposed law on genetic diagnosis in Germany in 2004 (although centred in “post-natal” 
testing) (Bundesministerium für Gesundheit und Soziales 2004). 
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This overlapping of our three stories on genetic testing can also be observed in our micro-
political approaches to those exemplary participatory governance arrangements or participatory 
governance experiments we have studied more intensely and will emphasise on in the narrative 
regarding various aspects: 
In the UK we focused the empirical research on the Human Genetics Commission (HGC), a 
new advisory body established in 1999 and linked to the Department of Health. The HGC has 
made strong efforts to promote elements of participatory governance in the last years by 
conducting consultations, citizen juries, and opinion polls bundling the debates on genetic 
testing. More specifically, we concentrate our analysis on its consultation process on repro-
genetics, and its resulting “Making Babies”-report (Human Genetics Commission 2004; Human 
Genetics Commission 2006). This report was published in the same week when researcher 
Susanne Schultz interviewed members of the HGC and representatives of NGOs in London in 
the end of January 2006. 
In Germany, we picked two experiments of participatory governance which are much more 
disconnected from the state than in the UK, but represent new practices of “Bürgerbeteiligung” 
(citizen participation – public engagement). We refer to the internet forum on bioethics called 
1000fragen.de organised by the Aktion Mensch since 2002, a big welfare NGO for disabled 
people. This has been a very visible public relations campaign and is particularly accessible for 
research because of its transparency through the website (www.1000fragen.de). 
Second, we analyse a youth conference on genetic testing in Leipzig called “Die nächste 
GENeration” (the next GENEration) in which Susanne Schultz participated on the 19th of May 
2006 (www.gen-diskussion.de). This has given us the opportunity to use the methodology of 
participative observation and to develop insights into a project that was evoking deliberation and 
constructing a specific political subject, the “youth” as an abstract, lay public. 
In Austria we focus on the citizen conference “genetic data: from where, whereto, what for?” 
(BürgerInnenkonferenz “Genetische Daten: woher, wohin, wozu?”), which was organised by the 
Austrian Council for Research and Technology development, an advisory body to the 
government, in Vienna in June 2003. 
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3.1. 1980s protest against “genetic engineering” benefit/risk assessment and 
new regulatory arrangements 
We begin our narrative with a general picture of the 1980s policies setting towards genetic 
testing. The 1980s were marked on the one hand by public protest against “genetic engineering”, 
influenced by social movements of that time, on the other hand by the establishment of 
technology assessment regimes. These regimes were based on the idea that above all scientific 
and legal, but also – as a beginning trend – philosophical experts could manage these new 
challenges. Their task was to elaborate a balanced analysis of benefits and risks in order to 
evaluate the impact of genetic engineering for society as a whole and for its larger future 
prospects. 
Until the end of the 1980s and beginning 1990s these risk-and-benefits-frameworks contributed 
to the establishment of highly country-specific regulatory frameworks that have influenced the 
governance of genetic testing through today. They vary extremely and range from a pragmatic, 
flexible case by case management in the UK to a combination of professional self-regulation and 
statutory law as dominant regulatory instruments in Austria and Germany. 
In the 1980s the contemporary, but even more so the potential future implications of human 
genetics became a subject of heated political debates ignited by social movements. Basically, the 
debates in the 1980s had a more general focus compared to today‟s specialised agendas 
(Interview 27-3 2005). They addressed the future potentialities of human genetic engineering 
and oppositional movements evoked apocalyptical negative utopias and scenarios (“brave new 
world”, “total surveillance state”, “production of human beings” etc.) oftentimes based on 
deterministic ideas about the implications of technological change for society (Kontos 1985; 
Schultz 1996). These debates focused mainly on the field of reproductive technologies. The 
birth of the first “test-tube baby” Louise Brown in the UK in 1978 (Steptoe & Edwards 1978) 
and the increasing possibilities of PND provoked concerns about the contents and 
consequences of human genetic counselling and about abortion practices following PND. In the 
UK, pro-life movements connected their protest against the new technologies with their moral 
objections against abortion. In the following, we will show the different governance schemes 
resulting from these different social conflict settings on genetic engineering in the countries 
studied. 
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In Germany, in the 1980s a broad range of feminist groups and organisations of disabled people 
centred their actions on a radical critique of reproductive technologies and genetic engineering 
(Bradish et al. 1989; Die Grünen im Bundestag 1985). The main frame within which feminist 
groups presented their arguments could be termed an “oppression frame”, including the 
argument that women were made victims of medicalisation and that the capacities of the female 
body were being dis-appropriated by (male) medical experts who sought access to and control 
over procreation and the uterus, human eggs and embryos. But also anti-eugenic and anti-
capitalist positions developed in this context. They were pushed forward above all by 
organisations of disabled people, especially by the radical movement which called itself the 
“movement of cripples”.14 These groups regarded PND and selective abortion as a modern 
form of eugenics and the new possibilities of genetic testing as an instrument to serve as 
utilitarian strategies for capitalist purposes, that is to enhance the “quality” of the future labour 
force or of the national population. 
The issue of abortion after PND caused some dissent between the feminist movement and the 
disabled people´s movement. Positions ranged from the feminist claim that women have the 
right of self-determination, meaning the right to abortion, when pregnant with a disabled child 
up to rigorous anti-abortion pro-life positions within the movement of disabled people. But 
inside these movements a position promoted by some disabled feminist women evolved that 
sought to combine women‟s right to self-determination with an anti-eugenic critique of selective 
practices such as PND (Degener & Köbsell 1992). Militant movements engaged in these issues 
as well. The feminist guerrilla group Rote Zora invaded laboratories and published papers about 
biotechnological research projects, which they had seized in their assaults (Bürobert et al. 1996: 
99; Rote Zora 1989). These radical movements had a considerable political impact in that they 
were a starting point for the German debates on reprogenetics and biomedicine. They remain 
influential as being embedded in social movements that were the historical background of 
several NGOs15, experts, and social researchers until today. 
                                               
14 The journal “Randschau” and its predecessors (“Krüppelzeitung”, “Luftpumpe”) are an interesting source when 
studying this movement (www.martinseidler.privat.t-online.de/randschau.htm). 
15 Gen-Archiv Essen, Bioskop, Gen-ethisches Netzwerk, Aktion Mensch, Institut Mensch, Ethik und Wissenschaft, 
Netzwerk gegen Selektion in der Pränataldiagnostik and other institutions and organisations were founded in continuity 
of these movements or need to be analysed against the background of these movements.  
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In these years the issue of human genetic engineering gave rise to a new type of institutions, 
namely advisory bodies on ethics (Damm 2004; Wildfeuer 1993). In 1984, the “Benda 16 
Commission” named after its chair, Ernst Benda, was established in order to advice 
policymakers on ethical and legal questions of IVF, gene therapy and embryo transfer. The 
Commission published a report in 1985 (Bundesminister für Forschung und Technologie 
1985) 17 . In 1987 a Parliamentary Study Commission (Enquete-Kommission), which is a 
commission composed one half each by parliamentarians and experts, was established on “risks 
and benefits of genetic technology”, thereby expressing the dominant frame at that time, namely 
the “risks and benefits” frame (Enquetekommission Chancen und Risiken der Gentechnologie 
1987). These commissions worked on the basis of a frame that was different from that of the 
social movements in that the former referred to the idea that positive and harmful consequences 
of the new technologies for society as a whole could be evaluated and balanced, thus arriving at 
an optimum middle course.18 One of the consequences of these processes was the establishment 
of the Office for Technology Assessment (Büro für Technikfolgenabschätzung) in the German 
Parliament in 1990. Also, in 1990 the first important legal act setting the regulatory frame for 
reproductive technologies and indirectly for repro-genetics was passed in Germany, the Embryo 
Protection Act (Embryonenschutzgesetz), still in place through today. It provides penalties for 
the artificial fertilisation of an egg cell for other purposes than causing a pregnancy of the 
woman who the egg cell was taken from. Further, it prohibits any “consumptive” research on 
human embryos, thereby indirectly prohibiting PGD through today. 
 
In Austria, similarly, no explicit regulation for PGD developed in these years. Neither the 
reproductive medicine law (1992) (Fortpflanzungsmedizingesetz) nor the gene technology law 
(1994) regulate PGD explicitly. However, jurists agree that reproductive medicine law implicitly 
prohibits PGD in most cases because its § 9 states that the examination of developable cells, 
sperms or human eggs, respectively, is only allowed if examination and treatment are necessary 
                                               
16 Chairman was the ex-president of the German Constitutional Court, Ernst Benda. 
17 The commission was an inter-ministerial working group of the Ministry for Research and Technology and the Ministry 
of Justice. 
18 The Benda Commission evaluated prenatal diagnosis on the positive side as an enhancement to the protection of 
health and life and as a possibility of preparing therapies for newborns, but on the negative side as a technology that 
could contribute to the discrimination of disabled people or could develop into a problematic routine practice 
(Wildfeuer 1993). 
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to bring about pregnancy. However, since polar body does not serve conception, this ban does 
not cover polar body biopsy. In addition, no consensus exists between jurists about the coverage 
of the ban, in particular with regards to the clause “to bring about pregnancy”. Some jurists 
argue that the law has to interpreted as a total ban of PGD, others that PGD is allowed and a 
third group thinks that PGD might be allowed if the test focuses on genetic anomalies that 
inhibit pregnancy. However, one has to bear in mind that PGD is only allowed in cases of in-
vitro-Fertilisation and the reproductive medicine law strictly constricts the relevant techniques to 
the treatment of infertility. Thus it is prohibited to carry out IVF for the only reason to conduct 
PGD without an indication to circumvent infertility. Breach of the law is considered as petty 
offence and penalised with a fine of € 36.000. (Bioethikkommission beim Bundeskanzleramt 
2004: 19ff). 
In the UK, a controversial debate on the issue of reproductive technologies and human genetics 
evolved in the mid 1980s – however leading to the establishment of a very different, less 
restrictive and more flexible regulatory regime which is also in place through today. In 1982, the 
UK government authorised a Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology, 
headed by the moral philosopher Baroness Mary Warnock, whose remit it was to develop a 
proposal for the regulation of assisted reproductive technologies. The Committee comprised 
scientific, religious, legal experts and lay members. The task of the inquiry committee was “to 
consider recent and potential developments”, “safeguards”, and “social, ethical and legal implications” (Ziegler 
2004: 66). 
In 1984, the committee published the Warnock Report which recommended the controlled and 
restricted permission of various aspects of assisted reproduction technologies (Eser et al. 1990: 
389).19 The Warnock committee had been established in the context of struggles in society over 
abortion and the pressure by conservative anti-abortion movements. Alfred Moore interprets it 
as a conscious reframing of reprogenetics issues, replacing the idea of grounding legal regulation 
on a “common morality”. Instead, it proposed a deliberative regime in order to keep regulatory 
possibilities open and flexible (Moore 2006). In the beginning, the Warnock Report was 
extremely contested (Mulkay 1997; Ziegler 2004: 68). Researchers opposed any intervention into 
their freedom of research and in 1986 established a “Voluntary Licensing Agency”, thereby 
                                               
19 There was no consensus in the committee. Three members voted against embryo research and four against the 
production of embryos for research.  
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opting for self-regulative mechanisms, whereas the majority in the parliament and in the public 
rejected the recommendations of the Warnock Report as being too permissive. A conservative 
lobby worked out the proposal of the Unborn Children (Protection) Bill (Eser et al. 1990: 393), 
which was confirmed by Parliament in the first reading, but then after delay did not pass. Similar 
to the German and Austrian legislation the Unborn Children (Protection) Bill would have made 
it an offence to fertilise an egg cell outside the womb unless it was destined for implantation to a 
woman and permission had been given by the Health Secretary. This bill, thereby, would also 
have prohibited PGD. But in the years after the Warnock Report, parliamentarian and public 
opinion changed. One important event in this context was the worldwide first successful 
pregnancy after PGD in the UK in 1989. During that time, the British Medical Journal 
euphorically evaluated: “The antenatal diagnosis of foetal defects is perhaps the greatest advance in perinatal 
medicine for generations” (quoted in Farrant 1985: 96). Ziegler comments that the promise that 
genetic screening of embryos will eventually lead to advances in gene therapy was also an 
important argument which influenced the public towards taking a more permissive attitude 
(Ziegler 2004: 73). 
By the end of the 1980s, after the experience of the Unborn Children (Protection) Bill, 
researchers too supported the recommendations of the Warnock committee. In 1989, in a White 
Paper the Health Ministry suggested future legislation that would follow the recommendations, 
opting for an independent licensing agency and thereby against professional self-regulation as 
well as against direct state control (Eser et al. 1990: 394) Also the Catholic Bishops Joint 
Committee on Bio-Ethical Issues favoured this form of regulation and a majority in the 
Anglican and Methodist Church accepted the definition of embryos as being “pre-embryo” until 
the 14th day from conception as recommended by the Warnock report (Ziegler 2004: 72). These 
recommendations became the law when the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
(HFEAct) was passed in 1990. 20  It constituted the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority (HFEA) as a body established in1991, which licenses and controls clinics offering 
reproductive technologies. The HFEA also has the authority to make decisions on a case to case 
basis when it comes to controversial practices such as exercising PGD for purposes of sex 
selection or the generation of a so-called saviour sibling. 
                                               
20 Documented at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1990/Ukpga_19900037_en_1.htm. 
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The cases of the UK, Austria, and Germany show that in the 1980s heterogeneous regulatory 
practices developed in Europe. In Germany and Austria, PGD was indirectly prohibited, while 
in the UK a sophisticated case by case regulation was established based on a new regulatory 
body. But there is less contrast, if we consider the developments in the case of PND. 
 
3.2. PND: Changing perceptions in the context of normalisation 
The following narrative on PND, starting in the 1990s, deals with the main field of 
“normalisation” and routinisation of genetic testing and the changing frames to explain and 
politically problematise the expanded application of prenatal genetic tests. The debates about 
PND are characterized by three main features: 
First, over time the attention paid to the modalities of individual decision-making by pregnant 
women has increased; their motives to use genetic tests, the institutional pressures on them, 
their need for counselling, and more profoundly the subjectivities developing in this context 
became increasingly important. This aspect will be fundamental for our analysis of changing 
concepts of “life” as we will further explore in chapter 4. Second, the concern about genetic 
testing as a selection practice by which the birth of people with “genetic disorders” can be 
avoided, thereby reintroducing eugenic ideas and practices, never quite disappears but persists 
through today. Third, the issues of abortion and the status of the embryo continue to be an 
important concern too. The regulatory framework developed and transformed above all in the 
1990s. In recent years, the more formal aspects of governance remained generally stable whereas 
the area of participatory governance exercises formed an area of dynamic development. 
Generally, the increasing routinisation of PND was not directly embedded in legal regulations, 
but in a system of professional self-regulatory practices within the health care system, which 
holds true for all countries under study here.  
 
Germany 
In Germany, the so-called maternity guidelines (Mutterschaftsrichtlinien), issued by a common 
committee by physicians and health insurance companies, recommend how to deal with PND 
tests and with counselling before and after doing the test (Bundesausschuss der Ärzte und 
Krankenkassen 2003). This commission also determines for which tests, how often and in which 
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cases the costs are covered by the health insurances. The application of PND, and in particular 
of amniocentesis, expanded enormously during the 1990s, a development that correlates with 
the increase in the varieties of tests the health insurances covered as well as the expanding 
indications for applying prenatal testing. In 1987, the commission issued that the costs of an 
amniocentesis would be covered for pregnant women age 35 and older; but in 1997 this barrier 
was dismissed too so that any pregnant woman who feels anxious about the genetic condition of 
her fetus has access to amniocentesis without having to pay for it (Enquete-Kommission Recht 
und Ethik der modernen Medizin 2002: 152-179). Genetic testing during pregnancy as well as 
abortion after PND became a routine, as already described in chapter 2. This process of 
normalisation was accompanied by a change in focus concerning the debates and controversies 
on PND in the 1990s. In the 1980s, techno-sceptical voices had been addressing pregnant 
women mostly as victims of institutions, medical experts, and research. This changed during the 
1990s when it became clear that pregnant women were actively and voluntarily using both PND 
as well as the new methods of assisted reproduction such as IVF. Their complex motivations to 
do so began to interest social researchers (e.g., Fränznick & Wieners 1996) and also became the 
subject of a broader public debate. In this context, the call for a prohibition of PND started to 
lose ground in feminist debates and also to some extent within the disabled people‟s movements 
(Interview 27-3 2005). 21  At the same time, the intermediate political position to support 
women‟s right to abortion while opposing selection through PND was developed further by 
some groups, in particular by the Network against Selection in Prenatal Diagnosis in Germany 
(Netzwerk gegen Selektion in der Pränataldiagnostik) which was founded in 1995 
(www.netzwerk-praenataldiagnostik.de). 
A revision of abortion law in the 1990s in Germany contributed in a specific unintended way to 
the process of normalization and routinization of PND and ensuing abortions. After German 
unification, abortion law had to be renegotiated since there had been huge differences between 
the abortion laws in the two German states before. One of the outcomes was that the critique 
on eugenic aspects of abortion practices in the context of PND was incorporated into the new 
abortion law in that it did not include the previous “embryo-pathological” indication for 
abortion anymore. This indication had allowed abortions up to the 22nd week of pregnancy if the 
                                               
21 This discursive change, for example, becomes obvious in the form how people deliberated in the 1000fragen.de 
internet forum. Only 22 percent of the contributions on PND, PGD, and “desired children” (“Wunschkinder”) 
consisted of a resolute statement (Waldschmidt et al. 2006). 
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fetus had been diagnosed as genetically or otherwise “defect”. In contrast, abortions for other 
reasons had been legal only up to the 12th week of pregnancy. The legislators considered this 
difference to be discriminatory and abolished it. The unintended consequence, however, was 
that selective abortions continued to take place but were now subsumed under the category 
“medical indication”. In case of a medical indication, meaning that the life or the health of the 
mother is endangered by the pregnancy, an abortion can be not only exempt from punishment 
but legal and the woman does not have to undergo counselling, in contrast to cases in which she 
is seeking an abortion due to “social distress”. In addition, there is no time limit for performing 
an abortion falling into this category.  Women having learned that their fetus was diagnosed as 
genetically defect would thus get access to a legal abortion even in the second or third trimester 
of pregnancy, provided they  argue that having a disabled child would endanger their mental 
health. This soon became a wide-spread practice. In the end of the 1990s, the conservative 
parties CDU and CSU started several attempts to restrict the practice of late-term abortions and 
organisations of and for disabled people issued position papers criticizing this practice 
(Lebenshilfe 1999).  
Another influential juridical event that further contributed to the pervasiveness of PND was a 
decision by the German Constitutional Court in 1997 on “wrongful birth”. The Court sided 
with the parents of a disabled child who claimed that their gynaecologist had not counselled 
them adequately about the options of prenatal diagnosis – by which they could have avoided the 
birth of the child. The gynaecologist was sentenced to pay alimony for the child (Riedel 2003). 
In order to protect themselves against such law suites, gynaecologists now have to recommend 
prenatal genetic testing at any rate. 
 
UK 
In the UK, there has been no dramatic change in the legal regulation of PND during the 1990s. 
The UK‟s Abortion Act had been established as early as 1967 and allows abortion up to the 24th 
week of pregnancy – and without time limit if the woman‟s life is at risk or if “there is a substantial 
risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously 
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handicapped” (quoted from: Human Genetics Commission 2006)22. Hence, it did not establish 
limitations for the practice of PND combined with abortion. Furthermore, PND has expanded 
gradually culminating recently in the announcement of the Department of Health (DoH) to 
screen all pregnant women for the Down‟s syndrome (Department of Health 2003: 42). 
During the 1990s, a set of new advisory bodies emerged with relevance to genetic testing. 
Generally, the bioethical approach to the issue of human genetics was strengthened in 1991 by 
the foundation of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics. Although it was founded by private charity 
foundations (the Nuffield Trust and the Welcome Trust) and not formally embedded in the 
state, this Council has since functioned as an institutional equivalent to the national ethics 
councils in other countries (Moore 2006; Jasanoff 2005: 171-202; Fuchs 2005: 32). As early as in 
1993 it published its report “Genetic Screening: Ethical Issues” (Nuffields Council on Bioethics 
1993) discussing “benefits and disadvantages of screening programmes - for individuals, families and society in 
general” (ibid: 87) – and debated the “general risk of a stigma of attaching or being attached for those being 
perceived as genetically disadvantaged” (ibid: iv). The report recommended a balanced assessment for 
“society in general” and flexible regulations at the same time, because “no-one can lay down fixed 
and immutable guidelines for the future of genetic screening”, thus aiming at keeping the door open for 
future screening programs. Further, it proposed “ethical” criteria for a legitimate application of 
PND, such as adequate counselling, confidentiality, and informed consent. 
This approach of regulatory flexibility towards human genetics was further developed in the 
Science and Technology Committee‟s report “Human Genetics: The Science and its 
Consequences” in 1995 (House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 1995). It 
proposed the construction of new advisory bodies to establish regulatory mechanisms for 
various dimensions of human genetics. 
However, the pro life movement re-gained momentum during the 1990s too. In 1994, 
Comment on Reproductive Ethics (CORE) was founded in order to promote the conservative 
pro life opposition towards reproductive technologies, engaging especially against abortion after 
PND and the liberal UK regulation of PGD (Interview 22-3 2006). It aims "to facilitate informed 
                                               
22 The Abortion Act does not apply for Northern Ireland, where abortion is still illegal. 
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and balanced debate” and explains “the absolute respect for the human embryo” as “a principal tenet” 
(www.corethics.org). 
In the movement of disabled people during the 1990s diverging positions evolved: While some 
radical groups continued to campaign against Nazi-eugenics, the British Council of Disabled 
People (BCODP), for example, developed a more moderate position, criticising further 
investment into PND rather than PND in general (Shakespeare 1999). Paradigmatic for these 
changes is the example of Tom Shakespeare, an important activist of the movement, who 
changed his position from a vehement critique of eugenics in the context of PND to a much 
more moderate position in favour of a dialogue between disabled people, people using PND, 
and human geneticists (Schneider 2002). 
In Austria PND is a common practice of antenatal care; little disputed in the public and the me-
dia. PND in general is governed by standards of “good medical practice” only (Wieser 2006: 
166) and no special legal regulation exists. Thus PND is legally allowed within the general frame 
of medical treatment (especially information and consent). Pre-natal predictive genetic testing, 
however, is covered by the Gene Technology Act (Bioethikkommission 2004: 71). The Austrian 
penal code, which came into effect in 1975, constitutes a general prohibition of abortion (§ 96 
(3)), but at the same time defines several important exceptions from punishment: firstly, if the 
intervention is carried out within a three months‟ period after the beginning of pregnancy (§ 97 
(1) 1); secondly, even after this period, in cases of medical, eugenic or ethical indication (§ 97 (1) 
2). 
 
Public concerns about PND in recent years 
In recent years, PND has turned into a widely accepted practice in the countries under study and 
stopped being a dense public energy field. Even critics of PND and selective abortions do not 
dare to challenge the regulatory frame of PND fundamentally. For Germany, one interview 
partner, a long standing activist and researcher in this field, explains that one reason for critics 
not to debate the regulatory framework of PND was that they wanted to avoid the risk of 
challenging existing abortion law: 
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“Since the new regulation on abortion the topic has been sort of dead: Nobody dares to touch it, to demand a new 
juridical regulation of PND, because that would mean to re-open the exasperating discussion of abortion” 
(Interview 27-3 2005). 
Nevertheless, there have been dispersed moments and spaces where the debate on PND 
continued to circulate, be it in expert circles or in participatory experiments. Generally, we can 
identify three main concerns dominating these enduring debates: the quality of counselling, pro-
life motivated debates on late-term abortion, and an ongoing broader public unease toward the 
eugenic or selective implications of PND. 
One recurrent point of discussion is how counselling services in the context of PND should be 
improved. We suggest that the interest in counselling practices can be understood in the context 
of the expanding knowledge production about the modalities of individual decision-making 
concerning PND. As we explained in chapter 2, the expansion of PND services has not always 
been accompanied by a corresponding expansion of counselling services (see chapter 2). For this 
reason, the feminist network Reprokult in Germany focused their efforts on the question of 
counselling when the proposed law on genetic diagnosis was negotiated (but not approved) in 
2004 and 2005. Through political lobby work they achieved that the obligation of gynaecological 
practitioners to inform pregnant women about the possibilities of psychosocial counselling 
before consenting to PND (Interview 5-3 2006) was established in the law proposal – which, 
except for this point, did not place a lot of emphasis on the issue of PND, however 
(Wagenmann 2005). The Parliamentary Study Commission on Ethics and Law of Modern 
Medicine also contributed to that debate. While their main focus at the time was not on repro-
genetics (see below with respect to PGD), the Commission nevertheless organised a hearing in 
2005, troubled by the increasing privatisation of PND as privately paid extra service. Further, 
the youth conference in Leipzig in May 2006 intensively discussed the question of adequate 
counselling. Various youth groups dealt with PND by questioning the problematic psychosocial 
situation of pregnant women confronted with the possibilities of PND, and the catalogue of 
demands that the young people set up called for a “comprehensive counselling before and after every 
genetic test” (www.gen-diskussion.de). Likewise, in the UK context the Consultation Paper on 
reproductive decision-making emphasised questions around the models and quality of 
counselling as one of the main issues for public dialogue (Human Genetics Commission 2004: 
29). 
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While these debates on counselling mostly circulated in expert-oriented debates and 
participatory experiments, the issue of late term abortion also received some attention by the 
media in the last years. It is connected to PND insofar as abortion after amniocentesis often 
takes place late in pregnancy. Since neonatal care has improved the survival rates of premature 
infants considerably, some of these "aborted" fetuses (abortion at this point of time means 
induced labour) would have a chance for survival if they were taken care of. Responding to this 
situation, the new German government included the promise to regulate late-term abortion in its 
2005 coalition contract. In the UK, in 2006 a MORI opinion poll reintroduced the issue to a 
broader political debate (Campbell & Hinsliff 2006). 
In recent years the question of late-term abortion received some attention also in Austria. The 
discussion however remained in small circles of experts23 and activists and ended soon in the 
usual tracks of the Austrian abortion debate (Griessler/Hadolt 2006). 
These uprising problematisations of late-term abortions have been interpreted by some as 
attempts by pro-lifers to revitalize the anti-abortion debate (Interviews 5-3 2006, 14-3 2006, 26-3 
2006). One interview partner from the Institut Mensch, Ethik, Wissenschaft (IMEW) in Berlin 
explains that the different approaches – the conservative attack on abortion in the context of 
PND and late-term abortion on the one hand and the call for psychosocial counselling before 
and after PND on the other– reflect the difference of critiques toward PND very clearly: 
“That is the conflict between those debating critically the issue of PND. The question is: where is the right 
moment to intervene. Feminist positions have always emphasised that the supply with genetic tests is the critical 
point, because here the pressures to decide are becoming effective. Those who want to protect the unborn life are 
intervening at the moment of abortion. In my view this is the central contradiction in the current political 
development: There is the offer [of PND services] that is suggesting that it pertains to a responsible decision not 
to have a disabled child – and than they judge women morally when they abort – that is too simple.” (Interview 
5-3, 2006) 
 
                                               
23 See, e.g., a symposium in Salzburg in 2006 on late term abortion. 
http://www.virgil.at/de/bildungszentrum/1044556130/1141283565/, 20.10.2006 
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The third ongoing concern keeping the debate on PND alive without directly calling for 
regulatory reforms is the ongoing diffuse public unease regarding the selective dimension of 
PND. Certainly, today the commitment to individual bodily autonomy is nearly a hegemonic 
position (except for pro-life groups) and the call to ban genetic counselling and genetic testing 
altogether, as many groups had demanded in the 1980s, has lost ground since. Nevertheless, 
various participatory governance experiments in the last years have shown that on a different 
level, concerns about eugenic practices or eugenic social developments persist.  
For example, in Germany a Consensus Conference on Genetic Diagnosis was initiated by the 
Ministry of Education and Research and organised by the Hygiene Museum Dresden in 2001 
(Deutsches Hygienemuseum Dresden 2002). The organizers invited 19 citizens, selected through 
a random process, to deliberate on various aspects of genetic testing during a course of several 
days. With regard to PND, the 19 participating citizens came to the following conclusion: “We 
are extremely concerned that PND has expanded so much in the last years”. Further, they criticised the 
untenable promise of getting “healthy” children and the social pressure on women “to deliver a 
quality product” (Schicktanz & Naumann 2003: 89). 
These concerns became even more salient in the internet forum 1000fragen.de organised by 
Aktion Mensch, a huge organization for and by people with disabilities, which revealed that 
there is a pervasive range of concerns and fears in the public. The 1000fragen campaign basically 
collected questions from citizens about reprogenetics and biomedicine in a very broad sense. 
These questions were published on the internet and some of them in an advertisement campaign 
by Aktion Mensch. In a second round, prominent figures from the public sphere such as public 
intellectuals, actors, politicians and others were asked to comment on these questions with their 
comments being published too. Most of the 8,500 questions collected from citizens referred to 
the topic of the “(im)perfect human being” – and a lot of references were made to the issue of 
“selection”, linking genetic testing practices to social tendencies of eugenics (Aktion Mensch 
2003; Waldschmidt et al. 2006). 
Again, during the youth conference in Leipzig, a recurrent topic concerning PND was that 
genetic testing might imply the idea of human beings being considered a “Fehlkonstruktion” 
(mis-construction). Posters were developed with slogans such as: “With or without handicap, it 
doesn‟t matter to us” or “You are special, for how much longer” or “GENug GENormt” (enough with 
standardisation). 
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Another conspicuous feature of the recent PND debates is the increasing reaction to these 
concerns, aiming to channel, control, and discredit the ongoing public unease towards PND. A 
sphere of strong reaction is academic social research. There are a lot of attempts to challenge 
and question the interpretation that PND forms the continuation of eugenics. Rose and 
Rabinow, for instance, emphasize the differences between the “old biopolitics” and the “new 
biopolitics” we see today. They refer to the voluntary character of PND today and insist that 
these practices today do not refer to the quality of a national population or even less to “race” 
(Rabinow & Rose 2003, see chapter 4). There are a lot of studies emphasising the complexity of 
individual motivations and reasons to undergo genetic testing (e.g., Heath et al. 2004; van den 
Daele 2005; see chapter 4). Also, in the last years we can observe strong efforts within the 
advisory system in the UK to discredit the analysis of current applications of genetic diagnosis as 
a continuity of eugenic traditions. Interestingly, for example, the predominant focus of the 
consultation leading to the “Making Babies”-report was directed at the question of persisting 
eugenics with the aim formulated by the HGC “to debunk some of the myths in this area” (Human 
Genetics Commission 2004: 19). This consultation process was linked to the recent 
commitment of the Department of Health to expand screening for Down‟s syndrome to all 
women, irrespective of age (Department of Health 2003), against which there had been some 
protest (GeneWatch UK 2004a). 
 
3.3. PGD: a public energy field around the millennium change: regulatory 
changes and new participatory governance experiments 
In contrast to PND which is mainly governed by professional self-regulation – and by the 
paradigm of guided individual self-steering –, the governance of PGD is linked to an intense 
debate on the role of modern statecraft and new forms of formal governance arrangements. 
PGD can in all cases be interpreted as an experimental field with – at some historical moments 
– strong controversial energy flows, as a public energy field that could be linked to the 
establishment of new advisory bodies or new bioethics councils around the millennium change. 
Hence, the debates on PGD became the occasion of further establishing and institutionalising 
the process of “ethicisation” of the debate on human genetics and reproductive technologies 
(see chapter 4). However, the forms of governance established in the different countries have 
been quite heterogeneous. In Austria and Germany, due to the existing the ban on PGD which 
had been established in the beginning 1990s the debate focussed on the question of whether or 
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not to legalise PGD at all and on the pros and cons of such deregulation. In the UK, in contrast, 
the application of PGD was governed by a flexible case-by-case mode of decision-making 
employed by the HFEA and public debate was much more pragmatically oriented. In this 
context, debates did not revolve around the general acceptability of PGD but focused on 
specific conditions and situations of its application – allowing a gradual shift of boundaries to-
ward an ever more permissive regulation. 
Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis is the most controversial practice among the three appli-
cations of genetic testing under study here. The intensity of this public energy field, however, is 
not related to the width of current applications of these practices, which in fact are still quite 
rare (chapter 2). Rather, as an interviewee put it, “it pushes some very sensitive buttons of some 
individuals, on both sides” (Interview 13-3 2006). These debates have involved a lot of actors, 
media, formal governance institutions, and NGOs in the last years and (with the exception of 
Austria) went beyond expert circles – evoking controversies as well on the topic of “designer 
babies” (or “Baby nach Katalog” – baby selection from a catalogue) as on the status of the 
embryo. The PGD debates were especially dense around the millennium change and linked to a 
change in formal governance arrangements: 
Around the millennium change in Germany, PGD formed a field of controversial debate and 
controversial institutionalisation of expertise and counter-expertise within formal governance 
arrangements (Braun, K. 2005, Braun & Herrmann 2001). The debate was initiated by the 
Bundesärztekammer (Federal Medical Association), which in 1999 published draft guidelines 
recommending the legalisation of PGD in certain cases and the establishment of certain 
governance procedures to process these cases (Bundesärztekammer 2000). This lead the newly 
elected government of Social Democrats and Greens and its Minister of Health, Andrea Fischer 
(The Greens), to react by proposing a new law on reproductive medicine that should clarify the 
matter. The intention of Minister Fischer was clearly to incorporate a legal ban on PGD into the 
prospective law on reproductive medicine. Fischer, however, took an unusual way, not just 
drafting a law but initiating a huge public deliberation process on the matters at stake first. She 
convened a huge symposium with some hundreds of experts from different disciplines and 
professions, not only physicians and scientists, but also midwives, counsellors, social workers 
and so on, among them many critics of PND and PGD, such as the Network against Selection 
in Prenatal Diagnosis and feminist experts with a background in the movements against 
reproductive and genetic technologies. In addition, she appointed feminist and other techno-
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sceptic critics to her newly constituted Advisory Board on Ethics. Some representatives of this 
new type of NGO experts24 also became members of the newly established Parliamentary Study 
Commission “Enquete-Kommission Recht und Ethik in der modernen Medizin”, an advisory 
commission composed one half each by parliamentarians and experts, which published its 
position about PND and PGD in 2002 (Deutscher Bundestag 2002). The commission 
confirmed the existing restrictions of the Embryo Protection Act and voted in its majority 
against the legalisation of PGD. In this context, the reaction of the German Chancellor, 
Gerhard Schröder, to establish the National Ethics Council (NEC-Nationaler Ethikrat) as a 
“counter project” to the Parliamentary Study Commission (Bogner et al. 2006) in 2001 was 
highly contested in the German public (Braun, K. 2005). Unlike the Parliamentary Study 
Commission the National Ethics Council was mostly composed of supporters of 
biotechnological research and development. In regard to PGD it did not achieve an internal 
consensus but published an ambiguous position in 2003 (Nationaler Ethikrat 2003). For a short 
time, the discussion in the media framed the conflict as an expression of a crisis of expertise, 
making it very clear that the evaluation of these issues depended on the different interests and 
different political backgrounds of different experts rather than on a “neutral” or “impartial” 
ethical expertise. 
These formal governance arrangements in the context of a new government opened a window 
of opportunity for questions of new direct and indirect forms of discrimination and social 
pressure via genetic testing, originating from the feminist and anti-eugenic social movements, to 
enter expert discourse. The broader public and media debate on the issue of PGD was quite 
different as it focussed not so much on questions of discrimination and social pressure but more 
strongly on the status of the embryo. The debate was largely framed as a controversy between 
advocates of medical progress and economic competitiveness, such as Chancellor Schröder, and 
conservatives seeing the embryo as a human being from the moment of conception. Meanwhile, 
gender issues and concerns by feminist groups about the social implications of PND, PGD or 
embryonic stem cell research for women were increasingly marginalised in this debate (Braun 
2007; Braun & Hermann 2001: 23). 
                                               
24 They founded a feminist expert network called “Reprokult” (www.reprokult.de). 
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After the intense debate during and shortly after the millennium change which resulted in a 
stand-off situation, the debate on PGD lost momentum. The next Parliamentary Study 
Commission (called “Enquete-Kommission Ethik und Recht der modernen Medizin”) turned to 
other bioethical issues – and neither did the National Ethics Council consider PGD of priority 
any more. Only indirectly there was a push toward the issue by legitimising the genetic diagnosis 
of oocytes in 2004. The National Ethics Council published its recommendation in 2004, 
concluding that the genetic diagnosis of the egg during the process of fertilisation is not to be 
considered restricted by the Embryo Protection Act and thereby opted for its unrestricted 
application (Nationaler Ethikrat 2004b). 
This situation might change soon. In July 2006 the new German government proclaimed the re-
placement of the National Ethics Council by a new German Ethics Council, at the same time 
not re-establishing the Parliamentary Study Commission. As the Minster for Education and 
Research announced this new body will review the issue of PGD (Bundesministerium für 
Bildung und Forschung 2006).25 
Austria is a case against PAGANINI‟s primary assumption that politics of life challenges and 
transforms traditional ways of public involvement in policymaking. The Austrian discussion can 
be characterized as an elite debate with little participation of the general public and the media. In 
general the politics of PGD, PND and postnatal genetic testing follow for the most part the 
usual patterns of Austrian of policy making, that means it is concentrated in ministries, marked 
by elite participation, and consensus orientation. 
Most preparatory work for legislation as regards content is done within the responsible 
ministries, that is the Federal Ministries for Health and Women (Bundesministerium für 
Gesundheit und Frauen, in the following BMGF), the Federal Ministry for Justice 
(Justizministerium, in the following BMJ) and the Federal Ministry for Education, Science and 
Culture (Bundesministerium für Bildung, Wissenschaft und Kultur, in the following BMBWK). 
Civil servants do the preparatory work but the ministers‟ directives are decisive. 
                                               
25 Oppositional parliamentarians protested against this expert-oriented ethics frame because there is no bioethics 
institution left for their direct participation (Hampel 2006). 
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The National Council and its individual representatives - as in most policy areas in Austria - play 
only a minor role in political debate and decision-making, despite their formal final legislative 
responsibility (Müller 2006). 
There is also little political controversy about genetic testing in public (Felt 2003: 16), however, 
due to the past abortion controversy of the early 1970s which ended in a fragile, but permanent 
compromise, politics of PGD are characterised by the threat of potentially heavy conflicts and 
therefore by a practical deadlock (Grießler 2006). 
Party lines are less than homogenous in the area of PGD. Up to now (autumn 2006) a pro-
restriction that includes, e.g., Federal Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel, Science Minister Elisabeth 
Gehrer and Representative Franz-Josef Huainigg dominated the governing Austrian People‟s 
Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP). But there is also a permissive ÖVP wing existing that 
includes, e.g., Economics Minister Martin Bartenstein, Minister for Health and Women Maria 
Rauch-Kallat, and the representative and party speaker for science Gertrude Brinek. Both 
opposition parties, the Austrian Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Österreichs, SPÖ) and the Green Party (Die Grünen) take a more permissive stand towards 
PGD than the dominant wing within the governing ÖVP. 
An elite of scientific experts (e.g, human geneticists, genetic researchers) and physicians play an 
important role within advisory boards and expert commissions such as the gene technology 
commission (Gentechnikkommission 26 ) at the BMGF and the bioethics commission 
(Bioethikkommission) at the Federal Chancellery (Bundeskanzleramt)27. But also a handful of 
catholic and protestant theologians as well as secular philosophers are important elite actors in 
governmental commissions and public debate as well. So far expert advice stemming from these 
commissions was extremely important because it informed or at least legitimated government 
proposals and decisions on genetic testing. Traditional or new expert commissions such as the 
relatively recent bioethics commission and the more than 10 years old gene technology 
commission remedy legitimation deficits. 
                                               
26 http://www.bmgf.gv.at/cms/site/attachments/7/7/8/CH0260/CMS1085581033386/original-liste_gtk__2005-
2009_.pdf, 20.10.2006 
27 http://www.bka.gv.at/DesktopDefault.aspx?TabID=3455, 20.10.2006 
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The officials of the Catholic Church, which take a very restrictive position, are rather influential 
particularly via their connection to the restrictive wing within the ÖVP. NGOs such disabilities 
groups and moderate catholic pro-life activists play a significant role, yet uninvited by elite 
circles, at times upsetting policy makers and blocking a permissive regulation of PGD. These 
groups cooperate loosely, e.g. within the working group “Ethics commission FOR the Austrian 
Federal Government”28 (Ethikkommission FÜR die österreichische Bundesregierung), and try 
to gain access to the policy arena. 
The governance of “red biotechnology” from above included also in Austria - similar to the 
German case - the establishment of a new national Bioethics Commission (Bioethikkommission, 
Brede 2005). This commission, established in 2001, advises the Federal Chancellor from an 
ethical perspective in all social, scientific and legal questions, which stem from the scientific 
development of human medicine and human biology. The commissions‟ tasks include in 
particular: First, to inform society about important discoveries of human medicine and human 
biology and the ethical questions that are related to these discoveries. Furthermore, the 
commission shall promote discussion in society about these questions. Second, the commission 
ought to report practical recommendations. Third, it shall suggest the necessary legal measures 
and, forth, prepare reports for particular questions. The commission includes not less than 15 
and not more than 25 experts from human medicine (gynaecology, psychiatry, oncology, 
pathology), molecular biology and genetics, law, sociology, philosophy and theology. 
The legitimacy of the expert committee did not remain uncontested. Partly challenging the 
Bioethics Commission, the City of Vienna installed a bioethics committee of its own. 29  In 
addition, as already mentioned, a group of representatives from disabilities groups and moderate 
pro-life activists formed the platform “Ethics Commission FOR the Austrian Federal 
Government” (“Ethikkommission FÜR die Österreichische Bundesregierung”) because 
governmental officials, who did not consider them as “experts”, denied these activists access to 
the official Bioethics Commission. It is therefore the aim of the alternative Ethics Commission 
to complement the opinion of the expert oriented Bioethics Committee and to provide an 
additional opinion from lay people who are actually affected by biotechnology. 
                                               
28 http://www.service4u.at/ethikkommission/index2.html, 20.10.2006. 
29 called Beirat für Bio- und Medizinethik; cf. http://www.wien.gv.at/vtx/vtx-rk-xlink?SEITE=020021129020. 
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PGD, in contrast to PND, is a controversial topic in Austria. However, the general public is 
little involved and the debate is limited to expert circles. Experts of medical law assume, as 
already mentioned, that the Austrian reproductive medicine law from 1992 prohibits implicitly 
PGD in almost all cases but does not cover polar body diagnosis. In recent years there have 
been efforts from expert geneticists and physicians to ease the legal restrictions placed on PGD. 
In 2004 a governmental advisory committee of experts recommended to loosen the law and to 
allow PGD in a small number of cases (BMGF 2005). Also a majority opinion of the official 
Bioethics Commission recommended to loosen the rigorous regulation of PGD in some cases 
(Bioethikkommission beim Bundeskanzleramt 2004). However, coordinated efforts of self-help 
groups of disabled and moderate pro-life activists stopped these attempts. Thus, “bottom up” 
participation of unruly and excluded stakeholders turned out to be extremely influential in this 
case. However, these marginalized groups used traditional forms of political campaigning and 
networking to gain access in the policy-making arena they were initially excluded from. 
In the UK, the debate on PGD began when the first fertility clinics started offering PGD in 
1989. In the end of the 1990s this debate was institutionalised by establishing two advisory 
committees following the recommendations of the 1995 report of the House of Commons 
Science and Technology Committee (House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 
1995). The Advisory Committee on Genetic Testing, established in 1996, and the Advisory 
Working Group on Pre-Implantation Genetic Diagnosis, a sub-commission of the HFEA, 
established in 1997, started a debate on the rules and criteria in regard to licensing PGD 
(Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority and Advisory Committee on Genetic Testing 
1999). Then HFEA-chairwoman Deech explained their efforts, expressing that she wanted to 
avoid PGD “for any social, physical or psychological characteristics… that are not associated with serious, often 
life threatening medical disorders” (Ziegler 2004: 86). This position remained stable within HFEA 
politics for a long time. Nevertheless we will show that it was open to a lot of different 
interpretations concerning the question of which conditions could be interpreted as “serious”, 
according to which criteria and who would be authorised to define them. 
When in 1999, the advisory system on biotechnologies in the UK was reformed, following an 
initiative of the Cabinet Office and the Office of Science and Technology (Cabinet Office & 
Office of Science and Technology 1999), the system of advisory bodies was assigned the 
function not only to react to existing debates but also to initiate debates. The explicit aim of this 
reform was to expand the mandate of the advisory system so that it would go beyond merely 
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reacting to concrete cases of technological development and beyond the expertise of specialised 
technocratic bodies. The idea was to develop a more encompassing “strategic framework” and 
to guide public debate on human genetics and make it more “forward-looking for so rapidly developing 
a technology” (Cabinet Office & Office of Science and Technology 1999: ii). The background of 
this reform was above all the uprising public unrest regarding GM crops and food (see work 
package 6; Interview 14-3 2006). Nevertheless, the reform also changed the governance 
arrangements for “red” biotechnologies, and, while preserving the statutory body of the HFEA 
in regard to assisted reproduction, in addition to it the Human Genetics Commission as meta-
regulatory body on the social, ethical, and legal implications of human genetics was created 
(Cabinet Office & Office of Science and Technology 1999). The Human Genetics Commission 
absorbed the former Advisory Committee on Genetic Testing and took over the consultation 
project on PGD that had already been started (Advisory Committee on Genetic Testing 2000). 
In 2001, HFEA and HGC published the outcomes from this consultation together with the 
HFEA‟s and HGC‟s recommendations on the issue (Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority & Human Genetics Commission 2001). They had consulted stakeholder organisations 
as well as the broader public. The background to this event had not been a big controversial 
debate about PGD in general, but rather the question, in which cases following which criteria 
the HFEA should license its application. It turned out that the majority of respondents accepted 
the existing practice of the HFEA of  “licensing clinics to perform PGD for a limited number of specific 
serious inherited conditions, including sex linked disorders and chromosome abnormalities” (Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority & Human Genetics Commission 2001: 12). Restrictions 
should be placed on the use of PGD “to prevent it being used for frivolous or „social‟ reasons, or for eugenic 
purposes” (ibid.: 12). Also, the majority opted in favour of using PGD only for “highly predictive 
serious disorders, not complex genetic components” (ibid.: 20). 
While these opinions, according to the report, were supported by the majority of those 
consulted, the consultation report also admitted the existence of some controversial issues. One 
was the question of tissue typing or so-called “saviour siblings” (Bionews 2005b). Tissue typing 
is done by Human Leukocyte Antigen Typing which allows to determine whether the tissue of 
the embryo matches with that of an ill family member, in most cases that of an existing sibling. 
That is why this use of PGD is also known to the public as selecting a “saviour sibling”. The 
advisory bodies recommended further consultations on this issue (Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority & Human Genetics Commission 2001: 6). Another controversial issue 
concerned the use of PGD to test for late-onset genetic diseases such as Huntington‟s Disease. 
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On this question, the report only suggests rather ambiguously that this “should be one of a number of 
factors but not an overriding factor, whether PGD should be offered” (ibid.: 19). 
Nevertheless, in the following years the HFEA did license uses of PGD the majority of 
respondents in this consultation had not approved. The most controversial case, leading to a 
sophisticated juridical, political, and media debate in the following years, was the license for 
“tissue typing.” 
Unlike it had announced previously, the HFEA did not conduct another consultation but 
allowed tissue typing in the case of the Hashimi family. However, it later rejected such use in the 
case of the Whitaker family. The main rationale was that the disease of Zain Hashimi, which was 
thalassemia, is considered a genetic disorder which meant that the embryo who would function 
as a “saviour sibling” would have to betested for the gene him- or herself, as well as for the 
tissue compatibility. In the case of Charlie Whitaker who suffered from the Diamond-Blackfan, 
a non-genetic disease, the embryo who would serve as a “saviour sibling” for Charlie would not 
be screened for this genetic condition (Wasserman 2003). The pro life NGO CORE took legal 
action against the decision in the Hashimi case, arguing that third party interests should not be a 
justification for the use of PGD; however, after initial success before the High Court, in the end 
it lost the case (Ziegler 2004: 90). 
Later the HFEA also allowed cases similar to the Whitaker case. The HFEA justified its policy 
change by pointing to a shift in priorities: While in the beginning the (small) risk for the 
prospective “saviour sibling” to be born with a genetic disorder was considered more important, 
later the HFEA in a more “contextual” way regarded the “welfare of the family” and their right 
to “reproductive choice” to be of higher priority (Mills 2006). 
The “saviour sibling” debate is one example of policy shifts regarding PGD that are not backed 
by consultation processes. Another contested case which marks a policy shift refers to the 
licensing of PGD in order to test for a form of eye cancer that is considered to be caused by 
genetic factors in 2005 (Bionews 2005a). The family in question already had one child with this 
“genetic condition” who had already been treated and had survived the disease. In this case, the 
HFEA did start a consultation process on this specific question – yet only after having issued the 
license (Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 2005b). Another specific consultation 
referred to sex selection – resulting in a refusal of sex selection related to non-medical reasons, 
but an acceptance of PND and PGD for sex-linked inherited “disorders” such as Duchenne 
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muscular dystrophy which predominantly affects boys (Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority 2003). 
These policy shifts concerned the criteria for applying PGD that were linked to the specific 
condition tested. Another mechanism for keeping the licensing system rather flexible has been 
the interpretation of the general requirement established by the HFEA that the “genetic 
disorder” tested for has to be “serious” in order to justify the application of PGD. HFEA did 
not establish a set of fixed criteria as regards which conditions were deemed “serious” and 
which were or not. Instead, the HFEA leaves this decision to case by case decision-making, 
taking the subjective assessments of the persons involved into account. Hence, the document 
that presents the outcomes of the consultation explicitly declares that: “The seriousness of a condition 
should be a matter for discussion between the people seeking treatment and the clinical team.” (Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority & Human Genetics Commission 2001). This 
mechanism shows that the governance of genetic testing, here, is directly linked to the 
motivations and the social situation of couples and families seeking genetic testing. Hence, the 
production of knowledge on what these motivations and situations are is required and the 
processes of regulation are, at least indirectly, linked to processes of such knowledge production. 
In a similar vein, a proposal that referred to recommendations from some disability rights 
organisations suggested to integrate “the testimony of families and individuals about the full range of 
experiences of living with the condition” into the decision-making process about PGD (Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority & Human Genetics Commission 2001: 8). 
The flexibility in decision-making on PGD was also supported by the argument that “PGD 
should be consistent with the use of PND” (Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority & Human 
Genetics Commission 2001: 6). This argument also reappeared in the consultation paper 
“Choosing the future: Genetics and reproductive decision making” (Human Genetics 
Commission 2004), which was prepared by the HGC for the “Making Babies” report. One of 
the key points it made was that the policies on PGD should be consistent with the guidelines 
and practices governing the application of PND. The consultation paper recommended to make 
both practices coherent in the sense that disorders or “defects” considered to be a reason for 
aborting a foetus should also be considered a possible reason for using PGD (Human Genetics 
Commission 2004). Such a policy  would extend the scope of applications of PGD considerably. 
The document also establishes a direct link between PGD and the argument of reproductive 
choice, thereby assuming that there is no relevant difference between the situation of a woman 
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who is already pregnant but does not want to be and the situation of a couple and their doctors 
to deliberately create embryos via IVF that they know might eventually be destroyed.30 
One of the explicit purposes of the “Making Babies” consultation process was – like in the case 
of PND and the eugenics frame – to discredit the concern that PGD will lead to the production 
of “designer babies”. The Making Babies-report explains: 
“The anxiety that PGD lies at the top of a slippery slope leading to the possibility of a wide range of potential en-
hancements, such as intelligence or beauty is misplaced” (Human Genetics Commission 2006). 
The delegation of decision-making to an authority, here the HFEA, and the case to case modus 
of regulation were not uncontested within government circles. The Science and Technology 
Committee of the House of Commons, for example, harshly criticised the arbitrariness of 
decision-making and argued in favour of a re-establishment of modern statecraft (Secretary of 
State for Health 2005). On the occasion of the government‟s initiative of 2004 to review the 
HFEAct itself (Department of Health 2005), the Science and Technology Committee assessed 
the HFEA‟s work as being “clearly unsatisfactory” (Secretary of State for Health 2005: 18) and 
objected in particular to what it saw as an inconsistency and arbitrariness of case-by-case 
decisions. It argued, for example, that the differentiated decision-making procedure of the 
HFEA that approves PGD for some genetic conditions but restricts it for others would make 
no sense. It argued in favour of a more general permission for PGD, refuting anxieties about the 
creation of “designer babies”: 
“PGD is limited in that it can only be used to screen out disorders and thus it cannot be used to create „designer 
babies‟. We see no reason why a regulatory framework should seek to determine which disorders can be screened 
out using PGD” (Secretary of State for Health 2005: 18). 
This review process of the HFEAct may point to a crisis of the advisory system in the UK itself, 
challenging it from both sides, from claims to professional self-regulation on the one hand and 
the call for more general legal regulations and norms on the other. 
                                               
30 In Germany, this point played a certain role in the 2000/01 debate and was made mainly by feminist groups but also 
by other actors such as the then Minister for Justice, Herta Daeubler-Gmelin. 
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However, this critique was not strong enough to fundamentally challenge the system of arm‟s 
length bodies. What is more important in order to explain the reform process that may result in 
the dissolution of the HFEA in the next years is a shift in how reproductive technologies are 
framed within the system of arm‟s length bodies. It is planned that the HFEA will merge with 
the new Human Tissue Authority established by the Human Tissue Act in 2004 (see 
www.dh.gov.uk; Wallace 2006). This integration of reproductive technologies and, more 
specifically PGD, into the HTA framework can be interpreted as a shift away from locating 
PGD within the framework of procreation. Instead, in the new institutional arrangement 
embryos, sperms, eggs, or toti-potent cells, blood, or bone marrow are equally framed as 
“tissue”; thus entities whose origin is actually quite different are all subsumed in one and the 
same category. This re-framing shows that the research perspective is getting more dominant in 
relation to reproduction, as research is mainly interested in tissue as research material (Interview 
10-3 2006). Insofar, the integration of the HFEA into the HTA would be another step of 
normalising PGD and other aspects of reproductive technologies. 
 
 
3.4. “Predictive medicine”: deregulated practices and incipient intents of 
regulation 
The landscape of regulations regarding “post-natal” medical genetic testing is also quite 
heterogeneous. While there is no comprehensive legislation on genetic testing in Germany and 
the UK, Austria has a Genetic Engineering Act (Gentechnikgesetz) prohibiting the use of 
genetic test results by insurers and employers. In recent legislation a ban on non-consensual 
genetic testing within the UK Human Tissue Act came into effect the 1st of September 2006. 
But its scope is rather limited and it installs a lot of caveats with respect to medical purposes and 
criminal investigations (Williams 2006). On the whole, the field is characterized by non-regula-
tion or deregulation. New practices of using genetic testing for the prediction of future disease, 
or the probability thereof, but also for insurance or employment purposes are starting to 
proliferate – without a consistent regulation of these practices. 
Scientific uncertainties concerning the validity of test results, as well as the contested concept of 
genetic testing, and the view of genetic data as referring to the most personal level of the 
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individual, to the core of her or his personality, all complicate the establishment of coherent 
legal frameworks. To make things more complicated, oftentimes powerful interests seeking to 
get access to genetic data may play an influential but not always visible role. Participatory 
processes and arrangements often confine the issue to the question of individual rights, consent, 
confidentiality, data protection, and counselling without addressing powerful research and 
economic interests at stake. 
“Post-natal” genetic testing had already been a controversial issue in the 1980s in a discourse 
that also addressed future potentialities of human genetic engineering and negative utopias as for 
example the fear that these technological developments would result in a totalitarian surveillance 
of citizens and a qualitative selection of workers by gene checking. These fears were a reason 
why the Commission of the European Union in 1988 had to rename their project for research 
on the human genome. The initial title of “predictive medicine” was revised due to massive 
protest by the EU-Parliament who discerned a eugenic framing at work here (Abels 2002). 
In Germany, in the 1990s the issue of genetic testing was addressed, albeit not as a salient 
question, by the campaign against the Bioethics Convention of the Council of Europe. People 
with disabilities organizations, religious organisations, anti-eugenic groups, civil rights groups 
and other groups protested against the proposed article on genetic testing (Art. 17) of the initial 
proposal and its possible negative impact on the rights of people affected by genetic disorders. 
Critics held that the language of this article did not restrict genetic testing at all as it would allow 
for requiring genetics tests from people for a broad range of reasons such as for “health care 
purposes or scientific research” but also “outside the health field” when “overriding interests” were 
concerned (Braun 2000b: 234).31 
In the UK, during the 1990s the newly established ethical advisory bodies were already tackling 
the question of how to regulate genetic testing, though still to a limited extent. The 1993 paper 
of the Nuffield Council on Ethics already proposed a flexible policy regarding genetic testing 
and opposed general legal restriction or regulations placed on these medical practices (Nuffields 
Council on Bioethics 1993). In 1997, the Advisory Committee on Genetic Testing (ACGT) 
                                               
31 The scepticism towards abuse of genetic information still became visible in a statement by the Advisory Board on 
Ethics of the Green Ministry of Health in 2000 (Ethik-Beirat beim Bundesministerium für Gesundheit 2000). The 
statement integrated a strong “socio-ethical” approach against the “social risks” for disabled people and proposed 
restrictive conditions for research on genetic data and opposed the use of genetic data by insurers or employers.  
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developed a first Code of Practice opting for a “voluntary system of compliance and monitoring” for test 
suppliers (Advisory Committee on Genetic Testing 1997). However, this code was later 
criticised as “ill-designed” by the HGC (Human Genetics Commission 2002b): The code referred 
only to over-the-counter tests supplied directly to the public and covered only certain tests on 
inherited dominant and x-linked disorders and on late onset genetic disorders.32 Hence it left out 
life style oriented tests or risk calculating tests referring to “multi-factorial” diseases. 
It has only been in recent years that medical genetic testing has entered the political agenda in a 
much more intense, complex, and sophisticated way, a process that is partly due to the expanded 
range of “genetic diseases” tested for or likely to be tested for in the future and in the build-up 
of biobanks, as introduced in chapter 2. Debates have evolved on ethical and legal questions of 
regulating genetic testing procedures. Nearly inseparable from this, there is an intensified debate 
on the access to and the management of individual genetic information. 
In the UK, as has been the case with PGD, the debate was initiated from above after the 
reorganisation of the advisory system on biotechnologies and the establishment of the HGC in 
1999 had taken place. By organising various consultations on these topics the HGC followed the 
idea behind the reorganisation of the advisory system of a “strategic framework”. One of the 
consultations that the HGC initiated after its constitution was a repetition of the consultation 
process on commercially supplied tests, a consultation which did not result in a clear 
recommendation for legal restrictions or regulations (Human Genetics Commission 2003). But 
the biggest consultation effort made by the HGC was on genetic testing and data protection, 
titled “Whose Hands on your Genes” and addressing the general question of how to regulate 
genetic information. It started as early as 1999 (Human Genetics Commission 2000). The 
consultation process integrated a mix of stakeholder responses, a people‟s panel, and a 
consultative panel and thereby interpellated different types of political subjectivities and 
different forms of publics it considered to be relevant. The evaluation of this consultation 
process by the HGC was published under the title “Inside Information” in 2002 (Human 
Genetics Commission 2002a). It touched a much wider range of issues related to genetic data 
than previous consultations – such as family relationships, paternity testing, consent, 
                                               
32 This limited orientation reflected the public debate on the marketing of a test for cystic fibrosis in the early 1990s, 
which the STC had vehemently criticised in its 1995 statement (House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee 1995). 
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confidentiality, protection of genetic information in medical practice, research, insurance, 
employment, and criminal investigations. In a lot of respects the recommendations of the HGC 
remained rather ambiguous, although clearly favouring the individual‟s right to personal genetic 
data protection. For example, the report opted for a differentiated approach to the sensitivity of 
data (Human Genetics Commission 2002a: 4). Concerning the possible disclosure of data it 
declared: 
“Disclosure of sensitive personal genetic information without consent may be justified in rare cases where a patient 
refuses to consent to such disclosure but the benefit to other family members or the wider public substantially 
outweighs the need to respect confidentiality” (Human Genetics Commission 2002a: 10). 
At least the Department of Health seemed to consider this statement as a legitimate basis not to 
promote a more cautious approach to data protection within medical care and research, but to 
foster the expansion of human genetics services within health care. One year later it published a 
White Paper which above all opted for the expansion of human genetics, genetic testing, 
screening, and counselling within the NHS, called “Our Inheritance, Our Future. Realising the 
potential of genetics in the NHS” (Department of Health 2003). The document announced the 
investment of an additional 50 Million GBP in the NHS to further develop the integration of 
human genetics into health care services. And it proposed a general screening for a broad range 
of genetic conditions with newborns (Department of Health 2003: 43), a proposal that provoked 
astonishment in the expert communities and later also became a topic for consultation 
(Interview 13-3 2006; Human Genetics Commission 2005). 
In Germany, there have been various statements on the topic of genetic testing and on genetic 
data and biobanks, issued by the National Ethics Council and the Parliamentary Study 
Commission (Deutscher Bundestag 2002; Nationaler Ethikrat 2004a; Nationaler Ethikrat 2005). 
This mainly expert-based debate opened up to some extent when in October 2004 the 
Government drafted a new law on genetic testing (Bundesministerium für Gesundheit und 
Soziales 2004). The draft caused an intense public debate and numerous NGOs set up position 
papers on the issue.33 The media mainly focused on the issue of paternity tests, above all on the 
question whether the mother‟s consent should be required. A broader public debate also 
                                               
33 Gen-Ethisches Netzwerk 2003;Netzwerk gegen Selektion durch Pränataldiagnostik 2004. 
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addressed the right of employers and the insurance industry to demand genetic test results. The 
law proposal was quite restrictive in this respect, although in the first draft version it had some 
loopholes (for example with respect to public servants). Less observed by the public was a much 
more “liberal” or market- and research-oriented aspect within the proposal referring to access to 
genetic data for research (Wagenmann 2005).34 
Until today the process did not result in passing the law – not only because of the early end of 
the coalition government of the Social Democrats and Green Party in autumn 2005. Apart from 
the public controversy on paternity testing, one important obstacle was the contradiction 
between the claim of individual data protection and the claim of the security apparatus to have 
access to medical data collections (Averesch 2005). 
One interview partner from the NGO Gen-Ethisches Netzwerk explains: 
“It won‟t be possible to solve the problem legally (…) There are too many different interests involved which they 
cannot abandon. One, for example, is the confidentiality of research with respect to the data collections. (…) The 
confidentiality of research would make research much more comfortable, with an easier access to the test persons. 
On the other hand there is no protection for biobanks against confiscation on reasons of criminal prosecution or 
danger in delay. The police can always justify that they need access to the data and the state will not desist of this 
right. In my view it is an impossible task to regulate these contradictions“ (Interview 26-3 2006). 
Another obstacle is the question of how exactly to define genetic testing – and how to 
differentiate information resulting from genetic tests (see chapter 2) from other kinds of health 
information. Nevertheless, the Green Party, now in opposition, is currently starting a new 
initiative and has announced to present a new draft in autumn of 2006. 
At the Leipzig youth conference in May 2006 this stalemated situation was a critical point of 
debate. The adolescents had been called to produce a catalogue of their demands with respect to 
the legal regulation of genetic information - only to learn that such regulation was not really 
promoted by politics. In the end of the conference, they were upset about the disinterest of 
                                               
34 This position substantially differs from the suggestions of the Advisory Board on Ethics of the Green Ministry of 
Health on predictive genetic testing in 2000: It still generally opposes the use of tissue samples, taken for other medical 
purposes, or for genome analysis (Ethik-Beirat beim Bundesministerium für Gesundheit 2000: 15).  
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journalists and policy makers in the outcome of the allegedly participatory process – and about 
the permanent delay of legislative efforts. 
In Austria, public involvement apart from the usual mechanisms of representative democracy 
was almost absent in the regulation of post-natal genetic testing. One exception was the citizen 
conference on genetic data “Genetic Data: From Where, Whereto, What For?” 
(BürgerInnenkonferenz “Genetische Daten: woher, wohin, wozu?”), which was organised in 
2003 (Felt 2003).The event was commissioned by the Austrian Council for Research and 
Technology Development (Rat für Forschung und Technologieentwicklung) within its public 
relation campaign “Innovatives Österreich”. The citizen conference was designed after the 
Danish model by the PR-agency “communication matters” (Bogner 2004, Menasse 2004). The 
primary aim of the conference was to raise public awareness for science and technology and not 
to take any decision at all. “Communication matters”, the organisers, consider this event as an 
attempt of institutional innovation, however, their efforts to place the consensus conference 
appropriately in the Austrian decision-making mechanisms completely failed and the conference 
remained disconnected from actual policymaking. The most influential politicians in this area 
either completely rejected or neglected the consensus conference. Other politicians, such as 
Representatives of the National Council simply did not notice the event.  
Despite the absence of a manifest public controversy the issue of genetic testing is still a 
challenge to government. However, it is not the general public but an elite of policy makers, 
experts and stakeholders who perceive a particular deficit of legitimacy. 
In 1998, the Austrian government faced the civic initiative on gene technology. The initiative 
was extremely critical about “green biotechnology” and demanded a very restrictive 
governmental policy. This civic initiative on gene technology (“Gentechnikvolksbegehren”) 
became one of the most successful civic initiatives in Austrian history. This act of civic 
participation traumatised politicians and civil servants who want to promote in research and 
development for economic growth. We propose to look at the “Gentechnikvolksbegehren” 
together with the abortion debate in the 1970s as one of the main “dislocatory events” of life 
politics in the area of genetic testing in Austria. Both were very emotional controversies, 
characterised by seemingly irreconcilable cleavages within society and followed by a political 
deadlock (Grießler 2005). 
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One response of politicians and policy makers to this experience of public rejection of 
biotechnology was to initiate and support the foundation of the “Plattform Gentechnik und 
Wir” (now “Dialog<>Gentechnik”), a platform of scientific societies that should defend the 
cause of biotechnology by giving science a voice in public debate.  
The lesson from the “Gentechnikvolksbegehren“, trying to seek a dialogue with a presumably 
sceptical public about the benefits of life science in order to create acceptance is also present in 
a strategy paper of the Austrian Council for the development of life science in Austria, that 
emphasises the importance of entering into dialogue with scepticisms in order to gain broad 
acceptance in society for life science (RFT 2004: 10).  
Thus the challenge for policy makers in this area is to raise positive awareness for the life 
sciences by increasing acceptance for “red” and thus avoiding the disaster of “green 
biotechnology” in the late 1990s. In the case of “green biotechnology” the controversy came 
rather late, was very emotional and led into a deadlock. Some actors perceive public 
participation events as one strategy within this general goal. However, they are confronted with 
the problem that they search and address a public that hardly becomes visible and shows up in 
the events they are staging together with social scientists and PR-agencies - such as scientific 
cafés, consensus conferences and days of dialogue -, as can be seen in the small numbers of 
participation and media response.  
However, there are also civil servants and researcher who perceive participatory events 
differently and want to connect them to decision making on different levels. 
Despite the absence of a manifest public controversy the issue of genetic testing is still a 
challenge to government. However, it is not the general public but an elite of policy makers, 
experts and stakeholders who perceive a particular deficit of legitimacy. 
In 1998 Austrian government faced the civic initiative on gene technology. The initiative was ex-
tremely critical about “green biotechnology” and demanded a very restrictive governmental 
policy. This civic initiative on gene technology (“Gentechnikvolksbegehren”) became one of the 
most successful civic initiatives in Austrian history. This act of civic participation traumatised 
politicians and civil servants who want to promote in research and development for economic 
growth. I propose to look at the “Gentechnikvolksbegehren” together with the abortion debate 
in the 1970s as one of the main “dislocatory events” of life politics in the area of genetic testing 
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in Austria. Both were very emotional controversies, characterised by seemingly irreconcilable 
cleavages within society and followed by a political deadlock (Grießler 2005). 
One response of politicians and policy makers to this experience of public rejection of 
biotechnology was to initiate and support the foundation of the “Plattform Gentechnik und 
Wir” (now “Dialog<>Gentechnik”), a platform of scientific societies that should defend the 
cause of biotechnology by giving science a voice in public debate.  
The lesson from the “Gentechnikvolksbegehren“, trying to seek a dialogue with a presumably 
sceptical public about the benefits of life science in order to create acceptance is also present in 
a strategy paper of the Austrian Council for the development of life science in Austria, that 
emphasises the importance of entering into dialogue with scepticisms in order to gain broad 
acceptance in society for life science (RFT 2004: 10).  
Thus the challenge for politicians and policy makers in this area is to raise positive awareness for 
life science by increasing acceptance for “red” and thus avoiding the disaster of “green 
biotechnology” in the late 1990s. In the case of “green biotechnology” the controversy came 
rather late, was very emotional and led into a deadlock. Some actors perceive public 
participation events as one strategy within this general goal. However, they are confronted with 
the problem that they search and address a public that hardly becomes visible and shows up in 
the events they are staging together with social scientists and PR-agencies - such as scientific 
cafés, consensus conferences and days of dialogue -, as can be seen in the small numbers of 
participation and media response.  
However, there are also civil servants and researcher who perceive participatory events 
differently and want to connect them to decision making on different levels. 
At the European level the Commission of the European Union also initiated a debate on the 
issue of genetic testing – without offering any concrete regulatory influence on projects 
concretely at stake (Interview 3-3, 2006). In May 2004, it organised a conference on genetic 
diagnosis in Brussels, the “European Stakeholders‟ and Citizens‟ Conference on 25 
Recommendations by the European Commission‟s Expert Group” (European Commission 
2004b). As the title already demonstrates, the conference limited the opportunities of 
intervention for the invited guests to submitting comments on the recommendations on “ethical, 
social and legal aspects of human genetic testing in research and healthcare applications” (European 
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Commission 2004a) that had been pre-elaborated by experts before. These recommendations in 
general did not propose clear regulatory mechanisms, but information, dialogue, and the 
consideration of certain questions. It introduced discursive mechanisms of differentiation such 
as the claim to avoid “genetic exceptionalism” – opting for the integration of regulation of 
genetic testing into the existing health care regulations and the claim to avoid “unfair 
discrimination” – a term that leaves the door open to “fair” discrimination – for example in the 
case of risk calculations of the insurance industry. The expert group who had formulated these 
recommendations consisted mainly of representatives of pharmaceutical enterprises, 
complemented by some academic scholars and patient organisations: The expert group also 
designed an Action Plan for further activities that should promote public dialogue and establish 
an “education network” especially for programs directed at school students (Feyerabend 
2004/2005). What becomes obvious in the EU efforts of dialogue is that it privileges the 
speaking position of patient organisations – apart from direct scientific and pharmaceutical 
lobby groups (see chapter 5). 
As we have already mentioned, the efforts of participatory and advisory processes initiated from 
above through diverse mechanisms have not resulted in specific legal regulations on genetic 
testing referring to “predictive medicine”. In the following we will summarise the main issues at 
stake, the frames of debates, and the governance mechanisms on the different topics involved. 
A very prominent debate in politics and the media has been the debate on regulating the use of 
genetic test results by insurance companies and employers. 
The topic of genetic testing and insurances was widely debated in the UK during the “Whose 
Hands on Your Genes” consultation and was also promoted by the government in the context 
of election campaigns. In 2001, the British government and the Association of British Insurers 
signed a moratorium whereby the insurance industry committed itself to not demand or use 
genetic test results in the next years, with the exception of life insurances exceeding a certain 
financial limit (Association of British Insurers 2001; Gesamtverband der Deutschen Versicherer 
2001). There are different interpretations within the expert community in the UK how to 
interpret the influence of the HGC on this moratorium: Some members of the HGC consider it 
a success of its consultation efforts (Interview 20-3 2006). However, one observer mentions that 
the HGC was still working on its report on the insurance question when the negotiations 
between the insurance industry and government had already developed: 
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“There was a rush to have a policy agreement. So they rushed their report ahead of their schedule. Then they did a 
moratorium. But the real political forces that created that moratorium were the government and the insurance 
industry” (Interview 14-3 2006). 
This impression is supported by the fact that the moratorium was again prolonged in 2005 
without any dialogue procedure on the part of the HGC. One commercial law expert within the 
HGC explains: 
“I wasn‟t thinking that the moratorium was extended by the government and the insurance industry without us 
knowing about it, we agreed to the first one, but I was very much in the view that we should have used that in the 
interim time, I as a lawyer saw it as an interim injunction, you know you get a preliminary injunction, basically it 
maintains the status quo and in the meanwhile you sort out what to do about it” (Interview 20-3 2006). 
In the same year, in Germany the insurance industry also declared a moratorium committing 
itself not to demand genetic testing results except for contracts exceeding a financial limit of 
250,000 Euro (Gesamtverband der Deutschen Versicherer 2001). 
Generally, the moratoriums should be interpreted as means of a “politics of time” as they 
delayed regulatory decision-making to the future. They form a concession by the insurance 
industry to public concerns in a moment when genetic tests results are still too rare and too 
uncertain to be economically relevant. Most test results give insufficiently clear prognostic 
information on life prospects so that insurance companies cannot efficiently calculate with them 
(Interview 13-3 2006). Also, representatives of insurance companies themselves point to the 
uncertainty of genetic test results in order to delude public concerns. For example, Achim 
Regenauer, chief medical expert of the Insurance Company Münchner Rückversicherung, 
puzzled the adolescents at the youth conference in Leipzig by emphasising that the insurance 
industry until then was not interested in using genetic tests. 35  Oppositional voices express 
concern that this situation could change dramatically as soon as DNA chip technology results in 
broader genetic risk assessment strategies within health care (Interviews 5-3 2006, 14-3 2006, 26-
3 2006). 
                                               
35 At the same time, he is an important lobbyist against a general legal restriction of insurance companies using genetic 
tests (cf. Will 2005). 
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The situation is similar concerning the question of whether employers should be allowed to 
demand genetic test results from employees. One member of the Human Genetics Commission 
explains: 
“I think there is much more to come because even a lot of scientists made very sweeping statements with mapping 
the human genome, and I think one begins to understand, how poorly determinant it is, really. (…) We have and 
we will do more about how poorly predictive tests, even for something like Huntington disease, predicts, you can‟t 
predict 100 percent, and so it might be long after someone‟s employment career, so how limited, of what limited 
usefulness most of these tests are. (…) So very few employers are using very few tests, so that is an implicit 
acknowledgement of how limited their usefulness is, which is an implicit acknowledgement of the failure of genetic 
determinism, so the knowledge is out there but it is not very well articulated” (Interview 6-3, 2006). 
However, there has been an intense public debate in recent years on this question. In Germany, 
it took place in the context of the law proposal. It proposed to generally prohibit employers 
from demanding access to genetic data, but provided exceptions, for example for public servants 
(Staeck 2004). In the UK, the debate has been incited by the Inside Information report in 2002 
and prior to that also by an early consultation of the Human Genetics Advisory Committee. 
This predecessor of the HGC, one of the specific advisory committees of the 1990s, had 
proposed a legal restriction of the use of genetic test results by employers (HGAC 1999). The 
UK government, however, reacted by proposing exceptions such as in the case of “susceptibility of 
specific features of a working environment” (Department of Health 2000). Until now there is no 
regulation and no clear legal requisite to restrict the employers‟ demand of genetic test results 
(GeneWatch UK 2003b). 
Although making genetic tests a precondition for employment still appears to be a science 
fiction scenario, there have already been some spectacular cases that caught international 
attention: One was the case of a teacher in Germany who was, in order to be employed as public 
servant, obliged by the school authority to do a genetic test because of cases of Chorea 
Huntington in her family. The teacher sued the school authority, refusing their demand, and the 
courts sided with her (Tolmein 2004). This case has further promoted public concern and 
unease as massively expressed in participatory governance experiments such as the 
1000Fragen.de internet forum or the youth conference in Leipzig. 
The proponents of permitting, albeit in a regulated way, the use of genetic tests for employment 
purposes above all question the “genetic exceptionalism” frame, that is they denied that genetic 
75 
 
information is essentially different from other health information. They opt for a differentiated 
evaluation of genetic test results as part of normal prognostics in health care. For example, the 
National Ethics Council in Germany published a statement in 2005 on “predictive health 
information in employment examinations”. It argued against a specific regulation on genetic 
testing and instead opted for a regulation consistent with other diagnostic methods, thereby 
proposing a more permissive regulation in favour of using certain predictive diagnostic test 
results in employment (Nationaler Ethikrat 2005). However, opponents of the use of genetic 
test results in employment are also increasingly confronted with the question of how to define 
genetic tests and the specificity of genetic discrimination – in the context of scientific 
uncertainties. We will further address this issue in chapter 4. 
In contrast to the debate on regulating genetic testing in insurance and employment, which is 
mainly directed to future possibilities, the question of access to genetic data is, as mentioned, 
already highly relevant for current human genetics research. As we exposed in chapter 2, 
currently biobanks are being newly established or coordinated and centralised on the basis of 
existing collections. There is an increasing orientation of human genetics research towards 
epidemiological research today. This is why research is dependent on the access to large samples 
of blood, tissue, and large data bases on individual health biographies and life styles.  
The debate on how to govern access to such data is mainly framed as a debate about the in-
dividual rights of the donors up to now. The confidentiality of data and procedures to gain the 
informed consent of the donors when using genetic data for research is an issue for an 
expanding expert discourse. The proposed law in Germany – following the recommendations of 
the National Ethics Council (Nationaler Ethikrat 2004a) – suggested only a very general, blank 
consent for using personal genetic data and material for research. Moreover, it established 
exceptions, for example, in the case of already collected materials. NGOs reacted to this 
proposal by pointing out the problem of anonymisation and pseudonymisation in genetic 
research. They proposed more restrictive regulations regarding data confidentiality and 
consenting procedures (Wagenmann 2005). The feminist expert network Reprokult proposed 
complex requirements for informed consent that could be read as an obstructive strategy – 
because putting it into practice would make research projects very difficult to perform 
(Reprokult 2004). 
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In the UK, the debate was connected to the establishment of the UK Biobank. There have been 
a lot of objections to its establishment by different experts –  ranging from issues of scientific 
consistency of this form of data collection (Barbour 2003) to ethical issues and the lack of 
safeguards concerning confidentiality and informed consent which were established only later in 
response to fierce criticism (e.g., Interview 6-3, 2006). In the beginning, the UK Biobank project 
had no clear criteria how to guarantee informed consent and data protection. Nevertheless, the 
mainstream position of the advisory system was the following: Because donors would participate 
voluntarily in the project and because the Biobank had meanwhile established its own ethical 
governance arrangement they saw no need for the HGC to further follow up this large 
experiment of genetic data collection by organising participatory deliberative processes in the 
future (Interview 20-3 2006). 
Generally – and as a result of these evaluations – the media and the broader public did not pay a 
lot of attention to this aspect of genetic testing although access to genetic data is economically 
quite relevant for current human genetics and so are the prospects of the biotech industries. In 
contrast to the insurance and employment issue, this topic generally did not transcend the 
boundaries of the expert community. 
There have been other expert-based debates with respect to genetic testing in “predictive 
medicine”, for instance on the question how to handle the samples existing in laboratories and 
internationalised via the exchange of samples beyond national borders (OECD 2005), or on 
how to regulate screening projects within health care systems and how to use the resulting data 
(GeneWatch UK 2004a; Steindor 2005). 
Another important issue linked to the access to data is the question of patenting. Patents are a 
key mechanism to secure “biovalue” generated in human genetics research. Thus, the issue of 
patenting has been an important public energy field, in particular when it came to implementing 
the European patent guidelines as mentioned in chapter 2. Nevertheless, the participatory 
governance arrangements and experiments we have studied did not promote active deliberation 
on the issue of patenting. Patenting was a rather neglected issue within these arrangements and 
experiments compared to other topics. HGC members justified this abstinence either with the 
argument that patenting was too complicated an issue for public debate or that it was not the 
competence of the HGC to debate such issues (e.g., Interview 20-3 2006). 
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Among NGOs both in the UK and in Germany, interestingly, the debate on access to genetic 
data led to a renewed interest in the Bioethics Convention of the Council of Europe. This is 
because the Convention in its revised version had established the restriction of genetic testing 
only for health purposes. Currently, in the UK, NGOs call for a ratification of the Convention 
referring to these restrictions (GeneWatch UK 2003b). In Germany, in contrast to the former 
rejection of the Convention, there are now also some voices from the techno-sceptic 
community who are debating whether to ratify the Convention in order to use its restrictive 
impact on genetic testing (Deutscher Bundestag 2005). 
 
 
4. Politics of  life: ethicisation, governing the bios, and 
strategies to discredit concerns about the future social order 
Is it possible to draw conclusions about a common specificity of “politics of life” if we consider 
the heterogeneity of the narratives on PND, PGD and “predictive medicine” and the different 
(participatory) governance arrangements and experiments in the different country settings? To 
what extent and how have the relationships between scientific facts and social order, risk and 
uncertainty, “bios” and “zoe”, “genes” and “environment” changed over the time period 
studied? What concept(s) of “life” are becoming central in current strategies of governance, 
which approaches and frames structure the politics of genetic testing? 
In the following chapter we will approach the politics of genetic testing as “politics of life” from 
a discourse analytical perspective, for we will focus on shifting frames, concepts, processes of 
discursive dislocation and (re-)ordering. In chapter 5 we will then connect the results of this 
chapter with a view on the performative dimensions of these processes by investigating the sites, 
institutions, political subjects, and forms of communication by which these discursive practices 
are staged and exercised. 
We will approach the dimension of “politics of life” from two angles. First, we will consider the 
process of “ethicisation” and its various dimensions. By ethicisation we refer to the currently 
hegemonic approach to deal with human genetics by framing it within a language of ethics (4.1). 
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However, in the second part we will address some subliminal and diffuse concerns about the 
consequences of genetic testing for the social order – and the strategies to govern these 
concerns (4.2). 
Our analysis concludes that the phenomenon of “ethicisation” is not completely new compared 
to the approaches of the 1980s. In the 1980s, technology assessment already focused on social 
and also already “ethical” implications of genetic testing. The difference is rather that in the 
1980s an expert-based balancing of risks and benefits focused on the future social risks of genetic 
testing for society as a whole, while the newer perspective operates with a more fragmented, 
individualised, and versatile reference system. In the following, we will take a closer look at this 
policy of acknowledging and protecting different values, approaches, and contingent situations 
in the political discourse in order to understand the production of the “non-antagonistic” setting 
we are interested in. 
In the second part of this chapter, we look at public concerns that nevertheless refer to the 
future social order as a whole. These concerns do not constitute dense “public energy fields” in 
the sense of culminating or condensing in conflictive settings, however. Rather what we find 
here is subliminal, diffuse, and dispersed unease or concern. In this context, we will analyse the 
politics that still recur to the frame of “eugenics” or “selection”. And we will also show that 
participatory governance arrangements and experiments today invest into governing these 
concerns. One of the strategies is to simply discredit these concerns as unrealistic feelings, 
another to postulate a new phase of biopolitics separated from the past. Hence, the 
transformation of the “politics of time” is an important element of these intents of reordering. 
They are transforming the temporal perspectives in which the debate is embedded. 
 
4.1. Dimensions of ethicisation 
“We have set out general principles to promote the use of genetic information in a fair and ethical way.” (Human 
Genetics Commission 2002a: 6) 
A powerful arrangement to control the “politics of life”, to establish boundaries as well as 
specific relationships between the social and the scientific – and at the same time to order the 
social in a specific way – is the process of “ethicisation” (Braun et al. 2001; Lettow 2004). We 
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have shown in the narrative that bioethics has been institutionalised by the proliferation of 
different types of ethical advisory bodies in policy-making in the 1990s. The deliberation on 
“ethical aspects” of genetic testing has become the main frame for public engagement. This 
process of “ethicisation” constitutes certain forms of problematisation, certain discursive 
frames, which structure and limit the talk on genetic testing. In the literature, this transformation 
is often linked to the shift away from the risk-oriented model of technology assessment in the 
1980s and beginning 1990s (cf. Beck 1986; Wynne 2002). This former model centred on the 
evaluation and the “balancing” of future benefits and risks of the new biotechnologies. The 
transformation towards ethics is usually explained as the acknowledgement by official politics 
that problematic effects of technological change could not be reduced to calculable risks and 
therefore could not be dealt with by scientific experts only.36 
Looking at the institutional setting, the change from the risk model to the ethical model of 
governance also proves true for genetic testing. Nevertheless, in the case of genetic testing the 
change concerning the patterns of problematisation was not as abrupt as the above hypothesis 
might suggest. Throughout the 1980s, we see an overlap between the risks frame and the ethics 
frame for a while. The Benda Report of 1985 in Germany and more explicitly the Warnock 
Report of 1984  in the UK already focused on “ethical aspects” of human genetics (cf. 
Herrmann 2006; Moore 2006). Note also that the transformation did not start from a risk-model 
referring to the calculation of physical safety or danger, as it was the case in many other areas of 
the politics of life. “Risk” within the debate on genetic testing in the 1980s already meant a 
social risk, for example the risk to create a hostile climate against disabled people or the risk to 
neglect social causes of health problems (see Bundesminister für Forschung und Technologie 
1985; Enquetekommission Chancen und Risiken der Gentechnologie 1987). 
Therefore, we can better conceptualise the change as a crisis of the idea that experts can evaluate 
the dangers of genetic testing for society as a whole. Instead we see an increasing recognition of 
a broader plurality of risk perceptions and forms of evaluating risks. For this plurality ethics 
became more and more hegemonic as the all-encompassing framework for problematisation and 
the privileged technique of negotiation. Another transformation that occurred is that the ethics 
frame has been gradually accepted by actors, such as feminist groups, activists of the disability 
                                               
36 Regarding the critique of the risk paradigm in technology assessment see Wynne 2002. 
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rights movement, who, in the beginning of the debate had vehemently criticised the ethics frame 
for promoting a utilitarian approach. Such rejection of the ethics frame was, for instance, at the 
heart of the protests against Peter Singer, a radical protagonist of a utilitarian bioethics, in 
Germany (Bogner 2000; Braun 2000a). In recent years, organisations of disabled people have 
started to refer to the ethics frame and even accepted the term “bioethics” which before had 
been strongly equated with a utilitarian approach in ethics, such as the approach of Peter Singer. 
The NGO Aktion Mensch, for instance, established the internet forum 1000fragen.de on 
questions about “bioethics” and in Berlin stakeholder organisations of disabled people founded 
the “Institut Mensch, Ethik und Wissenschaft” (Institute Human Being, Ethics and Science). In 
the UK the disability rights network BCODP developed a training pack on Disability and 
Bioethics (BCODP 2006), and in Austria, techno-sceptical NGOs also referred to the ethics 
frame by setting up the Ethics Commission for the Austrian Government in 2001 as a response 
to the constitution of the official Bioethics Commission 
(http://www.service4u.at/ethikkommission/index2.html). However, it has to be added that 
involvement into the debate about ethics is only a minor within a vast range of campaigning 
activities of Austrian disability groups. 
The process of ethicisation has complex and sometimes contradictory implications. In the 
following we will first focus on the institutionalisation of ethics as regulatory ethics. We will 
address some of the main features and implications of ethicisation, namely the persisting 
mechanism to separate “scientific facts” from ethical evaluation and to present “scientific facts” 
as the unquestionable basis of deliberation and the de-contextualizing effect of the ethics frame 
(4.1.1.). Another main feature of the ethics frame is its ability to function as a mechanism of 
“ethical brokerage” through refining and inventing concepts and thus facilitating negotiation 
(4.1.2.). And third, we will address the dimension of life style ethics as a phenomenon of 
ethicization, indicating the dimension of daily individualised ethics referring to experience-based 
knowledge about the modalities of individual decision-making on genetic testing (4.1.3). Life 
style ethics as a phenomenon can be seen in the context of the “bios-orientation” of genetic 
testing is also increasingly shaping current politics of genetic testing. Further, it explains the 
increasing reference to empathy and emotionality within the political talk (4.1.4). The critique 
that the ethics frame has de-contextualising effects has to be modified with regard to the 
phenomenon of life style ethics. In fact, in a sense, there is a growing interest in the social and 
psychological context of individual decision-making concerning genetic testing today. An aspect 
common to all these characteristics is the claim that the only legitimate discourse is the one that 
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acknowledges the authenticity of the interlocutors and the legitimacy of different values and 
personal experiences. This aspect contributes to a process of “apoliticisation” in the sense that it 
delegitimises the fundamental critique of certain political positions (cf. Braun 2006; Herrmann 
2006; Moore 2006). 
 
4.1.1. Deliberating on cases of life 
Framing the public debate on genetic testing as an ethical debate has resulted in emphasising 
certain issues while de-contextualising or ignoring others (Herrmann 2003; Lettow 2004; 
Waldschmidt 2002). Bioethics is embedded in different philosophical traditions, a fact which 
establishes tensions within the field itself. On the one hand, a dominant approach is 
utilitarianism; another, mainly in the German and Austrian context, is the deontological 
approach strongly referring to the Kantian idea of human dignity. These approaches to bioethics 
constitute certain important controversies as, for example, those on the hierarchy between 
freedom of research and human dignity, a question central to debates on discrimination of 
disabled people or eugenics. 
However, the tableau of ethics, structured by the dominant approaches, also impedes certain 
forms of politicisation, for it generally tends to frame problems of biotechnologies in a de-
contextualised, abstract way, presenting them as comparable “cases of life” (Herrmann 1999). 
The ethics frame pushes to the fore questions such as those about the beginning and the end of 
life, about the essence of being human, or about the status of the embryo. Renee Fox 
summarises the meta-themes of bioethics as: 
“issues concerning life and death and human personhood, their definition and meaning, beginning and end, the 
virtues, limits and dangers of vigorously intervening in the human condition to alleviate suffering, improve the 
quality of existence, and maintain life” (Fox 1999). 
However, the ethics frame tends to marginalise other issues such as questions about the 
character of scientific knowledge production. Usually, scientific knowledge functions as an 
allegedly objective basis for ethical reflections. Also problems in regard to distributive justice as, 
for example, the involvement of economic interests in human genetic research, the issue of 
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patenting, the marketing of tests as well as the development of health care systems are heavily 
neglected if not excluded by bioethics (cf. Callahan 1994).  
Another tendency of de-contextualisation via the ethics frame is linked to reproductive genetics: 
The ethics frame features the embryo as the main discoursive figure of reprogenetics debate in 
focussing heavily on the question of its legal and moral status. The embryo appears as an 
isolated entity whose status can allegedly be discussed without referring to the pregnant women 
or even the difference between embryos in vitro or in vivo. Thereby, the practice of abortion and 
the destruction of an embryo produced in vitro are constructed as equal practices that 
accordingly have to be treated alike by ethics and the law. This framing marginalises a feminist 
perspective that seeks to promote a relational view on genetics, reproductive medicine, 
pregnancy and abortion, seeing them as practices that take place within a broader social, cultural 
and institutional context that is shaped not least by gender relations rather than discussing the 
abstract status of entities such as embryos, human eggs, or gene sequences. (Graumann & 
Schneider 2003; Wiesemann 2003). 
What does the process of ethicisation mean for the reordering of the politics of life? One 
implication of ethicisation is the separation of “scientific facts” from ethical deliberation. This 
operation becomes quite visible when we look at the performative aspect of participatory 
governance experiments. Usually, the first step is that the organizers offer a dossier or some 
presentation by experts on the issue to the public respectively the participants. It is presented as 
the compilation of the most relevant scientific facts about the issue participants will have to 
know in order to be able to deliberate about the ethical aspects of the issue. In a second step the 
participants are asked to deliberate on the ethical (and only secondarily on “social” and 
“juridical”) aspects of such “objective” scientific and technological settings. That is, we see a 
traditional “facts first” approach here. Furthermore, the main objects of deliberation about 
ethics are not social relations as such but the de-contextualised “cases of life”, the entities of 
laboratories, which put certain definitions of biological life or aspects of “zoe”, such as the 
status of the embryo, the definition of the beginning and end of life, the genetic make-up of an 
individual etc. at the centre of deliberation. 
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4.1.2. Ethical brokerage and the creation of new scientific artefacts 
The ethics frame allows and organises the pluralistic coexistence of different and oftentimes 
contrary values and opinions on these “cases of life”. It demands that pluralist “personal” or 
“intimate” convictions and values have to be recognised and respected in any case. In situations 
where there is no perception of an urgent need for governance or coherent regulation it is 
comparatively unproblematic to maintain this pluralistic setting. Bogner et al. explain: 
“The function of the ethics expertise is not the production of definite decision knowledge, but rather the 
constitutions of the necessity of politics as an independent field of action” (Bogner et al. 2006). 
However, this setting becomes problematic when regulatory efforts are under way and powerful 
interests emerge seeking to influence the policy process and its juridical outcome. In such 
situations, regulatory ethics demonstrates another of its functions, namely to provide 
mechanisms to facilitate decision-making, negotiation and the production of comprises. 
For example, in the case of the debates on PGD in Germany, the ethics frame organised a 
radical opposition between the embryo as a human being here and as tissue there, and thus 
established apparently non-negotiable positions. However, this setting, as Brian Salter has shown 
for bioethics at the EU, can also be transformed and transferred into a situation of “ethical 
brokerage”, where intermediate positions and criteria are established to open the field for 
political negotiation and trade-off (Salter 2005). With “brokerage” we mean the permanent 
creativity in the governance of genetic testing to develop ever new criteria of differentiation. 
These criteria establish intermediate positions between conflictive viewpoints suggesting the 
possibility of compromise in situations where at first glance positions seem non-negotiable. 
In the UK, “ethical brokerage” is inscribed into the system of arm‟s length bodies itself, as the 
statutory licensing body HFEA allows a step by step transformation of regulatory principles in 
its case by case decision making.37 The consultations and public debates on PGD during the last 
years, which did not focus on the general approval or disapproval of PGD, are a case in point of 
                                               
37 Not only the form of negotiating cases but also the concepts introduced by the Warnock report and the HFEAct 
show the production of intermediate concepts which open the field for political solutions. For example the “special 
status” of the embryo as neither human nor tissue, or the concept of the “pre-embryo” until 14 days of existence (cf. 
Moore 2006; Mulkay 1997).  
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an ethical brokerage setting. We have observed an increasing sophistication of the criteria how 
to judge specific applications of PGD. Criteria such as the “seriousness” of a condition, “third 
party interests” (in the case of tissue typing), “health purposes” vs. “frivolous or „social‟ 
reasons”, “late-onset” vs. “early onset” disorders, “low penetrance” vs. “high penetrance genetic 
conditions”, as well as the “viability” of the embryo have entered the debate thus causing an 
explosion of ever refined and differentiated criteria and subcategories to facilitate negotiation 
and decision-making.  
Within public debate, we can observe the mechanism of ethical brokerage too, for instance in 
the debates on how to offer which types of genetic testing, under which quality control and 
through which channels of services. Also, the debates on possible procedures to acquire 
informed consent to research on individual genetic material, as it is now becoming rampant in 
the context of the establishment of biobanks, is another field where a “criteria differentiation 
explosion” has taken place. 
Ethical brokerage, therefore, creates a strategic situation in which the attention is shifted away 
from the fundamental questions of whether society is in need of such technologies at all and if 
so for what purposes, towards a universe of negotiable gradual criteria. Despite this expansion 
of discourse the ethics frame at the same time restricts discourse in that a lot of political 
problems and issues are not addressed within this frame. Yet, it creates the basis for a 
permanent renegotiation of issues at stake, for “slippery slope” situations or “salami slicing” as 
one disability rights activist describes it (Interview 11-3 2006). The effect of ethical brokerage is 
to deepen the public´s knowledge on very specific situations in genetic testing and to have this 
knowledge permanently circulating, an effect that leads to a normalisation of situations which in 
fact are very rare medical cases. 
From a techno-sceptical point of view, the strategy of continuously shifting the boundaries 
between what is ethically acceptable and what is not, might appear arbitrary and creating a 
“slippery slope” (Interviews 9-3 2006, 22-3 2006). Nevertheless, the complicated and multiple 
criteria of (ethical) brokerage provide a set of sophisticated arguments that are meant to generate 
trust in the consistency, transparency, and justice of compromises despite of the instability of 
the negotiated technological applications. For us, this discursive productivity in the governance 
of genetic testing is key in order to understand the current transformations in the “politics of 
life”: The permanent introduction of new artefacts or new scientific criteria and parameters in 
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order to “ethically” negotiate them, tends to question the boundary between scientific facts and 
ethical values – which at the same time is and paradoxically remains – the fundament of 
ethicisation. 
There are several examples for the expansion of “scientific facts” or the deliberation on 
“biological life” or “zoe” at the centre of the ethics frames – translating scientific uncertainties 
into a certain ethical relativism. 
In Germany, for example, in the context of PGD, proponents of deregulating this practice 
recurred to a redefinition of the cell extracted from the embryo to test its genetic “quality”. In 
order to by-pass the Embryo Protection Act, the point was made that at a certain stage of 
embryonic development the extracted cell is no longer totipotent (and can develop into an entire 
embryo) but only “pluripotent” (Hillebrand et al. 2006). Thus, it would not count as an embryo 
according to the Embryo Protection Act. The differentiation between “totipotent” and 
“pluripotent” cells thus became one of the central questions, a question, however, that could – 
theoretically- be determined by scientists only, not by lawmakers or the general public. The 
newly revised ethical criteria were thus directly depending on scientific know how. 
Another case of redefining the stakes is the discursive and political strategy to debunk “genetic 
exceptionalism”. This strategy, pronounced by proponents of fostering R&D policies in human 
genetics and deregulating governance schemes, is based on the reordering of categories by 
questioning a broad definition of “genetic testing”. First, this strategy replaces the generic 
concept of “genetic testing” by more complex and sophisticated criteria (see chapter 2). For 
instance, during the youth conference in Leipzig, Prof. Dr. Peter Propping, the director of the 
Institute for Human Genetics in Bonn, discredited the catalogue of demands pronounced by the 
adolescents as being incoherent because they did not clarify their definition of genetic testing. 
Second, the strategy is to question that there is a relevant difference between genetic diagnostic 
procedures and other medical diagnostic methods. This strategy aims at discrediting any 
specialised regulations of genetic testing and proposes to subsume genetic testing under the 
existing regulations for the use and marketing of medical devices. In that vein, the National 
Ethics Council in Germany intended to frame the predictive dimension of genetic testing as 
similar to other predictive diagnostic procedures. Also in the Human Genetics Commission 
“genetic exceptionalism” is an established concept from which part of the Commission 
members distance themselves. One HGC member declares: 
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“I am questioning the extent to which ethics in genetics is so very different from ethics in health care generally, 
because there is a point to which having this genetic exceptionalism. If you look for example genetic data, well it 
really is just about health care data, it is part of your health record, and so separating out genetic data, starts to 
get very difficult.” (Interview 20-3 2006). 
In this context the term “genetic discrimination” – a strategically  important element within the 
critique of using genetic tests in the insurance business and employment – has also become a 
contested issue (GeneWatch UK 2001b; Lemke 2005; Stockter 2004/2005). One issue concerns 
the question on the basis of which diagnostic procedure a person is “discriminated” against: Is 
he or she discriminated on the basis of a DNA test or simply on the basis of the analysis of the 
“phenotype”, which is linked to a “genetic disease”? Second, the level of probabilities is at stake, 
the predictive value of a diagnostic procedure and also the “seriousness” of the condition 
predicted – a lot of levels of differentiation. These categories of differentiation are based on the 
increasing scientific uncertainties themselves, produced by epidemiological knowledge and the 
focus on “multi-factorial” diseases (chapter 2). 
Today, mostly the proponents and not the critics of genetic testing emphasise the scientific 
uncertainty of the knowledge produced by predictive genetic tests, especially by the tests for 
multifactorial disorders, arguing that the information a test provides has only a probabilistic 
character and does not foretell a predetermined future but rather offers a range of options to the 
user. Thus, proponents contest the assertion that the knowledge produced by genetic tests is 
more personal – and accordingly more sensitive – than other information about the individual. 
Opponents, on the other hand, are under pressure to shift the parameters of their critique and 
to move towards more ambiguous constellations of arguments – in order to react to these 
discoursive strategies of genetics‟ new modesty. Techno-sceptical NGOs like the German 
GenEthic Network argue for example that the current self-representation of scientific expertise 
is ambivalent because there is still some form of genetic reductionism at work today, manifesting 
itself in the fact that huge resources in health research are still concentrated on research based 
on the reductionist genetic paradigm38 or –- despite of recent insights into the complexity of 
gene-gene and gene – environment interactions  – on the idea of a single genetic factor causing a 
                                               
38 In the UK, the 2004 Treasury‟s Report confirmed this critique by concluding an imbalance in medical research 
funding, with too much emphasis on genetics. (Wanless 2004)  
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particular diseases (cf. Interview 26-3 2006). Some of the NGOs oppose the argument that the 
capacities of human genetics research are limited and that accordingly its risk and dangers are 
being exaggerated. One interview partner from Human Genetics Alert in the UK argues that 
techno-sceptic positions should not underestimate the seriousness and scope of individual 
genetic risk assessment and the articulated possibilities of genetic discrimination in the future 
(Interview 14-3 2006). 
This ambiguous positioning of techno-sceptic arguments also affects the term “genetic 
discrimination”: While most NGOs cling to the term as an important oppositional frame, the 
problem of defining remains. Generally, the argumentative strategy is to opt for the broadest 
possible concept of genetic testing –  including for example all diagnostics that ascribe some 
disease or impairment to genetic factors, whether it is deduced from the family history or from 
phenotype analysing (e.g., Reprokult 2004, Gen-ethisches Netzwerk 2003). Another strategy 
chosen by techno-sceptics is to distinguish between “direct genetic discrimination”, referring to 
the use of genetic test results by employers or the insurance industry, and “indirect genetic 
discrimination”, which would comprise more diffuse effects such as a hostile attitude towards 
disabled or ill people in society (Interview 5-3, 2006). However, these strategic reflections carry 
the prize of assimilating oppositional strategies to practices of “ethical brokerage”. One German 
disability rights activist – when asked whether the term “genetic discrimination” would indirectly 
contribute to a stabilization of genetic determinism as a way of thought by emphasising the 
“genetic” quality of certain conditions – answered: 
“Those debates – I would say very simply – are meta-debates. They can move within circles that have time and 
energy for those considerations. (…) We don‟t have time for these meta-debates. And they don‟t get to the point. 
The point is that to reduce a group of people to one common characteristic, say Down‟s Syndrome, that does not 
say anything about them” (Interview 11-3 2006). 
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4.1.3. Life style ethics as individual management of uncertainties: “bios-oriented” 
governance of genetic testing 
“The lines are crossed at different stages of severity in the disorder or disability. People‟s attitudes to severe mental 
impairment are often different from their approach to physical impairment. Decisions are often linked to whether 
the family could cope with the demands of a child with such problems, the impact it would have on other children, 
or on the carers. Something few outsiders can gauge accurately” (Kennedy 2006). 
Beyond the aspects of regulatory ethics discussed so far, we have detected another aspect of 
ethical governance within our narratives. It is linked to the expansion of knowledge production 
about what we can call the “bios-aspect” of genetic testing. We have observed a discursive 
explosion about the contingent social, cultural, psychological etc. modalities of individual 
decision-making on genetic testing or the subjectivities developing (and also required) in the 
context of a “geneticised” paradigm of individualised health care. This discursive explosion is 
linked to the notion of individual self-steering, to the “micro-choices for individuals that the biomedical 
powers force on them” (Callahan 1994). 
The increasing interest in the question how individuals handle uncertain and complex social 
situations in the context of increasing possibilities of genetic testing is linked to the scientific 
uncertainties produced within epidemiological knowledge on “multi-factorial” diseases. 
Governmentality studies scholars have analysed the construction of subjectivities linked to the 
new paradigm of genetic self-governance (Lemke 2004; Polzer n.d.; Rose & Novas 2003). They 
emphasise that the allegedly unchangeable destiny a genetic test result supposedly reveals is but 
one element of truth production involved in genetic testing. Opposed to this, the uncertainty of 
risk calculations and the paradigm of “multi-factorial” diseases, paradoxically, also foster the 
“responsibilization” (Rose 1999: 74) of the individual.. Responsible behaviour is seen as 
something to be activated in order to minimise risk by compensating the influence of negative 
genetic factors through decreasing other risk factors such as smoking, unhealthy nutrition etc. 
and counterbalancing the “bad” genes by a “good” life style (exercise, dietary measures), or 
psychosocial factors (seeing a therapist, having a more optimistic outlook on life etc.). Further, it 
implies preventive health care and measures – ranging from regular physical examinations to – 
in the case of breast cancer – breast amputation. This neoliberal paradigm of individual self-
responsibility implies the integration of other forms of knowledge about health or social and 
environmental factors of diseases – beyond genetics. But the paradigm still concentrates on the 
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individual, its agency, and its responsibility. Hence, it is not directed toward broader projects of 
social change, for example to improve environmental conditions or conditions of work in order 
to prevent disease. This is another reason why we consider the term “bios-orientation” adequate 
to describe this form of knowledge production, for it centres on the biography and the 
individual relationship to the own body and health. 
The new forms of expertise about the modalities of individual decision-making develop in 
different contexts: 
First, there is a field of research dedicated to complement “hard” scientific research on “red bio-
technologies” by producing sociological, cultural, or psychosocial analyses of the social 
embedding of genetic testing. This research is interested in the effects of the application of 
genetic testing. It studies the promises and future projections that shape the understanding of 
kinship, health care, corporality, or disease. Moreover, this kind of research is interested in the 
strategies individuals develop to handle often contradictory social norms, expectations, and 
desires (Knecht 2005; van den Daele 2005; Rapp 2000: for a critical overview see Kerr 2004, 84-
102). 
Second, this type of knowledge on the “bios-aspect” of genetic testing is also produced within 
the more practical context of counselling, guided by ever more sophisticated “non-directive” 
and “communicative” counselling concepts (Samerski 2002; Vieth 2004). For example, Alison 
Lashwood, consultant nurse at the biggest UK PGD clinic, explains that counselling is a rather 
therapeutic, comprehensive communication that by far exceeds the aspect of conveying 
information about the medical procedures and the risks at stake: 
“We spend a lot of time discussing PGD with couples before they undertake it. And the things we want to talk to 
them about it: What is the background, what has happened previously, so that we can understand where they are 
coming from, why they might be asking for this and why they think, PGD may help them” (Lashwood, 2006). 
Third, this knowledge production also takes place within participatory governance experiments. 
At the youth conference in Leipzig, the youth groups emphasised the need for reflecting on 
what would be the best practices of counselling. A considerable part of the catalogue of 
demands the young people developed referred to the adequate ways to address the fears, 
concerns, and needs of women confronted with the possibility of PND. Thus, not the practices 
of genetic testing and its social implications themselves were the major issues of negotiation at 
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the youth conference, but the modalities of counselling, informing, and addressing fears or 
enhancing individual choices. 
In the UK case, we have shown that the specific and contingent individual social and 
psychological situation of a “family” or “a couple”, 39 requesting PGD are in fact the main 
criteria for evaluating the “seriousness” of a condition and thus for deciding about approval or 
disapproval of their demand. Again the consultant nurse Lashwood explains: 
“The severity of a condition, the conception of this, may vary tremendously from family to family. It is not enough 
just looking at a situation of a child with a genetic disorder without looking at that within the context of the 
family, the family experience, what has happened before, how many children this couple have” (Lashwood, 
2006). 
Hence, scientific facts about genetic disorders are viewed and evaluated in the context of 
personal experience, subjective perspectives and feelings (Interview 17-3 2006).40  When the 
HFEA refuses to set up a catalogue of genetic disorders considered as “serious” enough to 
justify the use of PGD, it argues in a similar vein. In this paradigm, scientific facts such as in this 
case genetic data form merely one element in within a complex composed of different types of 
factors and their interrelationships. This systemic paradigm does not allow for any kind of long-
term, stable boundaries or regulations based on fixed categories but only for a rather flexible 
case to case decision-making. It thus shows an inherent tendency of expanding the application 
of such practices. 
Last but not least, the increasing interest in the contingent “bios-aspect” of genetic testing, in 
the specific social and emotional conditions of people using or not using genetic tests, is also 
expressed in the constitution of a new political subject involved. We will discuss this political 
subjectivity further in chapter 5 and characterize it as the “individual expert of its own lived 
genetic disorder”. The interest, for example, of the HGC to establish a Consultative Panel of 
100 persons being affected by “genetic disorders” was to get into contact with people who are 
                                               
39 In the UK, the policy discourse is very family- or couple-oriented and much less oriented toward the individual 
woman than for example in Germany. 
40 One interview partner, a disability rights activist, reports a similar but authoritarian version of this practice: He 
remembers a human geneticist counselling couples for PND who explained to him that she would recommend couples 
to meet with families with the same specific genetic condition as diagnosed for the pregnant woman before doing an 
abortion – and that she would organise the contact with families that have problems for those women she evaluates as 
not capable of having a disabled child and organise meetings with more “successful” families for those she would 
recommend to have the child (Interview 11-3 2006). 
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considered experts of their own lived genetic condition: They are of interest because they have 
the expertise to speak about the individual, yet socially embedded experiences of living with a 
certain condition in a certain social context, about the emotional circumstances of being 
confronted with the possibility of a test, about the family situation when having a disabled child 
etc. 
 
4.1.4. Empathy in order to gain “bios-related” expertise about genetic testing 
By taking into account this explosion of knowledge production on the “bios-aspect” of genetic 
testing we can understand and interpret the increasing reference to empathy and emotional 
conditions inscribed in the new forms of governance regarding genetic testing. We would argue 
that the interest in the emotional situation of the individual, couple, or family situation, in which 
a genetic test is relevant, is not only an effect of media sensationalism. It is not just a strategy to 
provide striking arguments in favour of medical or technological innovations, although it may be 
that too. Sensationalism is in fact involved, when, for example, a telecast about a family applying 
PGD for a “saviour sibling” was presented to the youth conference of the HGC in Wales (an 
element of the “Making Babies” consultation process). One interview partner from the pro life 
NGO CORE who was present at the conference remembers that she had no chance to argue 
against the emotional impressions incited by this feature: 
“They showed a television programme which lasted nearly an hour of a couple who was trying to have a baby and 
so it was just endless pictures of the sick child and how dramatic it was. It was impossible to compete with that. 
My feeling afterwards was: you don‟t move into discussing big ethical issues after you have watched a hair-tracking 
programme on television” (Interview 22-3 2006). 
Yet, on a more profound level, the role of empathy in the current governance of genetic testing 
in our view is related to the urge to know more about and thereby to better govern the 
individual “ethics” of using genetic tests (Heath et al. 2004). It is embedded in the efforts to 
steer the individual “economies of hope” (Brown 2006) linked to genetic testing and to the 
therapeutic promises of human genetics research. 
For example, one interview partner from the Genetic Interest Group (GIG) in the UK explains, 
in a rather cynical way, how the GIG “governs” the hopes of their members by developing a 
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sophisticated “politics of time”: He explains that a five years interval is useful when you want to 
generate hopes about prospective successes of human genetics in developing new therapies for 
certain genetic conditions. This time period would be short enough to maintain hope alive at the 
moment of making the promise and long enough for people to have forgotten about the 
promise once the five years are over and no therapy has shown up (Interview 13-3 2006). 
The increasing interest in the emotions involved in the use of genetic tests therefore is directed 
at a more permeating knowledge relevant for gaining public support, not just at an occasionally 
instrumental knowledge. That might be the reason why stories of individual cases are circulating 
within the expert communities; they might be interesting not only for strictly medical reasons. 
Rather, they are metaphors everybody is familiar with. At times, such stories do not even refer 
to concrete “cases” but to hypothetical constellations. There is the example of the story about 
the deaf community, a case referred to in nearly each of our interviews in the UK and circulating 
widely in the debate (Interviews 6-3 2006, 9-3 2006 and 17-3 2006; Brecher 2006; Mills 2006). 
The story is about the possibility that the people from the deaf community could demand to use 
PGD in order to select an embryo with a specific form of inherited deafness. By this means, so 
the story goes, the couple could make sure that their child will be like them and just like they 
want it to be: deaf. The story attracted a considerable amount of attention; it was evoked again 
and again, mainly in order to illustrate the potential troubling consequences a technology such as 
PGD might have. 
But there has been no such case in the UK. The story refers to a merely hypothetical setting, 
originally incited by an article about a deaf lesbian couple in the US who had looked for a sperm 
donor with a certain genetic condition linked to deafness (Spriggs 2002). Yet, the story is 
circulating as a means to incite empathy as well as reflections about a complicated and 
interesting issue to argue about. It is presented as an ethical dilemma, constituted by the value of 
reproductive autonomy on the one hand and the “welfare of the child”-principle as established 
by the HFEAct, on the other. 
Another example of the power of stories would be story of “the Hashimis” or “the Whitakers”, 
both families who have become enormously famous because they requested PGD for the 
purpose of “tissue typing”. These stories are about “suffering”, the need for making hard 
choices, but also about the need for the expert community to show empathy towards such 
individual cases.  
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The intensified interest in the “bios-aspect” of genetic testing, in the individual strategies to 
handle genetic testing emotionally, but also rationally and practically, has to be interpreted in the 
context of the economic vulnerability of the biotech industry and its uncertain future (see 
chapter 2). Only if (private or public) health care really adopts the paradigm of “pre-
symptomatic” medicine and only if the demand steadily increases, genetic tests and human 
genetics research in general will be able to expand beyond repro-genetics and beyond the rather 
small group of clients as patients with monogenetic diseases. And only then – with genetic 
testing as the forefront of possible other future applications of human genetics and as basis for 
access to samples and data – the research industry can continue. 
 
4.2. Governing the submerged unease on social implications of genetic testing 
In the following, we will confront the process of ethicisation with another aspect of the politics 
of life as observed in our narrative: The analysis of the process of ethicisation has shown, that – 
in summary – both pluralist value systems at the level of regulatory ethics and the importance of 
the “bios” at the level of individualised ethics contribute to the “non-antagonistic setting” in the 
politics of genetic testing. They establish the general claim of bioethics that values and personal 
experiences are “authentic” and need to be respected and not to be challenged within politics. 
At a symposium on the politics of bioethics in Seattle various participants analysed the function 
of bioethics within politics in its dynamic to depoliticise or “apoliticise” (Braun 2006) the debate 
on biotechnologies. Ethical policy advice does normally not provide definitive solutions to 
political governance problems (Herrmann 2006). Rather, ethics contributes to framing the issues 
in a way that precludes questioning the “authentic” experiences and the values of others. 
Therefore, “the ethics frame implies a tendency to avoid or at least mitigate controversial fights over substantial 
positions” (Braun 2006). Further, it has established fragmented and plural sites for the evaluation 
of the social consequences of genetic testing, thereby avoiding a perspective on the 
consequences of genetic testing for social order as a whole. 
Nevertheless, we have shown in the narrative that certain moments of diffuse unease about 
genetic testing remain that in a certain manner transcend the ethics frame of coexisting, 
fragmented, plural, “authentic” values and experiences. There is a persistence of discursive 
elements and forms of problematisation in the current “politics of life” that still refer to the 
implications of genetic testing to the social order as a whole – thereby transcending the 
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fragmenting ethics frame. While we hold that today‟s politics of genetic testing is not a field of 
major conflicts or disruptive moments, these frames are interesting subliminal moments of 
dislocations and of unstable interpretations. In chapter 4.2.1., we will briefly introduce the 
character of these concerns, and then focus on strategies of current participatory governance 
arrangements and experiments to govern them (4.2.1). Further, we will focus on the question 
which changes in the “politics of time” are linked to these strategies – which we will address in 
subchapter 4.3. 
 
4.2.1. Eugenics and “designer babies” as disturbing approaches 
There are two major discursive elements still circulating within participatory governance arrange-
ments. They resume the existing public unease about the normalising tendencies of genetic 
testing and its implications for the future social order: the critique of eugenic motives and 
backgrounds – in Germany rather pronounced as the critique of the “selective” bias of genetic 
testing, on the one hand, and the metaphor of “designer babies” or “babies by catalogue”, on 
the other hand. 
These two discursive elements differ in origin, and in the sites from which they are emanating: 
The reference to eugenics is embedded in the history of technosceptical social movements and 
NGOs. Today, it is above all disability rights and “pro life” activists who recur to these elements 
(e.g., Interviews 9-3 2006, 14-3 2006, 22-3 2006). However, its scope exceeds these circles and 
sites by far. The participatory governance experiment 1.000fragen.de demonstrated this very 
clearly: An overview over the questions formulated in the internet forum shows that there is a 
pervading range of concerns and fears, linking genetic testing practices to social tendencies of 
eugenics (Aktion Mensch 2003). A research project about 1000fragen.de at the University of 
Cologne evaluated the campaign and concluded that the topic of “(im)perfect humans” (Der 
(im)perfekte Mensch) was the favoured topic followed by the topic “PGD, PND, and planned 
children” (Waldschmidt et al. 2006). Within the category “PGD, PND and planned children” 
questions addressing these concerns were so abundant that two subcategories on “eugenics” 
(ibid.: 49-51) and “selection” (ibid 117-131) were established.  
Whereas the concern about eugenics is formulated mostly by organised groups or NGOs, the 
metaphor of “designer babies” or “baby by catalogue” is more diffusely originating in media 
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discourses and images (Interview 5-3 2006). However, it could also be found within the 
1000fragen.de campaign. At the 1000fragen.de internet forum questions such as “Designer 
Babies – the best for the child?” addressed that concern (www.1000fragen.de: question7360). 
There have also been a lot of connected questions such as “Does disability start with the wrong hair 
colour” or “What, if my child wants optimised parents?”, two questions which were selected as 
representative for the poster series. At the youth conference in Leipzig a group designed a 
poster with the title “baby from catalogue”; another group integrated “no baby from catalogue” in its list 
of demands. 
How to describe the character of these more diffuse public concerns that in the last years have 
not culminated in broader conflictive settings? Maybe the explanation of one researcher 
interviewed, interpreting the character of the discourse evoked by the 1000fragen.de experiment, 
is enlightening in understanding at which level of “public knowledge” these concerns are 
situated. The persistence of references to selective practices and eugenics occurs within a sphere 
that she describes as commonplace knowledge directed to the public (Interview 27-3 2005). This 
means that this knowledge directed to the public (in the sense of social visions) differs from the 
perspective of individuals towards individual decision-making on health and reproduction, a 
perspective of choice or self-determination widely accepted at the same time (with the exception 
of pro life groups). It is exactly this perspective which challenges the current politics of life – 
maybe a reason why it is addressed extensively and even evoked by the participatory governance 
arrangements we studied  – although there was no necessity to pacify concrete conflicts or even 
reorder moments of disruption. 
 
4.2.2. Strategies to “debunk myths” and to reduce political positions to “false” 
emotions 
In our narratives we have identified various sites where discursive strategies developed to evoke 
and deal with this broader but diffuse public unease towards genetic testing. A site where this 
could be observed very clearly is the consultation process in the UK, with the “Making Babies” 
report as its result. In the consultation paper there was an explicit reference to those concerns 
and to the necessity to “debunk” and divert them (Human Genetics Commission 2004). But this 
effort was also present in the other participatory endeavours, for example when a jury at the 
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youth conference in Leipzig evaluated the best media and art products created during that 
process. It deemed certain films or posters presented by young people to be “exaggerated” or 
“one-sided” and negative, or emphasised that possibilities of genetic engineering were 
“overestimated”. Efforts to “debunk myths” and especially to normalise PGD against these 
concerns have also been obvious in the academic setting of a symposium on “Designer Babies” 
at Middlesex University, in which researcher Susanne Schultz participated in February 2006. 41 
The 1000fragen.de project differed from the other examples insofar that it was a more open 
space, more sympathetic for these concerns, allowing them to circulate without developing 
explicit counter-strategies; after all the NGO Aktion Mensch as an organisation for disabled 
people is more grounded in these concerns. Nevertheless, there have been experts invited to 
discuss some of the questions at the forum and some of these experts used this space to 
discredit some of those concerns. 
One strategy, for example, to argue against the accusation formulated by disability rights 
organisations that PGD or PND would discriminate people with disabilities, was to differentiate 
between the individual decision and the social discrimination of a group. The dossier about 
PGD at 1000fragen.de for example explains: 
“A lot of associations and groups of disabled people explain that PGD has a discriminatory character. However, 
it would be wrong to state that the personal decision of a couple to use PGD amounts to a discrimination of the 
group of people with disabilities” (www.1000fragen.de/hintergruende/dossiers/). 
In a similar vein, the HGC Making Babies report recommends policy measures to compensate 
the potentially discriminating effects of PND and thus to solve the problem: 
“We suggest that a strong programme of research aimed at better treatments for genetic conditions, coupled with 
availability of appropriate services for those with genetic conditions, is the best means of addressing some of the 
ethical objections to prenatal screening” (Human Genetics Commission 2006: 35). 
                                               
41 Symposium: “Ethical and Legal Issues at the Beginning of Life: Debating „Designer Babies‟” Middlesex University, 
2.2.2006. London. 
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The public deficit to understand the “bios-orientation” of genetic testing 
“Obviously there has been a lot of talk here but also in America and across Europe about designer babies, the 
ethics of that. But what the commission always strongly say in their meetings, but perhaps haven‟t said in a report 
before, is that actually a lot of this is fantasy, that the science just doesn‟t match the tabloid of public perception of 
what is possible, that it is just not possible, and we can‟t conceive of a time in the near future that it would be 
possible to have any child you want” (Interview 4-3, 2006). 
In general, concerns about the return of eugenics via genetic testing often refer to the “feelings” 
or “emotions” of disabled people that could be offended by preventing the birth of people like 
them. The counterstrategy, in turn, responds that these feelings have to be taken seriously, but 
that they are nevertheless misled (e.g., van den Daele 2005: 226). Here the respect for feelings 
and emotions  and the high regard for authenticity shows some limitations. The strategies to 
debunk concerns about eugenics and “designer babies” stem from the classical deficit model of 
public understanding of science: They declare that public fears are unfounded and irrational 
because they are not grounded in real facts, not based on real developments but on “myths” and 
in they get declassified as being emotional in a pejorative sense. In the case of PGD the 
argument normally is that it had nothing to do with the concept of “designer babies” for there 
are no practices and also no technological possibilities to select “blue eyes” or “intelligence” 
(e.g., Interview 17-3 2006). This rhetoric also refers to the indication that PGD was not about 
positive eugenics (in the sense of deliberately producing a higher “quality” baby) but merely 
constituted a “dis-selective” strategy to exclude embryos with certain negative characteristics 
(e.g., Interview 10-3 2006). 
However, these arguments about the scientific incorrectness of public fears, which are a typical 
gesture of the old deficit model are now embedded in a different type of argumentation. The 
discursive investment not only and even not primarily aims to identify the lack of understanding 
as a lack of “objective” or scientific knowledge. Above all it discredits evaluations of the motives 
and reasons why people use or not use PGD or PND as “false”: We would argue that this is a 
prevailing dimension in the present governance of genetic testing and recurs to the expanded 
knowledge production on the “bios-aspect” of genetic testing. 
For example, the typical argumentative strategy in favour of PGD and against the “designer 
babies” paradigm is to explain that the procedure of IVF and PGD is very arduous and harmful 
for the patients, that often the treatments do not result in a pregnancy, and that patients only 
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undergo the procedure when they are faced with extremely burdensome experiences in their 
families and extreme situations of suffering. Here again, we see the new modesty assumed by 
proponents of genetic technology. Interestingly, this argumentative strategy partly refers to 
arguments (once) formulated by critical feminists protesting against the harmful procedures of 
hormone treatment and IVF. 
For example, one commission member of HFEA explains: 
“My view is that eugenics isn‟t a very helpful word because it has such negative overtones for very good reasons, 
and I think what we mean by PGD isn‟t eugenics in any sense, as I would understand it. I suppose, really 
important to remember with PGD is that it is very, very rare, it is very difficult to do, it is very expensive and is 
really stressful for the patients, and the people who go through have nasty, nasty conditions in their families, they 
are not doing that for some sort of breeding superchildren, they have generally had children who have died of 
horrible diseases or who have horrible diseases and they don‟t want their next child to suffer. And I can‟t see that 
as eugenics, I see that as parents doing everything they can to avoid their children suffering” (Interview 10-3 
2006). 
In the last years, this argument also surfaced, as a disability rights activist observes, in more 
expert oriented panels where academic experts try to discredit the positions of technosceptical 
NGO representatives by referring to empirical studies about the motivations of people using 
PND: 
“There are various academics who intent to prove by scientific arguments that PND does not have a 
discriminatory factor; what is ridiculous because it very simply has this factor, but they try to prove contrary with 
strange empirical studies” (Interview 11-3 2006). 
For example, Wolfgang van den Daele, a social researcher very present in public discourse in 
Germany as a member of the former National Ethics Council and, for example, also as 
participant of the youth conference in Leipzig, has published recent empirical research results 
about the consequences of PND for disabled people. He concludes that there is no empirical 
proof that the expanding practice of PND is embedded in an increasing discrimination of 
disabled people within the German society. He argues that from the individual perspective of a 
woman having an abortion after PND it is “obvious that the judgement to be „not desired‟ is a judgement 
against the disability as characteristic and not against the disabled as a person” (van den Daele 2005: 228). 
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Generally, this reference to empirical knowledge about the motives of people using PND or 
PGD, the reference to the “bios-aspect” of genetic testing distracts attention from the fact that 
abortion after PND, or PGD is a selective practice based on normative approaches towards the 
“quality” of genetic or bodily characteristics of future persons. 
 
Eugenics beyond state coercion? 
Connected to the emphasis on the motives why women or couples choose to use PGD or PND 
is the general argument that the decisions to use PGD or PND are voluntary and part of 
individual reproductive choice and freedom – and, therefore, have nothing to do with the 
tradition of eugenics. The effort to distance the analysis of genetic testing practices and its 
contextures from the tradition of eugenics is also present in social science research on 
“biopolitics” (Rabinow & Rose 2003). The main argument is, that today‟s developments could 
not be interpreted as eugenics, 42  because they are no longer state-governed, coercive, and 
directed to a national or racial body. 
This arguments shows that the definition of eugenics itself is a contested terrain in this “public 
energy field” – although the question of definition mostly is not addressed directly. 
The efforts to accuse anti-eugenic positions of ignoring the voluntary character of current 
selective practices within reproduction attempt to marginalise the concerns of those who 
consider the new “individualised” or “normalised” forms of eugenics a nevertheless problematic 
development relevant for deliberation and political debate. 
Especially in the UK, the strategy to debunk the term eugenics as a wrong perspective on 
politics of genetic testing is currently very present. Techno-sceptic pro life organisations and 
disability rights activists refer to historical eugenics when they criticise practices of genetic 
testing. They argue that even in the absence of state coercion, individualised or “laissez-faire” 
eugenics nevertheless constitutes a practice of eugenic selection (Interview 14-3 2006). Or, 
secondly, they interpret current practices of repro-genetics as nevertheless indirectly state-led or 
                                               
42 There are exceptions: For example STC declares in its statement on the review of the HFEAct that it has no problem 
to positively refer to the term: “If ensuring that your child is less likely to face a debilitating disease in the course of their life can be 
termed eugenics, we have no problem with its use” (Secretary of State for Health 2005). 
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institutionally controlled. For they question the possibilities of voluntary decision-making or 
self-determination for individual patients within these settings (Interviews 9-3 2006, 22-3 2006). 
 
4.3. Reordering the politics of time 
The strategy to discredit the argument of a continuum between historic eugenics and genetic 
testing is linked to a specific “politics of time”. In the following we will look at the relation 
between the politics of life and the politics of time in the field of genetic testing. Three aspects 
are important here:  first, the separation of past and present, second, different approaches 
towards the future in terms of different time horizons (near – far) on the one hand and different 
degrees of predictability on the other (uncertain and “realistic” vs. predictable and extreme), and 
third, the contents of the different approaches to the future and their changes over time. 
 
4.3.1. Separating past and present 
One element within the strategies to discredit those who see a continuity of between historic 
eugenics and PND and PGD is to draw a clear line between the past and the present and to 
emphasise discontinuities (Kerr 2004, 15ff.). In some respect the point made by Rose and 
Rabinow (Rose 2001; Rabinow & Rose 2003) that we are currently experiencing a new form of 
biopolitics supports this strategy. Anne Kerr, in contrast, argues that recent research (and we 
would add: recent governance too) is oriented towards patient autonomy, lay people, genetic 
citizenship, and the separation between the past and the present, while there is a tendency to 
neglect continuities, the power of experts and professions, and the institutional control of 
genetic testing by health care systems (cf. Kerr 2003, 2004). In regard to the question of 
eugenics and the politics of time, there was a telling conflict within the Human Genetics 
Commission between the utilitarian hardliner John Harris and other members of the 
commission. Insiders explain that the argument was about whether to include the topic of 
eugenics in the “Making Babies” report as the background for current politics of genetic testing. 
In the end, a reference to eugenics was included but only to historic eugenics without any 
discussion about potential continuities to the present (Human Genetics Commission 2006). 
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4.3.2. Post-catastrophic/post-euphoric realism 
“You don‟t want to close the door on what is potentially good, but you don‟t want to rush ahead and do things 
before you are ready. So if at some point in the future there seems like a significant health gain to be had from 
doing it, then lets have the discussion then about the ethical and social consequences of doing it, but otherwise, if 
you do it now, then what you really do is guessing what is going to happen. And we have a very bad history of 
predicting where science will go” (Interview 13-3 2006). 
Looking at the relation between the politics of life and the “politics of time” in our case study,  
we see a new “post-catastrophic” or “post-euphoric” realism emerging in recent years. 
Proponents of genetic testing today are incorporating techno-sceptic arguments into their 
evaluations of future scenarios. Additionally, we see a “new modesty” among proponents in that 
they emphasise the limited scope of human genetics‟ possibilities in the future. At least the 
expert community (less the media or public education projects on science) increasingly refers to 
the fact that human genetics have continuously revised their models during the last years turning 
away from models of genetic determinism towards more complex models, which, however, 
involve a considerable amount of scientific uncertainty (chapter 2). They thereby do not 
discredit human genetics research but rather consider science as being capable of self-reflection, 
modesty, and complexity. This integration of uncertainty about the future into (self-) 
presentation of human genetics also surfaces when HGC members reflect their limited 
possibilities to decide about future developments (see quotation above, interview 13-3 2006). 
One HGC commission member compares talking about regulatory decisions on future possible 
applications of genetic testing to “crystal ball gazing” when (Interview 20-3 2006). Similarly, the 
argument against “genetic exceptionalism” displays a post-euphoric but also post-catastrophic 
“realisms” in that it stresses the (so far) limited applicability of genetic tests for the insurance 
industry and employers and the uncertainty of genetic risk profiling – thereby normalizing 
genetic testing in framing it as just one way of acquiring – more or less reliable - information 
among others. 
4.3.3. Colonising the future: exploitation of biovalue versus the administration of 
populations 
“The workshop addressed the intersections between potential developments in biotechnology and current trends of 
commercialisation in health care systems. One of the major themes that emerged from the discussion was concern 
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about the subtle „colonisation‟ of discourse on the future of health care by the pharmaceutical industry, which is 
highly invested in genetics research” (Summary of a workshop at the conference “European 
Biopolitics”, Berlin 2006). 
Despite this “new modesty” as regards predicting the future, some scenarios about the future are 
circulating and shaping the current governance of genetic testing. The debate on predictive 
medicine is essentially a debate on future scenarios. For up to now, the development of a 
predictive or “pre-symptomatic” medicine is limited to a few tests actually being on the market 
testing common “multi-factorial” diseases and not merely rare monogenetic conditions. 
Therefore, the current governance of genetic testing is permeated by future scenarios although 
with less apocalyptical or techno-euphoric elements. Rather, it is directed towards the economic 
possibilities and the scenarios the pharmaceutical and biotech industry promotes – such as the 
scenario of an individualised medicine and tailored drugs that would fit individual susceptibilities 
and risks. These future scenarios are linked to the success of health care concepts such as 
prevention, life style orientation, self responsibility, and also social differentiation of clients. 
These changes in the politics of the future are also reflected by techno-sceptic NGOs. Recently, 
at a European workshop on biopolitics in Berlin,43 NGOs debated whether they unconsciously 
have contributed and participated in this “colonisation of the future”. Those NGOs asked 
themselves whether they had uncritically adopted pharmaceutical and human genetics research 
assertions about the development of future health care systems – without any evidence on the 
question of whether these projects will actually work and whether they will be integrated into 
future health care systems or will only develop in niches of privatised services (Sexton 2006; 
Shalev 2006). 
Hence, proponents as well as critics have changed their politics of time towards less forward-
looking utopian or dystopian scenarios and increased their scepticism towards the possibilities of 
anticipating scientific and technological transformations in human genetics. 
However, there are a lot of differences in which frames are used in order to (more cautiously) 
approach nearer future scenarios. Especially, there is a certain tension between an economic 
                                               
43 Conference: European Biopolitics. Connecting Civil Society - Implementing Basic Values, 17-19 March 2006. 
Heinrich Böll Stiftung Berlin. 
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frame and a more state-oriented frame, which is important for the contested perspective on 
eugenics. 
There is a trend in current social research projects – and also in the debates within formal 
governance institutions – to focus on the economic prospects of biotech or pharmaceutical 
industries. This perspective is interested in the increasing networks of research and industries 
seeking to exploit “biovalue” (e.g., Gottweis 2005; Rose 2006; Rabinow & Rose 2003). 
While the (nation) state plays a minor role in these analyses and scenarios, some voices continue 
to link these developments to the question of the role of the state and the dimension of 
administration of populations, a dimension neglected or even negated within mainstream social 
research approaches (van den Daele 2005: 219). Especially in the context of the privatisation of 
health care systems they alert that strategies of cost-efficiency and commercialisation can be 
linked to strategies of population management. They argue that strategies to reduce costs by 
reducing the amount of “ill” or “disabled” children or strategies to delegate the responsibility for 
preventing future diseases to the individuals show continuities to the historical background of 
eugenics and have administrative state-oriented dimensions. One interview partner from the 
pro-life organisation CORE, for example, mentions a text in the British Medical Journal, in 
which the economic benefits of a general screening of pregnant women for Down‟s syndrome 
are calculated (Gilbert et al. 2001). 44  One interview partner from the German NGO Gen-
Ethisches Netzwerk explains that in her view a eugenic perspective is present when 
administrative and economic projects come together in order to manage the quality of a 
population as has been the case in her view in recent attempts to establish the discipline of 
public health genetics in Germany (Interview 26-3 2006). 
These different frames to evaluate the futures of genetic testing are connected to the question 
whether more systemic or more fragmented perspectives on the social implications of genetic 
testing should be adopted. The economic frame suggests a more fragmented type of analysis by 
looking at different projects to exploit biovalue and different interests of “consumers” and 
“providers” within complex sets of research interests and potential products of human genetics. 
In contrast, the focus on population management highlights a strategic setting or even “state 
                                               
44 In Copenhagen there has been a proposal to screen all pregnant women in order to detect cases of Down‟s syndrome, 
openly basing their case on the reduction of public expenses for disabled children (Dahl 2003).  
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project” that, if not in terms of intentions but in terms of effects implies eugenic features– and 
is impregnating the future social order with hierarchical norms about the quality of human 
bodies and populations. 
 
 
5. Performing participation: multiple publics and new 
political subjectivities 
“I am sure that the aim [of creating the Human Genetics Commission] is to prevent all the trouble that 
they had with GMOs (…) But there hasn‟t been a really large public movement in the area of human genetics, so 
we can‟t test whether that commission would have an effect.” (Interview 14-3 2006) 
As work package 1 has elaborated theoretically, the shifts in the politics of life in recent decades 
took place within concrete more or less institutionalised procedures, within specific sites, setting 
the scene for specific forms of communication and constituting specific “publics” and specific 
political subjectivities. It is this performative dimension of the governance of genetic testing we 
will stress in this chapter, by analysing the concrete new models of participatory governance 
arrangements or experiments that we have selected for observation in more detail. 
For our work package the perspective on performativity is particularly illuminative, because the 
new governance schemes did not develop within strong conflict settings but are – at least in the 
UK – part of a “strategic framework” developed by the government to promote public 
deliberation. Hence, they need to be analysed as the production of a “public energy field” that is 
initiated, shaped and steered “from above”. Hence, we can see that the forms of political 
problematisation and the subjectivities circulating within these settings are not only “mise en 
scène” but even evoked within performative practices. In the following, we will approach the 
concept of performative practices also in the sense of practicing, or exercising – the new 
governance arrangements are a place to exercise new ways to talk, act, and think about genetic 
testing and to establish these forms by continuously repeating and inciting them. 
In the UK, we have observed the establishment of a flexible, expanding advisory system 
including lay people participation, public consultations, people‟s panels, citizen juries, focus 
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groups, and consultative panels. In contrast, at the European Union level there have only been 
isolated dialogue processes, strictly regulated and limited by pre-formulated recommendations. 
In Germany and Austria we have observed a more state-centred system of parliamentary study 
commissions and the National Ethics Council (or future German Ethics Council) in Germany, 
or the Bioethics Commission in Austria. They integrate experts and some stakeholder 
representatives, while participatory governance experiments such as consensus conferences and 
other participative projects have rarely been embedded within these formal governance 
arrangements. Jasanoff discerns different styles of governance of biotechnologies in Germany 
and the UK, distinguishing between state-led “programmatic regulation” in Germany, and 
regulation focused on the process in the UK (Jasanoff 2005). However, as regards Germany, the 
picture would be incomplete without taking into account a rather strong tradition of protest 
movements and a vital civil society in the sense of Dryzek and others (Dryzek et al. 2003). In 
Germany, the separation between the sphere of civil society and what is going on there on the 
one hand and the state and its formal governance arrangements on the other  is deeper and 
more significant than in the UK. In Germany and Austria, formal governance arrangements are 
more insulated against public engagement practices. One reason for this separation might be 
that in Germany today‟s “involved publics” are still perceived as being successors of the rather 
oppositional, in part radical protest movements in the 1980s.  
In the following, we will not so much present a systematic comparative study about the 
nationally specific forms of governance but rather highlight the different ways in which new 
participatory governance arrangements or experiments dislocate and reorder “politics of life”. In 
our narrative we have described the absence of strong controversies and the coexistence of a 
plurality of different positions which do not collide with one another but stand side by side. 
Within this non-antagonistic setting critique is not invisible but is able to circulate in the various 
channels of fragmented debates. We want to show that the procedures and sites of deliberation 
that we will analyse in the following are effectively organising this situation. They do so by 
multiplying different forms of “publics” and political subjectivities, and by stimulating the 
debate and even the circulation of techno-sceptical or oppositional arguments. However, these 
performative practices guarantee that the discourses of problematisation circulate in fragmented 
and specialised ways, regulated by new and differentiated forms of expertise. We therefore 
suggest that, although the participatory governance experiments at the EU level, in Austria and 
Germany are much more isolated, disperse, and disconnected from the centres of political 
power, they nevertheless might contribute to a similar “strategic constellation”. The term 
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“strategic constellation” refers to the interpretation of strategy by Michel Foucault and thus does 
not refer to actors intentionally promoting and planning these strategies (Foucault 1983). This 
concept also takes into account that this strategic constellation might not be completely 
established and that there is no linear development toward its completion. 
We will approach the performative dimensions of the current new governance schemes in the 
field of genetic testing in the following way: We start with a twofold approach to “institutional 
ambiguities”, one concerning the boundaries between what is inside and what is outside of these 
participatory practices, the other concerning institutional ambiguities within those practices: 
Therefore, first, in 5.1 we have to  point out the limited scope and influence of participatory 
governance arrangements within existing power relationships of human genetics. We can discern 
different dimensions of limitation here. Second, in 5.2., we will analyse in more depth the 
institutional ambiguities within these new schemes of governance – especially the multiplicity of 
different “publics” constituted by these participatory procedures and the paradoxical democratic 
pretensions of citizen juries or consensus conferences. In this subchapter we will at first focus 
on the case of the Human Genetics Commission in the UK, because of its explicit complex 
strategic framework. Afterwards we will compare these findings with the more disperse settings 
in Germany and Austria. In a third step (5.3.), we will take a closer look at two privileged 
political subjectivities staged within the new settings: the figure of the patient or the personally 
affected individual as “individual experts of the lived genetic condition”, and the “genetic 
citizen”, connected to the idea of “genetic solidarity or altruism”. 
 
5.1. Institutional Ambiguities 1: the boundaries of new participatory 
governance practices 
“One general thing I would say about the Human Genetics Commission that actually whenever there is a concrete 
policy issue to decide, it gets marginalised. For example on all which has to do with reproduction, it is basically the 
HFEA that takes policy decision, in the area of genetic screening, you have a genetic screening committee etc.” 
(Interview 14-3 2006). 
In the course of the presented narrative of genetic testing our case study has made a general 
observation on the changing “politics of life”: There has been a change in governance away 
from pure technocratic and expert-based models of policy advice toward – albeit often 
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piecemeal or comprising pilot elements only – participatory, deliberative, consultative, or 
dialogue approaches. As Jones and Salter have shown in a discourse analysis of the European 
and UK governmental documents on human genetics policies, there is a growing emphasis on 
“transparency” and “openness” as criteria for a good regulatory practice (Jones & Salter 2003). 
For Germany, Herrmann identifies the beginning of a third phase of bioethics policy 
characterized by dialogue and participation of “basically everybody” (Herrmann 2006). 
These new elements, nevertheless, coexist with regulatory principles based on experts, 
stakeholders, or even on formal state institutions only. Anne Kerr has analysed this ambiguity 
with respect to human genetics as a simultaneously centrifugal and centralist tendency of 
governance (Kerr 2003). Braun has suggested the coexistence of an “expert model”, a 
“stakeholder model”, and a “republican model” in the governance of human biotechnologies 
(Braun 2002). 45 Moreover, several studies suggest that these coexisting or combined governance 
models are not combinations governed by equitable forces, but that there is a persisting nucleus 
of insiders, allotted expertise, and professional and scientific/technological self-regulation. This 
nucleus is not seriously questioned by the new forms of governance. Rather, it is merely 
complemented, and uses mechanisms of closure and control towards new governance elements 
in times of public contestation of certain technological developments (Herrmann 2005; Kerr 
2003). The new forms of participatory, dialogue oriented governance techniques are often 
situated at the periphery of the policy arena, while technocratic, professional, and modern-
statecraft forms of governance still dominate the politics of genetic testing in a lot of ways. This 
proves to be especially true when examining the “end product” of political, regulatory decision 
making (Interview 3-3, 2006). Regarding their influence and connection to “modern state-craft” 
and to the technocratic and professional nucleus of power in human genetics, we need to take 
into account the following limitations: 
First of all, the impact of the new participatory elements on political decision-making and on the 
control over the development of research and the regulation of genetic testing is rather limited. 
In the UK, the advisory system which organised public engagement procedures has a mainly 
non-statutory character – with the exception of the HFEA and its right to license individual 
procedures in reproductive technologies. There is no guarantee that government policies or 
                                               
45 Similarly: Jones & Salter 2003. 
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parliamentarians will consider the advisory system‟s recommendations in their decisions (Jones 
& Salter 2003; Martin 2001) – and often, when the HGC claimed to have had such influence, 
insiders questioned the commission‟s real impact on government action (see, for example, the 
insurance moratorium). Moreover, consultations, forums, and panels as forms of direct 
involvement of “the public” or of stakeholder organisations are dependent on their translation 
into policy recommendations by the advisory committees, which are not obliged to follow the 
outcomes of these participatory processes (see below). 
In Germany and Austria, even more so, new forms of participatory governance have not even 
been established in a consistent way. As mentioned before, traditional institutions of modern 
statecraft such as parliamentary study commissions  with its mix of parliamentarians and experts 
and the National Ethics Council (based on experts and stakeholders) or, as planned by the 
current government, the German Ethics Council, dominate the governance arrangements. And 
consensus conferences or other models of public engagement have been disperse and 
marginalised from political decision making. 
Moreover, there are various mechanisms to exclude certain issues from deliberation within these 
participatory spaces: In our narrative we have already pointed out that a lot of “hard” issues in 
the politics of genetic testing are negotiated and decided while ignoring the new promises of 
dialogue, transparency, and public engagement. At the symposium on European biopolitics in 
Berlin, UK participants pointed out the “elephant in the corner” neglected by new participatory 
forms of governance. For example, the UK Human Genetics Commission has no mandate to 
debate research policies and has only marginally touched the topic of patent law, claiming that 
both were not a topic for the ethical and social aspects of human genetics. It also withdraws 
from involvement as soon as other institutions – as recently the UK Biobank project – establish 
their own ethical governance schemes (Interview 20-3 2006). The 1999 review of the 
biotechnology framework already alluded to this possibility to exclude certain issues from 
consultation when it declared that “in future, the public will have […] the opportunity (where appropriate) 
to comment” (Cabinet Office & Office of Science and Technology 1999). 
There also is a limitation in regard to the time frame: At which stage of technological 
development are participatory elements introduced? We can observe that in all national contexts 
most dialogue and consultation processes on genetic testing have been established when genetic 
testing practices were implemented and applied for the first time – in the sense of cutting-edge 
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science – for example genetic testing on “multi-factorial” conditions now and PGD during the 
millennium change. This focus keeps both already established practices and research and 
development phases of genetic testing out of the debate (Jones & Salter 2003). 
Another limitation concerns the impact of possible outcomes of participatory governance 
practices. Governments or decision-making authorities oftentimes choose not to respond to 
controversial outcomes of for instance consultation processes by simply delaying the political 
decisions. This became obvious, for example, in how the HFEA and the HGC handled the vote 
on PGD for tissue typing. Also the fact that in Germany PGD was removed from the political 
agenda when the controversies during the millennium change did not result in public acceptance 
for more permissive regulations could be interpreted as a delay strategy  that avoided a formal 
legal regulation of the issue at a time when large parts of the public remained opposed to PGD. 
Beyond these more direct limitations to participatory deliberation there are also inherent 
limitations set by the discursive frame of ethicisation: firstly, insofar as regulatory ethics has a 
de-contextualising effect on defining what is considered an issue worthy of discussion, and 
secondly, insofar as the ethics frame discredits substantial political controversies by referring to 
the plurality and personal status of differing values. 
 
5.1.1. Governance through professional self-regulation 
The new participatory governance arrangements are not only limited in their relationship to 
formal regulatory state-led decisions, to modern statecraft. Our narrative has shown that there 
are also important sites of governance of genetic testing not covered by state-based regulatory 
procedures. These sites consist of, on the one hand, governance through professional self-
regulation; and, on the other hand, the spaces left to individual decision-making backed by the 
paradigm of individual self-steering and linked to professional self-regulation by the policies and 
codes for counselling. 
Practices of professional self-regulation are not only prevalent in scientific research and in the 
commercial sector but also in the public health care system. PND, which in quantitative terms is 
the most wide-spread practice of genetic testing, is regulated mainly by guidelines of medical 
associations. Also, in Germany it is physicians who “rule” whether the health of a pregnant 
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woman is endangered by the “defect” fetus she is pregnant with. Decision-making about 
abortions after PND in general and about late-term abortions too is exercised by the medical 
profession. For the UK, Martin concludes that the strongest governance institutions for human 
genetics in health care are medical bodies such as the Royal Colleges and the British Medical 
Association. He also shows that often their guidelines and codices are more influential and often 
do not follow the recommendations of the non-statutory advisory system but rather collide with 
them (Martin 2001). 
In this context it is interesting that internal professional governance procedures in health care 
are often left out from consultation processes. For example, it is illustrative that the first 
consultations on genetic testing performed by the new advisory system in the UK referred to 
over-the-counter-tests only, leaving out tests delivered within the NHS and thus via the medical 
profession. In Germany, there haven‟t been any influential public initiatives to influence 
practices of late-term abortion through medical guidelines either (Interview 27-3 2005). Neither 
did the debate on the proposed law on genetic testing in 2004 and 2005 focus on PND, 
although some feminist experts engaged in revising some of the formulations in the draft. 
 
5.1.2. Governance by individual self-steering as background of de- or non-regulation 
Beyond these different sites of governance, we also need to take into account the persisting 
space of practices of genetic testing not regulated at all – as is the case for commercially supplied 
tests (with the exception of Austria). The paradigm of individual or consumer choice and 
individual self-steering is another general boundary. It is promoting recommendations and codes 
of practices rather than legal regulations. In the case of the proposed law for genetic testing in 
Germany it became clear that there is much opposition to regulate this space at all (in particular 
in the case of paternity tests). In the UK, the paradigm of individual choice has also prevented 
the advisory system from proposing clear forms of regulation in a lot of areas and cases. For 
example, the consultation on over-the-counter-tests resulted in a limited scope of 
recommendations of codes of practice to be voluntarily implemented by the biotech industry 
itself. Hence, the paradigms of reproductive or patient autonomy, consumer choice, and 
individual responsibility for health care are themselves an important obstacle against the 
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influence of more collective, consensual decision-making, and, in this sense, participatory 
governance mechanisms. 
The paradigms of counselling, privacy, confidentiality, and informed consent strengthen the 
scope of individual decision-making and protect it against collective decision-making, whether 
participatory or not. Therefore, these individualistic paradigms in a sense limit the scope and 
influence of participatory governance too. 
 
5.2. Institutional ambiguities 2: within the new governance arrangements 
“The government is also very aware how difficult and controversial these areas are and actually quite happy to 
have the commission [HGC] feeling its way and supporting. They have such a mess in almost every other area of 
society, I think they are well off leaving this alone.” (Interview 6-3 2006). 
 
“Since the HGC was established it has been quite successful in terms of promoting rational discussion of the 
issues. (….) there was no forum within which it was possible to have a measured debate. Discussion of the issues 
tended to be more sort of shouting from fixed viewpoints, so as they were, and hoping to convince whoever, the 
government the public, about the validity of your views simply by the force with which you expressed it. Human 
Genetics Advisory Commission moderated that and then the Human Genetics Commission I think improved 
even better” (Interview 13-3 2006). 
After having emphasized the limitations of new participatory governance arrangements or 
experiments, we will concentrate on the internal rationalities and the ambiguous constellations 
within participatory governance arrangements or experiments in the area of genetic testing. 
In the beginning we will focus on the advisory system in the UK with its complex but 
nevertheless centralised system of different forms of consultation and public engagement – and 
integrate some observations about other national settings with respect to the different “publics” 
constituted. Also, we will at the end of this subchapter comment on the differences between 
Austrian, German, and EU settings. 
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5.2.1. Flashing out heterogeneous “publics” 
“The commission [HGC] is much more concerned to work, ensuring that it flashes out the viewpoints that exist 
around an issue. That is why in a sense there are multiple ways in which you can input to the commission” 
(Interview 13-3 2006). 
“We did not count how many organisations and individuals argued one point as against another. (…) Instead we 
were interested in understanding and considering the variety of views. Each conclusion and recommendation is 
taken on its own merit” (Human Genetics Commission 2006). 
First, institutional ambiguity within the participatory governance arrangement of the UK means 
that the HGC and also the HFEA apply heterogeneous methods to organise consultation and 
public engagement, with a diversity of procedures to stage different forms of political subjects: 
 the “abstract public” constituted by opinion polls, 
 the “pure public”, the ignorant public, eventually being converted through the process of 
citizen juries and focus groups into the “informed” or “educated” public, 
 the “partisan public”, namely the stakeholders who are given a voice in the consultation 
paper responses, and 
  “affected publics” constituted by individuals who are directly or indirectly affected  by a 
certain genetic condition or disorder,  as we see for instance in the constitution of a 
patients panel. 
In the UK, this huge discourse machinery seems to work quite well in centralising and 
channelling a broad range of the political debates on genetic testing. Also techno-sceptic, 
oppositional NGOs feel generally obliged to respond to consultation papers, although they 
rather view this as an “arduous task” absorbing a lot of work without having much impact 
(Interviews 14-3 2006, 22-3 2006). 
The effect of this arrangement of methods, actors, and viewpoints staged by the advisory system 
could be interpreted as performing the complexity, fragmentation, contingency, and uncertainty 
of political stakes and thereby contributing to the versatile, non-antagonistic setting we have 
introduced at the beginning. At the same time the highly appraised claim of the advisory system 
to produce consensual recommendations organises this complex landscape of opinions and 
actors in such a way that it draws a line between positions that are still inside and other that are 
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outside of a “measured debate” (Interview 13-3 2006), excluding the latter for being extremist or 
fundamentalist positions.46 
How is the construction of different types of “publics” integrated into the governance of genetic 
testing? How do these constructions shape the advisory system‟s decision making and how have 
they regulated the public debate? There are various answers, which hold, as we would argue, 
different momentum: 
Certainly, there are cases in which the results of participatory consultation processes are quite 
obvious, when the opinion or concern articulated via these procedures appears quite clear and 
quite unanimous. In these cases, for example, in the consultation on sex selection, when the vast 
majority of responses expressed strong objections against using sex selection for “family 
balancing”, the advisory system here functioned as a mode to react to this more or less 
homogeneous public concerns. In this case the consultation process led to a clear 
recommendation respecting the concerns. It even resulted in a clear vote against liberal 
utilitarian representatives within in the HGC or also against the STC who had voted in favour of 
the right to select the sex of one´s future child via PGD (Bionews 2006a; Moore 2006). 
Within the general situation of very few conflicts on genetic testing, the main function of the 
advisory system, nevertheless, is not to directly react to public concerns. It is rather an 
instrument to proactively incite and steer public discourse on genetic testing prior to the 
emergence of antagonistic constellations. Even more, it not only anticipates public concerns but 
even more actively initiates a productive discourse machinery influencing and shaping the future 
hegemonic discourse on genetic testing. 
Hence, one interview partner from the techno-sceptic NGO Human Genetics Alert concludes 
that the main function of the HGC is not to be an early warning system for oppositional and 
conflictive arguments and movements. Rather, he interprets it as a discourse machine “directed 
toward policy formation organisations and NGOs and think tanks” (Interview 14-3 2006). However, this 
analysis again misses the point in regard to the political subjects constituted and privileged in 
this process. The privileged subjects in the UK case are not NGOs or representatives of older 
                                               
46 The claim of a measured debate is connected to the bioethics frame that focuses on “conciliatory, moderate regulation as the 
antidote to extremism of the right or left” (Callahan 1994). 
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forms of expertise and think tanks but other forms of “publics” and – coming along with them 
– also new forms of experts, staged in these processes. In the following we will analyse this new 
construction and constellation of “publics” in regard to their function within the advisory 
system. 
The analysis of primary documents and interviews with HGC and HFEA members makes very 
clear that the main function, which these advisory bodies ascribe to consultation processes and 
public engagement, is not the function of acquiring representative inputs that could provide a 
basis for the democratic legitimacy of policies. Rather theses procedures are conceptualised as 
combined instruments to flash out the political landscape of opinions and as a tool to produce 
sophisticated arguments within a “measured debate” on the specific topics deliberated. Then, – 
this is the other direction of the deliberative process – the collected arguments are filtered and 
packed in order to return them into public discourse by allowing them to circulate in order to 
foster and animate discourse while keeping its flow within a certain realm. 
The idea of having a “measured debate” is also supported institutionally by the way the HGC‟s 
and HFEA‟s membership and speaking positions are constructed. Although the commissions 
are composed of an interdisciplinary group representing different forms of expertise and 
professional or social groups, the idea is that their recommendations do not result from their 
role as representatives but from independent individual evaluations, opinions, and value systems. 
The HFEA, for example, bases the appointment of its members by the UK Health Ministers on 
the “Nolan” principles, demanding that: “Members are selected not as representatives of any particular 
group or organisation, but because of their personal knowledge and expertise.”47 
Furthermore, the interviewees explained that the main purpose of consulting the public was not 
to learn about the quantitative distribution of opinions, to investigate the representative 
opinions of democratic majorities, but rather to “flash out” all arguments (Interview 13-3 2006), 
to get the maximum range of views to inform their own individual (and then consensual group) 
decision making. The speaking position of the HFEA and HGC members fits into the ethics 
frame in demanding that decisions within this frame are value decisions and as such personal 
judgements or “decisions on a matter of conscience” (Bogner et al. 2006). 
                                               
47 Quoted from the HFEA webpage (http://www.hfea.gov.uk/main.htm). 
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One HFEA manager explains that even the instrument of opinion polls was not interesting to 
the HFEA as a “quantitative” method in a strict statistical sense but only as a method to 
compare the scope of arguments resulting from a poll with the scope of responses to the 
consultation paper (Interview 17-3 2006). Thus, the quantitative dimension is of minor relevance 
in “opinion polls” – when compared to the aim of fishing for complex arguments by calling for 
consultation papers. This fact already demonstrates that within the consultation policies of the 
HGC and the HFEA there is a hierarchy of priorities attributed to the different methods, and 
hence to the different “publics” constituted. 
 
5.2.2. Hierarchies of publics – and new experts 
 
“Abstract publics” constituted by opinion polls 
“So you have to be quite careful with polling and sort of justify why you come to a different conclusion. But I sort 
of rationalised it in my mind, that it is not unlike the way in which a court or a judge weighs evidence, you know 
some evidence is more persuasive because it is nearer, or because it is more relevant, or because it is more recent, or 
because you like the witness better, you trust the witness better” (Interview 20-3 2006). 
In the interviews, HGC and HFEA members expressed a general scepticism toward the method 
of opinion polls (e.g., Interview 10-3 2006). One manager of the HFEA, for example, explains: 
“Of course, the disadvantage of the opinion poll is that people involved in it are not involved” (Interview 17-3 
2006). This is the classical deficit model argument against polls: the public is not informed 
enough to give adequate, thoughtful answers without being coached first. (Interviews 10-3 2006, 
20-3 2006). 
Interestingly, in the interviews especially those actors who are considered extremists within the 
UK human genetics debate and who are located outside a “measured debate” by the advisory 
system – and therefore not represented within it– are referring to quantitative methods such as 
polls as possible form of participation: For example, the interview partner from the pro life 
organisation CORE calls for a strengthening of representative democratic methods such as 
opinion polls (Interview 22-3 2006). 
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Stakeholders as experts, not representatives 
However, not only opinion polls, but also the classic stakeholder-oriented responses to 
consultation papers tend to be discredited by the advisory bodies when it comes to appreciating 
the political subjects staged thereby. Subsuming very different social, political, lobby, or interest 
groups under the category of “stakeholders” already demonstrates that the specific interests, 
programs, power resources, etc. of these groups, organisations, enterprises, or NGOs do not 
matter so much here. The possible speaking position of representing specific interest groups is 
not even mentioned in the interviews – a further hint at the fact that it is not substantial 
controversy that structures the constitution of publics.  
The main interest of the UK advisory bodies in “stakeholders” – and this becomes very obvious 
in the interviews – is that they dignify the deep insight into complex arguments allowing their 
“harvest” through consultation. They recur to “stakeholders” as experts of political discourse, of 
producing the most complex variety of arguments. In contrast, they discredit the speaking 
position of the stakeholder as a representative  (of an oppositional NGOs, a political lobby, an 
interest group, an association, etc.), arguing that they are a “minority of highly vociferous groups” 
(Interview 20-3 2006), a “small set of people” (Interview 6-3 2006), a “self-selecting sample” (Interview 
17-3 2006), that is not at all democratically legitimated. 
This quality of being experts in order to provide a tableau of complex arguments differs from 
and extends the older expertise function of NGOs, of being addressed as “counter-experts”. 
This role was still visible, for example, during the conflict between the Parliamentary Study 
Commission in Germany, being dominated by “counter-experts” in comparison with the 
different set of experts within the National Ethics Council. In the UK, this pro- and contra 
structure is not operative within the participatory governance frameworks. Bogner et al. explain 
the role of stakeholders as experts in the following way: “Civil society actors do not act as pressure 
groups but rather operate as organisers of a public discourse, consciously keeping it open” (Bogner et al. 2006). 
In contrast to the scepticism toward “opinion polls” and this “abstract uninvolved public”, on 
the one hand, “stakeholder” participation as representatives of groups, on the other hand, the 
interviewees celebrated two models as more adequate methods of public engagement: citizen 
juries or focus groups – constituting “pure publics” to be converted into “informed” citizens 
undergoing a process of education – and panels of “affected” publics. 
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The affected public 
In chapter 4 we have mentioned the role of the Consultative Panel (consisting of 100 individuals 
living themselves or having family members with a “genetic disorder”) to organise an empathetic 
relationship with commission members. The Consultative Panel is organised as a space for 
informal personal communication and contact and thus has a directly performative dimension. 
The HGC members explain that being able to personally talk with the consultative panel 
members in small table groups during a meeting was a most helpful experience in order to 
prepare the “Making Babies” report (Human Genetics Commission 2006). 
One of the commission members remembers: 
“Another consultation we had I think that was very valuable, there is a group of people with genetic disabilities 
who are consulted on a regular basis.(…) They spent a whole day sitting in meetings in open discussions in a big 
room you know in a table like this and they did have a chance to really go deeply into things (…) Somehow the 
fact that you met face to face with people who were involved was helpful. I am sure that where people did have 
strong points, these would have been repeated and remembered by the commission” (Interview 1-3, 2006). 
We will have a closer look on the role of these “affected publics” when we examine the new po-
litical subjectivities staged in the participatory practices in subchapter 5.3. 
The pure public: Citizen juries as privileged form of consultation 
 “They specifically wanted to take people who probably know nothing or very little about the use of genetic 
information, apart from what they see on television, and to spend two or three days with them and have real 
expert witnesses and educate them about the issues involved, and then ask them, after these few days, how they feel 
about it. Just to get a flavour (…) They want a measure of how people would feel, when they are ignorant of the 
issue and when they are completely educated” (Interview 4-3 2006). 
The other participatory method preferred by HGC members is the deliberative process by 
citizen juries and focus groups, educating participants and pointing out the change of their view 
and attitudes during the process. This strategy is based on a specific idea of democracy, 
emphasising the change of attitudes and viewpoints through participatory mechanisms instead 
of looking for channels to communicate already existing preferences and opinions. This idea, 
however, leads to a paradoxical imperative: there is the aim to, on the one hand, avoid to 
manipulate participants but also to, on the other hand, foster a process of opinion 
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(trans)formation. The dilemma inherent in the concept of citizen juries is a motor for the 
permanent enhancement of methods. In a sense the dilemma is equivalent to the dilemma of 
non-directive counselling. The idea is to give “non-directive” balanced information on 
biotechnologies in order to strengthen the autonomy of the participants and their possibilities to 
develop their deliberation in an unbiased way. However, when it is presupposed that the 
procedure itself will actually change opinions in a substantive way, there always remains the 
temptation for the organisers of such events to select and evaluate the informative or educative 
inputs given by experts or via dossiers, etc. in regard to the expected output. Therefore citizen 
juries or consensus conferences provide many opportunities for manipulation and also the 
setting for a propaganda competition between the experts invited and presented whenever they 
have conflicting viewpoints (Interviews 11-3 2006, 22-3 2006). 
A transformed deficit model of public understanding 
To a certain extent the practice to inform and educate people before giving them the authority 
to deliberate on a certain topic is linked to the old “deficit model of public understanding”: This 
model implies that technocratic experts, who are authorised to evaluate benefits and risks of 
technologies, should instruct a public, which is constructed as a passive absorber of information, 
in order to make it “understand” scientific and technological developments, on the assumption 
that such understanding will lead to an increase in trust and not to an increase in scepticism (see 
Irwin 2006). The separation between science as objective pre-information and pre-condition of 
deliberation and deliberation itself is not questioned within this process. We have already 
emphasised this separation in its discursive dimension as one effect of “ethicisation” in chapter 
4. It is performed in citizen juries, consensus conferences, or focus groups through the 
separation between scientific pre-information (by experts, dossiers, etc.) and the deliberative 
process on ethical (and social) aspects itself. 
This old, very instrumental version of the “deficit model”, for example, appears in the Human 
Genetics Commission‟s report “Inside Information” when it justifies its work as follows: “We 
want to ensure that the exciting prospects for genetic research will not be impeded by public anxiety” (Human 
Genetics Commission 2002a: 3). In the Department of Health report “Our Inheritance, Our 
Future”, following the Inside Information report in 2003, the deficit model is also prevalent, 
albeit combined with other paradigms such as openness and transparency (Jones & Salter 2003). 
In the chapter “Ensuring public confidence” it explains: 
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“Realising the full benefits of human genetics will require public acceptance and public confidence. Fundamental to 
this is greater public understanding of genetics. The government is committed to ensuring openness and 
transparency in genetic policy making. We want to engage in a genuine dialogue on genetics issues” (Department 
of Health 2003: 10). 
Nevertheless, we suggest that what we see here is not simply the old deficit model. There is 
something new. We have shown in chapter 4 that the focus in these processes is shifting from 
“objective” scientific facts towards a more contingent and contextualised presentation of genetic 
testing integrating its application, the empathetic attitudes toward “affected” people, user‟s 
motivations and fears etc. 
 
New expertise – lay experts of the bios and the process 
 “I conceive an expertise quite on the top of the things and also a dominance of the experts; the more official bodies 
were founded the more there is a professionalisation and expert-orientation in the discourses. Therefore, there is no 
crisis of expertise in the sense that experts are retreating, but one type of expert is replaced by another” 
(Interview 27-3 2005). 
The shift toward knowledge production on the bios-aspect of genetic testing is further 
combined with the effects of a differentiation of expertise within these processes (and not its 
crisis as some analyses have elaborated) (cf. Interview 27-3 2005). First, this means that social 
science and cultural studies or theologians – sometimes academics recruited from NGOs or 
other civil society organisations – are becoming more relevant in the education on “ethical” or 
“social” aspects of genetic testing.48 Second, there is a new (meta-level) expertise within these 
participatory practices that is not directly an expertise on scientific facts, but on the process of 
deliberation, on organising these processes, an expertise based on the work of political science, 
pedagogic and participation experts. It is also contributing to some new forms of “deficits” in 
the non-expert communities. The upcoming of “deliberation experts” indicates an ambivalent 
situation. There is the more and more acknowledged claim that scientific experts do not 
represent an objective, neutral position relevant for society as a whole and that there are 
                                               
48 “Each exponent of a discipline – the physician, the lawyer, the sociologist can maintain the status of an expert for a certain stock of 
knowledge” (Bogner et al. 2006). 
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specialised plural perspectives on biotechnologies. Nevertheless, these plural perspectives have 
to be governed and managed by the new set of experts; experts who no longer directly refer to 
substantial scientific truth but to the process of deliberation and to their expertise in organising 
and managing it. They are experts of the process. By legitimising their expertise not by science 
itself but by negotiating science debates, they also add to the stabilisation of a new “reflexive” 
model of expertise, which can be organised as a deficit model all the same, in this sense: People 
need to be instructed in order to understand that the new forms of governance and deliberation 
governed by the new experts are legitimate and adequate for debating genetic testing. 
 
5.2.3. Germany and Austria: disconnected participatory governance experiments 
The UK advisory system fundamentally differs from the German and Austrian situation. More 
than the UK situation, the German governance situation concerning the politics of genetic 
testing lacks a strategic centre of debate because of the persistence of a stakeholder and expert 
oriented system of modern statecraft and disconnected experiments of heterogeneous forms of 
public engagement. For example, a researcher of the IMEW and former member of the 
Parliamentary Study Commission, observes that politicians generally are not interested in the 
outcomes and even less in the procedures of consensus conferences and are much more relying 
on expert and stakeholder knowledge production (Interview 5-3 2006). This also proved true at 
the Leipzig youth conference. Although it was a large national consultation project patronised 
and financed by the BMBF (Ministry of Education and Research), no politician from federal 
parliament, government, or the political parties was disposed to participate in the central event 
of this process. 
Despite this uncoupling of participatory governance experiments from formal governance, we 
need to emphasise some similarities with respect to the broader and also internal discursive and 
performative effects of these more isolated experiments within the national settings of politics 
of genetic testing. 
First of all, the isolated practices of participatory governance experiments in Germany and 
Austria add additional speaking positions to the broader discourse on genetic testing – 
contributing to the map of fragmented and plural publics. Thereby, they foster and connect the 
development of new forms of expertise of the process and expertise on the bios-aspect of 
121 
 
genetic testing. If we look at the expert community invited to the 1000fragen.de experiment 
(2002-4), the Leipzig youth conference (2006) or the Dresden consensus conference (2001), we 
can observe a knowledge community on genetic testing present in the different places – 
composed by NGO experts, human geneticists, and social science and participation experts. 
The new subjects performed in these events, that is “lay” citizens involved in a process of 
education and deliberation, contribute knowledge on “authentic” and “experienced based” 
ethical values to the expert debates within media and formal governance settings. They can 
thereby contribute to a policy model that substitutes conflictive political positions by plural 
ethical positions and knowledge on the contingency of the bios-aspect of genetic testing. 
In considering the German experiments we need to distinguish between different performative 
settings within which this production of publics happens. 
The Dresden Consensus Conference on genetic diagnosis was an elaborated and long-planned 
“serious” consensus conference – above all serving as a reference point and model for the 
participating expert community itself – while having little impact on formal policy (Fraunhofer 
Institut für Systemtechnik und Innovationsforschung 2002; Schicktanz & Naumann 2003). It 
was initiated by the BMBF (Federal Ministry for Education and Research) and located in the 
“Hygiene-Museum” as a cultural and academic place which guaranteed a certain appearance 
independent from direct political decision-making. 
The youth conference in Leipzig was also initiated from above, from the same Ministry, and also 
had difficulties to find a link to formal politics. In contrast to the Dresden conference, however, 
it demonstrated less elaborated participatory techniques and displayed some effects of the 
paradoxes of this procedure– in its pitfalls, failures, and also Freudian slips: The construction of 
the youth as a homogeneous social group and as a “pure” public – in the sense of citizens of the 
future –  hindered the conference in discussing and deliberating on the obviously quite 
controversial and heterogeneous positions presented by different youth groups. Addressing the 
youth as an amorphous mass was further emphasised in various situations. At some moments 
during the conference the participants were not even addressed by their first-names when 
speaking in panels, but only presented as “pure” public of young people, while “experts” were 
presented with full titles and curricula. 
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This disinterest in different political positions and backgrounds of the youth groups was just the 
prelude to the last act of the conference, the elaboration and presentation of a common 
“catalogue of demands”. This procedure was rather manipulative – the group of young people 
did not elaborate the catalogue themselves but more or less only consented to demands pre-
formulated by the organisers of the conference. Generally, the bias in differentiating between 
renowned experts invited and ignorant young people was not really levelled in this conference. 
In the end of the process it led to a feeling of disregard and useless effort from those young 
people who had invested a lot of time in studying and elaborating their projects without having 
the feeling to have influenced political decision-making through this process. This feeling was 
further reinforced by some experts on the panels who emphasised that the outcome of the 
conference, the catalogue of demands was nothing new and would not have any effect on 
politics or media. Some Freudian slips by the organisers were also quite telling: one speaker 
spoke of disinviting (“ausladen”) the young people instead of inviting (“einladen”) them, 
another even more puzzling moment was a panel which was inaugurated without inviting the 
young participants to their chairs at the podium. These gestures can be evaluated as expression 
of an antidemocratic expert-centred political culture in Germany. But beyond this aspect, we 
would add that it also revealed the somehow empty speaking position of “the youth” keeping 
them from entering political debate – by, on the one hand, giving them the authority to be an 
“authentic voice” but, on the other hand, evaluating their concrete interventions as expression 
of the ignorant public that has to be submitted to revision and refinement by qualified experts. 
The 1000fragen.de project of Aktion Mensch differed from these consensus conferences 
initiated by the government and executed by academic or cultural institutions. It was not 
initiated by a government initiative but by a large NGO involved in welfare politics for disabled 
people. The campaign was much more visible publicly than the consensus conferences because 
it included a broad poster and media campaign. Its major aim was not to set up a catalogue of 
“the public‟s” recommendations or demands for purposes of policy advice (although a 
publication with the questions collected was presented to politicians), but to offer an internet 
platform in order to facilitate discussion without the pressure of decision-making (“Austausch 
ohne Entscheidungsdruck”) (Aktion Mensch 2003: 11). As we have mentioned in chapter 4, this 
civil-society-led rather than state- or expert-led arrangement enabled some unease and concern 
about the implications of genetic technology for the social order as a whole to circulate more 
freely within this project than in others. A research project at the University of Cologne which 
evaluated the internet forum speaks of a process of “socialisation” of the issues at stake that 
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took place here (Waldschmidt et al. 2006). However, there are also aspects of the 1000fragen.de 
project, identified by this research project that point to effects of ethicisation in that the 
discourse established via the internet forum legitimates itself not through reference to scientific 
facts, but through reference to experience. 
The interim report of the research project explains: 
“First results of the systematic coding focused on the knowledge type „experience-based knowledge‟ reveal that not 
only expert knowledge, but also experience-based knowledge are able to produce powerful speaker positions – 
powerful in that the ensuing discussion threads concur with the argumentation pattern of the experience-based 
knowledge (…) The greatest legitimation is ascribed to personal experience“ (Waldschmidt et al. 2006). 
Similarly, the organisers praised the internet forum for the special “authenticity” of the 
contributions gathered here (Aktion Mensch 2003: 12). The research project considers expert 
knowledge and experience-based knowledge as competing forms of knowledge within the field 
of bioethics. However, as has been argued in chapter 4, we consider scientific knowledge 
production and “authenticity” of experiences not to be two antithetical types of knowledge in 
the field of genetic testing but rather two necessary elements, both referred to by expert 
communities and governance arrangements, within the new systemic type of knowledge 
production which characterized genetic testing today.  
The performance of authentic and lay people‟s speaking positions based on experience are the 
basis of two political subjectivities which are clearly privileged in the UK case, but have also 
proliferated through the more disconnected participatory governance experiments at the EU 
level, in Austria, and in Germany. In the following, we will concentrate on these two speaking 
positions: Individual experts of lived genetic conditions and ignorant, albeit ethically capable, 
citizens as new political subjectivities emphasised by the new forms of governance. 
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5.3. New political subjectivities within participatory practices 
“Various ideal types inform this model [of genetic governance]: an educated public, consenting patients and 
tissue donors, centralised regulatory agencies, a community of experts who debate and discuss the ethics of their 
work, and a responsible and innovative industry, in need of nurturance” (Kerr 2003: 123). 
If we look at the main political subjects addressed by participatory governance arrangements 
from above in recent years, we can observe a certain trend towards two poles, which correlate 
with the methods of public engagement privileged by the HGC, namely the Consultative Panel, 
and the citizen juries. 
On the one hand, the group of people considered to be directly affected by genetic testing is 
narrowed down to people who have personal experiences with genetic testing, such as people 
who have a certain “genetic disorders” or have a family member who has, or people confronted 
with the possibility to do a test or women/couples prompted to make decisions in regard to 
PGD and PND. If we look at the European dialogue projects and the influence of the 
Consultative and Patients Panel as well as the Genetic Interest Group in the UK, we can see 
here the promotion of patients and patient organisation to fill in this speaking position. 
Another type of addressees of new participatory governance arrangements are the "pure" 
(ignorant) citizens, the lay people who not yet hold any specific views on the issue and do not 
form part of a political or interest group active in this field. This "pure" public is called upon in 
many consultation processes and consensus conferences, oftentimes constructed as forming the 
opposite of or counterweight to another group build of experts, scientists, or politicians 
(Edwards 2002). 
The trend towards referring to or establishing these two authorised speaking positions is 
certainly not absolute. Yet, it contributes to a shifting of power relations in the field of speaking 
positions. For example, by emphasising that patients are the ones "truly" affected by genetic 
testing, the claims of social groups who see their lives as actually or potentially affected by the 
practice of genetic testing too, albeit not necessarily in a medical but rather in a social and 
cultural way (such as the feminist or the disabled movement) are delegitimated and not accepted 
as a legitimate speaking position. In the UK case we have shown that the speaking position 
available to these latter groups is rather the position of “stakeholders” and even they are not so 
much invited to participate as representatives of group interests or as empathetic dialogue 
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partners but mostly as a resource of knowledge in that they help organizers to flash out the 
complex landscape of possible arguments. 
 
5.3.1. The "authentic public" or the experts of embodied experience  
“There was a certain amount of engineering involved [in constituting the Consultative Panel], because they 
wanted a range of experiences as wide as possible. So people were asked what the genetic condition was, were they 
affected directly or were they looking after someone, or were they someone who had a condition run in the family 
and they didn‟t know if they were affected yet, so that kind of thing. It was to get as broad a picture as possible, 
and then so there was a little bit of engineering I think, because they would get a lot of people with a certain genetic 
condition and not so many with another, and they wanted to balance” (Interview 4-3 2006). 
This new type of political subjectivity staged by new participatory governance arrangements is 
more clearly discernible in the UK than in the other countries we looked at in our work package. 
The HGC's Consultative Panel is a case in point here. The subject celebrated here is the 
individual confronted with the diagnosis of a specific “genetic condition” (of him-/herself or of 
a family member). The panel consists of 100 individuals with “genetic disorders” or who have 
family members with such a disorder. They are explicitly not selected as representatives of 
certain disability or patient organisations nor as individuals with a specific professional or 
political background but as individuals as „pure‟ as possible, as individuals affected by a specific 
genetic health condition. One of our interview partners within the HGC makes it clear that 
people from political organisations or “lobbyists” of the disabled community are not tolerated as 
members of the Consultative Panel so that the expertise required, the speaking position 
established is that of experts of being personally affected by a medical condition, either by 
suffering from it or by caring for someone who suffers from it (Interview 4-3, 2006), their 
speaking position thus is framed and allocated in medical terms and on the basis of a medical 
model of disease and disability. 
However, participants are framed not as passive patients but as active individual experts in their 
own right. They are addressed as experts knowing about social, familial, and health care 
situations as well as about the research progress and the symptoms, diagnostics, and therapies of 
their specific “impairment”. This speaking position is equipped with a special authority, the 
authority of authenticity which grants its incumbent and his or her views a highly regarded and 
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virtually unquestionable status. Nevertheless, as an expert position it is rather fragile insofar as 
this expertise is based on the individual situation only, the situation of being affected – thus not 
on broader social settings or political positions. This expertise is integrated, as demonstrated in 
chapter 4, into the advisory system by settings supposed to generate empathy with those who 
are considered truly affected – in this medicalised sense - when for example HGC members 
celebrate their meetings with the Consultative Panel‟s members in small groups for giving them 
the opportunity  to get very close to “these people” and being emotionally moved by this 
experience.  
This expertise, on the one hand, constitutes a shift away from the supposedly objective, 
universal scientific type of expert knowledge about “genetic disorders”, traditionally provided by 
medical experts and scientists. On the other hand, the speaking position of the "affected public", 
at least if constructed in medical terms -  strongly differs from what disability rights activists 
propose – namely a speaking position based on a social model of disability. The social model of 
disability interprets disability not just as a physical condition but as socially constructed in that it 
is society that disables people through labelling, reducing them to this one characteristic only, 
through stigmatisation, or denying access to public goods. It connects disability to other civil 
rights movements and political struggles against all forms of segregation, discrimination, and 
exclusion of people on the basis of certain characteristics – a position which the HGC discredits 
as undesired lobbyism within the Consultative Panel. 
Nevertheless, the borders between these two political subjectivities are not always clear. The 
possibility to speak as an expert of certain social situations and lived experiences and not only as 
an expert about certain "matters of facts", established only through scientific knowledge, is 
offered by both speaking positions. The organisational borders between both positions are not 
always clear, either. Nevertheless, the position of the Genetic Interest Group (GIG) in the UK, 
in favour of and actively promoting human genetic research and genetic testing on the one hand, 
and older types of disability rights organisations such as the BCODP or Disability Awareness in 
Action on the other, opposing what they see as the eugenic contexture of genetic testing, are 
extremely opposed to each other (Interviews 13-3 2006, 9-3 2006). The power relationship 
between both speaking positions in the current governance setting of genetic testing is not easy 
to define and has been analysed in rather different ways by our interview partners. Among HGC 
members we interviewed, we found both positions from the BCOCP and from the GIG as 
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commission members, but the HGC clearly frames the Consultative Panel as a space for the 
representation of bodily affected  patients. 
In Germany, pro-human genetics research and self help groups are not as visible and influential 
as in the UK and there is no centralised political lobby group equivalent to the Genetic Interest 
Group. As we have shown in the narrative, there nevertheless is a rather disperse network of 
patient and research cooperation with similar attitudes. Its formal cohesion is organised by the 
Federal Association of Self Help Groups (BAGS) that however does not articulate a similarly 
accentuated political lobby position like the Genetic Interest Group. 
One disability rights activist we interviewed held that until now the lobbyist background of some 
patient organisations financed by pharmaceutical or biotech industry has remained quite obvious 
(for example in the EU context). They have not yet achieved a hegemonic speaking position in 
its own right (Interview 11-3 2006). As other commentators state with regard to the German 
situation: Although the patients‟ speaking position has become more visible in the last decade, 
there has also been an increasing acceptance of disability organisations with a more pronounced 
disability rights background within the political realm (Interview 5-3 2006). Insofar the balance 
of speaking positions is not developing in a linear manner, but has different focuses and sites of 
power and resources within different national settings. 
Moreover, the expertise on one own individual “genetic disorder” in itself presents an 
ambiguous frame between representing “bios” and “zoe”, between a medicalised body and the 
social embedding of disease: It does allow bringing in knowledge on a lived condition by non-
medical experts and as not primarily medical expert knowledge. Nevertheless, it is closely linked 
to a predominantly genetic framing of disability. This form of biologisation becomes quite 
evident in the positive reference to “genetic diversity”. This concept, supposedly critical of 
genetic testing, circulates within the UK context (not in Germany): It could be endangering the 
future, so the argument goes, to limit the genetic diversity of mankind by eliminating certain 
genes through selective abortion or PGD. Such biologisation of human diversity as biodiversity 
(which in turn is linked to evolutionist models) shows that all the expansion of contingent and 
individualised knowledge on “lived conditions” has its limit in the subtext of an extremely 
medicalised knowledge pushing back the social model of disability. 
The understanding of mankind as a gene pool is also important for analysing the second 
speaking positions “mise en scène” in the new forms of governance of genetic testing: 
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5.3.2. Lay citizens and genetic solidarity 
“Genetic solidarity: We spent two years trying to sort out what we meant by it, and we did come up with these 
principles genetic solidarity and genetic altruism, all this sort of things: you know, we are all citizens of the world, 
we share the same DNA” (Interview 20-3 2006). 
The other political subjectivity addressed by the new governance arrangements is that of the 
ignorant but nevertheless ethically capable citizens; a subjectivity performed in citizen juries or 
consensus conferences. It is also evoked in youth conferences addressing the youth as the 
citizens of the future. 
As mentioned before, the staging of “lay people” as a performative effect of consensus or 
citizen conferences contributes to a non-antagonistic setting. Like the affected individuals with 
an authentic experience, lay people are also constructed as authentic speaking position of the 
public – as a site of neutral reflection of information and input given to them within those 
processes. 
First, we need to distinguish what is meant by lay people within different settings. Within the 
advisory system of the UK, `lay´ simply means non-scientific in the sense of not being a 
researcher (or entrepreneurs) within the biosciences. Thus, in the HGC and the HFEA 
journalists or lawyers also count as lay people. Within the public understanding of science 
debate, this perception is linked to the idea of a division between scientists representing science 
and lay people representing society. This frame proves less relevant in the other national 
settings. Therefore, in the following we will concentrate on the speaking position that refers to 
lay people in the sense of “pure”, ignorant citizens as evoked in the participatory governance 
arrangements or experiments in all country settings. 
Recalling the concerns we have addressed in the second part of chapter 4 on the “politics of 
life”, the speaking position of neutral citizens could be a space for republican deliberation on the 
implications of genetic testing for the social order as a whole – as they are expressed for 
example in the concerns on eugenics and designer babies. However, the idea of pure citizens is 
linked, at least in the UK, to “discursive currencies” (Jones & Salter 2003) such as “genetic 
solidarity”, “genetic altruism”, and – a more academic discourse – “genetic citizenship”. These 
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concepts are based not on debating broader social processes but rather on the ideas of duties 
and obligations for citizens as individuals. 
 “Genetic citizenship” is a term which, on the one hand, refers to an individualised perspective 
of rights: the right to participate, to have access to information, to non-discrimination, to 
counselling, to consumer choice, etc. The frame “genetic citizenship”, on the other hand, also 
establishes duties of citizens: the duty to donate tissue samples or blood, to consent to research, 
or to inform family members about certain test results (Petersen 2003). 
The HGC frames these obligations in the concept of “genetic solidarity” or “altruism” – 
explaining them in its report “Inside information” as follows: 
“Genetic knowledge may bring people into a special relationship with one another. We lead our lives as members 
of large and small communities and we have certain duties to other members of these communities. … Sharing our 
genetic information can give rise to opportunities to help other people and for other people to help us and we have a 
common interest in the benefits that medically-based genetic research may bring. We have, therefore, set out a 
concept of genetic solidarity and altruism. This supports the idea that, although nobody should feel pushed 
into taking part in genetic research, when they make this decision people should be aware that by taking part they 
might help those suffering from disease“ (Human Genetics Commission 2002a: 6; accentuation in the 
original). 
HGC further explains genetic solidarity and altruism: 
“We all share the same basic human genome, although there are individual variations which distinguish us from 
other people. Most of our genetic characteristics will be present in others. This sharing of our genetic constitution 
not only gives rise to opportunities to help others but it also highlights our common interest in the fruits of 
medically-based genetic research” (Human Genetics Commission 2002a: 18). 
Hence, the Human Genetics Commission frames the reason why genetics should be an issue for 
all citizens by pointing at the idea of a common DNA we all share; this common DNA is the 
reason why everybody should be participating in the debate. This explains why in the view of 
utilitarian liberal John Harris, member of the HGC, everybody should feel the “moral duty” to 
give samples of his or her DNA to the UK Biobank project (Bionews 2006b). In contrast, other 
HGC members refer to the concept in arguing that everybody should oppose genetic 
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discrimination and should accept the right of disabled people not to know about their genetic 
characteristics (Interviews 1-3 2006, 6-3, 2006).  
Similarly, the concept “genetic literacy”, which was introduced by the British Medical 
Association (British Medical Association 1998; Jennings 2004), is based on the assumption that 
genetic knowledge is essential to people and to society. However, the idea of a duty of citizens 
to be informed about human genetics neglects the fact that truth claims in human genetics 
themselves are highly contested and that different concepts of life are intermingled within the 
current governance schemes of genetic testing. 
Although these concepts are contested in the way we mentioned with regards to genetic 
solidarity, the paradigms of “genetic solidarity” or “genetic altruism” as “overarching principles” 
(Human Genetics Commission 2006: 10) display a certain form of geneticisation as they put 
“genes” and the relation of people to “their genes” at the centre of social relations and political 
engagement. It is simply assumed here that “bio-sociality”, as Nikolas Rose has called it, (Rose 
2001), is a reality and not just a contested discourse. The genetic paradigm and its truth claims lie 
at the heart of metaphors such as “genetic solidarity” or “genetic altruism” but also of “genetic 
citizenship”, “genetic diversity” or “genetic literacy”, assuming that “the genes” are the essence 
of a person, of a group, and of humanity  and that therefore the way to deal with genetic 
information is essential for society.  
This geneticised way of framing citizenship and solidarity is less visible in the German or 
Austrian case, or at least not publicly stabilised by terms such as genetic solidarity or genetic 
diversity. Nevertheless, there are various tendencies pointing in the same direction, beyond the 
proliferation of self help groups linked to medicalised identity politics. The first population-
based biobank project in Northern Germany, popgen, addresses the same type of altruism and 
solidarity as it calls on people to help future generations by participating in the collection of 
DNA samples (Görlitzer 2004/2005). 
There also is a strong impetus, a strong obligation towards “genetic literacy”, present in 
participatory experiments and projects of public education from above (for example the Year of 
Life Sciences propagated by the BMBF in 2001). Also, we find the idea, albeit not the term of 
“genetic literacy”, in the design of the Leipzig Youth Conference at work in the form of genetic 
truth claims and the claim that everybody should get an education about human genetics. The 
Leipzig youth conference included a first phase in which participants received an education 
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about human genetics as a prerequisite for further deliberation without that the contested 
character of this knowledge was addressed in any way. 
 
6. Conclusions: Politics of  genetic testing – non-
antagonistic, fragmented, and systemic 
6.1. PND, PGD, and “predictive medicine”: different stories to tell 
Are there some cross-cutting, general results about the new politics of life and new participatory 
governance arrangements within the current politics of genetic testing? On the basis of our case 
study the answer at first sight would be „no‟, while a second glance yields the answer „yes‟. 
Concerning the politics of life, we have found that there are different stories to tell depending 
on whether one looks at PND, PGD, or genetic testing within “predictive medicine”: The 
public energy field around PND has been established beyond strong formal regulatory 
mechanisms, beyond the judicial power of modern statecraft, while PGD is still a contested 
issue at the heart of debates on how to formally regulate genetic testing. Concerning “predictive 
medicine”, we found that the politics of time are of especial importance. 
 PND is a field where professional self-regulation and the paradigm of individual self-
steering have become the major governance schemes – within a context of routinisation 
and normalisation. Codes and guidelines or medical associations are the main regulatory 
mechanisms – and the paradigm of individual reproductive choice guided by counselling 
has become hegemonic. Hence the former strong pros and contras about selective 
abortions have been mitigated by a frame centred on the complex motivations and 
concerns of the pregnant woman or the couple deciding about PND. In the 
consequence, there have been few dense political conflicts around PND in the last years, 
while there is a persisting but subliminal public unease about it. 
 In contrast, PGD is a field where different formal governance arrangements have domi-
nantly shaped policy-making and the forms of deliberation. We have discerned a 
temporary but dense conflict in Germany around the millennium change about whether 
or not to ease the restrictions of the Embryo Protection Act – or its interpretation – in 
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order to legalise PGD. In the UK, PGD constitutes a major “public energy field”, too, 
but in a different manner. In contrast to Germany, regulation does not take the form of 
criminal law but of an intense flexible and sophisticated decision-making process on a 
case by case basis – with the HFEA as a prototype for the UK arm‟s length bodies 
system. 
 “Predictive medicine”, finally, is still widely characterised by non-regulation and 
incipient forms of regulation (in the form of moratoriums, law proposals, and very 
recent legislations). Debates in this issue area centre on the questions how to regulate at 
all. The debate is highly dependent on different projections about future scenarios of 
genetic testing within health care – and is thereby a debate on different “colonisations” 
of the future. It is the field where politics of time and interpretative strategies about the 
specificity or non-specificity of human genetics have became especially important for 
governance strategies. 
 
6.2. Introduction into common features 
Despite these strong differences in the issues at stake and country settings under study, we have 
found a number of common features, which are visible only at second glance. These features 
relate to political settings, strategic constellations, changes in political subjectivities, the 
transformation of frames, and the performative dimension. We can summarise them by the 
following keywords: 
A non-antagonistic setting: The current governance of genetic testing can be analysed as 
governance via a “non-antagonistic setting”. Compared to former periods, in recent years we 
have noted the absence of an antagonistic conflict constellation and of dense dislocatory 
processes. Interestingly, this does not mean that public discourse runs dry. On the contrary, we 
see an ever more active discourse machinery permanently inciting and regulating debates in 
which techno-sceptical arguments against the expansion of genetic testing practices are 
circulating, but are detached from the idea of fundamental political conflict. 
Diversification and fragmentation: This non-antagonistic constellation is partly due to the 
enormous diversification and fragmentation among different coexisting forms of expertise, sites 
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of negotiation and deliberation, political subjectivities, publics, and increasingly detailed issue 
constructions. 
Ethicisation: On the other hand, we find a process of ethicisation in the sense of an 
increasingly prevailing ethics frame stretching across this diversity of coexisting sites, problems, 
publics, and subjectivities and organising the different debates. The process of ethicisation 
contributes to the non-antagonistic character of the political setting, privileging certain topics 
and political subjectivities while marginalising others. We can distinguish between regulatory 
ethics and life style ethics. Life-style ethics have incited an enormous knowledge production on 
what we call the bios-aspect of the governance of genetic testing. This knowledge production 
addresses the motivations, desires, concerns, anxieties, and decision-making and coping 
strategies of individuals who are confronted with the possibilities of genetic testing. 
Post-euphoric and post-catastrophic narratives: We have found the politics of time to be a 
key aspect in understanding the specificities of the current governance of genetic testing. With 
respect to the politics of time, we note that current politics of genetic testing are framed in less 
far-sighted prognostics – no matter whether the prognosis is derived from a techno-sceptical or 
from a techno-optimistic viewpoint. Expectations towards genetic testing in general are rather 
based on concrete experiences and economic and scientific uncertainties are taken into account. 
Post-euphoric respectively post-catastrophic narratives have superseded the big stories of all 
encompassing solutions, on the one hand, and scenarios of a horrendously geneticised society, 
on the other hand. 
Subliminal public unease: The above listed keywords describe a hegemonic setting. However, 
we have also elaborated that there is a subliminal public unease which is disturbing, albeit not 
confronting this hegemonic setting by referring to the frame of eugenics and the metaphor of 
designer babies. 
These results arise from the focus on the participatory governance of genetic testing, as marked 
by more coherent and centralised arrangements in the case of the UK and more disperse and 
disconnected experiments in the cases of Germany, Austria, and the European Union. Before 
further explicating them, we need to highlight once again that the participatory practices are 
clearly limited with respect to scope and political influence. The participatory arrangements we 
have looked at in our case study exercised little influence on formal political decision-making. 
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Generally, “hard” issues of considerable economic interest, such as national research policies or 
patenting, tend to be absent from the agenda of participatory governance arrangements. 
 
 
6.3. Dimensions of ethicisation 
In chapter 4, when discussing the discursive dimensions of the current governance of genetic 
testing, we have emphasised that the non-antagonistic constellation in the debates on genetic 
testing partly results from a process of ethicisation – a process with at least three dimensions. 
We distinguish between regulatory ethics and life style ethics. Regulatory ethics is established via 
expert commissions or advisory bodies whose task it is to study the ethical implications of 
certain contested practices and technologies such as genetic testing with respect to possible or 
necessary regulation. Regulatory ethics is the use of ethics-as-expertise in science policy-making. 
Applying regulatory ethics implies framing the issues at stake in the language of ethics, which in 
turn implies a tendency towards a non-antagonistic constellation. One mechanism of 
ethicisation in this sense, which we can discern, for example, in the debate on PGD in Germany, 
is framing the issue in terms of “ethical dilemmas” which as such appear to be pre-given and 
unquestionable. The dilemmatic structure of the issue demands a relativist acknowledgement of 
different values and opinions within a frame of dialogue (Moore 2006). Moore (2006) and Braun 
(2006) argue that regulatory ethics serves less in creating a consensus but rather help to “move the 
struggle from politics”. 
Regulatory ethics, as we have shown in our case study, sometimes also organises processes of 
negotiation, of “ethical brokerage”. This proves to be especially true when there is a need for 
formal governance to find compromises and develop coherence in political and juridical terms. 
The case of PGD in the UK can be considered a prototype of such processes within which 
there is an enormous productivity of new differentiated artefacts, new intermediate concepts in 
order to find coherent solutions – such as debating who can how assess the “seriousness” of a 
condition, what happens with “late-onset” and “low-penetrance” genetic conditions, etc. 
Moreover, these intermediate concepts allow for gradually shifting the boundaries of what is 
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allowed and what is prohibited – for example gradually allowing PGD first for a few restricted 
and then for more cases of tissue typing, or also allowing PGD for risk of an inherited cancer. 
Life style ethics, on the other hand, is intrinsically linked to the neoliberal paradigm of individual 
self-steering and self-care. Concerning genetic testing, life style ethics manifests itself in a 
knowledge production dealing with what we call the “bios-orientation” of genetic testing. Here, 
we see a sophisticated knowledge production about the motivations, desires, fears, hopes, and 
anxieties of individuals using genetic testing, considering to use genetic testing or being 
confronted with family members who use or consider to use genetic testing. This knowledge 
production focuses on the pressures these individuals are exposed to as well as their scope of 
action and the social, cultural, and psychological conditions under which they take decisions. 
This experience based knowledge contextualises the scientific dimensions of genetic testing – 
however in an individualistic, consumerist way. We have argued that the increasing interest in 
the bios-aspects of genetic testing explains the increasing significance ascribed to emotionality 
and empathy within the governance of genetic testing, establishing the perception of an 
unquestionable authenticity of those who are “really” affected by or in need of genetic testing. 
 
6.4. Anticipatory governance strategies and authentic subjects 
In the issue area of genetic testing, as our case study shows, discursive frames, narratives, and 
participatory arrangements are inseparable from performative practices. Discursive frames are 
staged within specific sites of negotiation and by specific forms of communication, and they are 
bound to specific political subjects constituted within these practices. We have shown that this is 
especially relevant for our case. Within a non-antagonistic setting, as we have found in this issue 
area, participatory governance arrangements or experiments are oftentimes rather producing 
concerns than responding to existent conflicts or debates. In the case of the Human Genetics 
Commission we have shown that it explicitly established an anticipatory strategy in order to 
incite and channel discourses on human genetics even before controversial issues would appear. 
In this case, we can speak of a government-induced public energy field. Hence, the current 
governance of genetic testing not only responds to or transforms but actively constitutes public 
energy fields. 
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In our case study, the practices of participation and the problems and subjects staged in this 
context constitute a fragmented and heterogeneous landscape. We can distinguish between 
different types of publics staged: 
 The “abstract public” as addressed by opinion polls, 
 the “pure public”, made up of “ignorant but ethically capable” individuals as addressed 
by  consensus conferences, youth conferences and citizen juries 
 stakeholder publics as experts of complex political arguments addressed within 
consultation  processes, 
 “affected publics” as representatives of people affected individually by certain genetic 
 disorders and/or genetic testing. 
Within this plurality of publics, we have shown that the ethics frame especially strengthens two 
kinds of political subjectivities, two speaking positions: on the one hand, the figure of the 
abstract citizen or lay person – who constitute the “pure public” – and, on the other hand, the 
“affected public” made up by patients as individual experts of being personally affected by a 
certain genetic condition. Both constitute an “authentic” speaking position either based on 
personal values or experiences. “Authenticity” seems to form a new type of qualification for a 
privileged position in processes of dialogue and deliberation, one specifically promoted by the 
ethics frame. We can interpret the focus that many participatory governance arrangements in the 
area of genetic testing put on the “affected” and the “pure public” as part of a process of 
apoliticisation in the sense that political struggle is discredited or at least mitigated. “Authentic” 
subjectivities are positioned against older models of speaking position such as lobby or interest 
groups or social groups in the sense of Iris M. Young, constituted along lines of social 
difference. For example, current participatory governance regimes marginalise the speaking 
position of disabled people as a social group, that is as a group constituted via socially 
discriminated people and not via specific “genetic conditions”. Or they neglect women as a 
social group positioned within specific gender regimes in society and not as individual 
consumers of genetic testing. 
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6.5. Scientific and economic uncertainties as basis for a systemic approach 
Which scientific truth production has fostered these models of governance? 
We have shown that there is an increasing attention for scientific uncertainties within the 
hegemonic setting of governance. The crisis of genetic determinism has not resulted in the 
rejection of the gene paradigm altogether but rather in its transformation. On the one hand, the 
increasing importance of epidemiological knowledge production has resulted in statistical 
foundations of probabilities and risk factors for “low penetrance” genetic conditions; on the 
other hand, systemic models of the interrelation between environmental, organic, and genetic 
factors have become the dominant paradigm. Epidemiological and more complex approaches in 
human genetics have transformed but not abolished the process of geneticisation already deeply 
rooted in popular knowledge. 
The systemic approach, that is the idea that individual health can be understood as the result of 
multiple interacting factors, such as life style, environment, genes, and processes occurring in the 
cell, the proteins, or the larger organism, implies an increasing significance of what we have 
called the “bios-orientation” of genetic testing. We can understand the new focus on life style 
ethics in the light of a twofold uncertainty: On the one hand, life styles form an important 
element within the new systemic paradigm of human genetics which produces knowledge about 
a bundle of factors and their interactions rather than about a single gene and its expressions. 
Hence, life styles are of enormous interest for research into multi-factorial genetic diseases. 
Knowledge about life styles, life style decisions, and life style ethics thus is required to increase 
the production of (more) reliable diagnostic or prognostic instruments – if not therapies – and 
to thus reduce scientific uncertainty in the area of human genetics. At the same time, the focus 
on life style ethics can, on the other hand, be understood in the context of economic 
uncertainty, namely the uncertainty regarding the establishment of a genetics-based “pre-
symptomatic” medicine within the health care systems and regarding the question of whether 
the market for genetic testing will actually expand in the near future. In the absence of gene 
therapies and the uncertainty concerning “low penetrance” risk factors, the production of 
“biovalue” in this field depends on individuals actively requesting and applying genetic 
knowledge. In this context, the motivations, fears, anxieties, and hopes surrounding both genetic 
disorders and genetic tests as such need to be governed adequately in order to reduce and handle 
economic uncertainties. Hence, the focus on “bios” has not replaced the focus on “zoe” in hu-
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man genetics, nor have “bios” and “zoe” become undistinguishable, as Agamben holds, nor can 
social and individual identities necessarily be reduced to “somatic identities” as Rose argues, but 
rather does the systemic approach integrate and produce knowledge about both zoe and bios 
and the different modes of their interrelations without collapsing the distinction or reducing one 
to the other. 
The systemic model with its privileged position for the “bios”, that is for life styles and life style 
decisions, thereby also stabilises the gene paradigm, albeit in a modified form. The gene 
paradigm, that is the assumption that knowledge about the “genetic makeup” is the key to 
predict, preserve or improve individual health, remains the unquestioned reference point of the 
systemic approach. We have shown that the gene paradigm also forms the foundational basis of 
new paradigms of governance such as “genetic solidarity”, “genetic citizenship” or “genetic 
diversity” which all frame political concepts with reference to the gene paradigm. 
 
6.6. Disturbing effects of the frame of eugenics and the designer babies 
metaphor 
In this context, it becomes clear that the recent focus on the “bios”, for instance on emotions 
and on the social context of individual decision-making, as such does not pose a serious 
challenge to the dominant model of genetic governance. In fact, it is contrary to de-
contextualising trends within regulatory ethics and within the older genetic determinism, but it 
introduces social contingency in a consumerist way without questioning the gene paradigm as an 
integral part of a systemic approach. Other frames and metaphors seem to be more unruly and 
disturbing, as we can see from the increasing discursive investments into the delegitimisation of 
the frame of eugenics and the metaphor of designer babies. However, these investments have 
occurred with a certain time-lag; they did not come up when debates about eugenics and 
designer babies had been embedded in ongoing political conflicts. It is against the background 
of the dominant non-antagonistic and ethicised setting that the eugenics frame or the metaphor 
of designer babies becomes unruly and provokes delegitimising efforts in that they question the 
benefit of genetic testing for the social order as a whole. These discoursive elements principally 
question the basis of genetic knowledge as knowledge based in the differentiation of social 
groups and transgress a setting of pluralist values by emphasising the negative and hierarchical 
consequences for society as a whole. 
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Hence, these discourses take an implicitly macro-political and antagonistic approach in the sense 
that they imply a substantial opposition between a “right” and “wrong” way for society to go. 
Such a substantial and macro-political opposition can not be represented within the current 
systemic, non-antagonistic governance scheme. In addition, the eugenics frame and the 
metaphor of designer babies deviate from the medium-term time frame characteristic of post-
euphoric and post-catastrophic perspectives in that they imply a more farsighted look onto an 
envisaged future. 
The strategy to discredit selective abortions and PGD as eugenic practices does not fit into the 
dominant ethics frame. While the dominant ethics frame always claims to respect the authentic 
emotions of those who are personally affected by a genetic disorder, it is questioning the 
relevance of personal authenticity and affectedness in the moment when eugenics is addressed. 
Eugenics is not addressed by people with disabilities who speak from the speaking position of 
individuals defined by their medical condition but from the speaking position of a social or 
political group. The efforts to delegitimise the eugenics frame as being erroneous and irrational 
shows that here the old deficit model of public understanding that has discredited techno-
sceptical arguments as emotional and false – supposedly overcome within new governance 
schemes – is still in place. Despite all references to empathy and emotionality, there is a clear 
tendency to re-establish the talk on rationality and scientific knowledge (integrating social 
research on the role of the bios in genetic testing) in order to discredit these broader and more 
fundamental questions about the social meaning of genetic testing. 
Within fragmented landscapes of multiple speaking positions, issues, expertises, and problems, it 
is difficult to propose general political strategies in order to improve participation and political 
transparency within the political decision-making on genetic testing. However, one message of 
our case study might be that there should be a greater attention to these disturbing effects of a 
subliminal public unease. This attention could be a starting point in order to overcome the 
effects of apoliticisation and of a non-antagonistic setting organised by ethical governance. 
There are other messages implied by our results that have to do with the problems of 
ethicisation. For example, there should be strategies to counteract the effects of marginalising 
“hard” political and economic issues from participatory deliberation on human genetics. And 
there should be the possibility to reengage with a general critique of geneticisation, politicising 
scientific and economic uncertainties in ways that should transcend the mutual reference 
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systems of reinforcing individualising perspectives and the gene paradigm within a systemic 
approach. 
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August, 21, 2006. 
Interview 22-3: CORE, telephone interview Berlin-London, UK, March, 14, 2006. 
Interview 23-3: Aktion Leben Österreich, Vienna, UK, July, 3, 2006. 
Interview 24-3: University of Vienna, Institut für Bildungswissenschaft, Sonder- und 
Heilpädagogik, Vienna, August, 30, 2006. 
Interview 25-3: Science-Center-Networks, former team member of “dialog<>gentechnik”, 
Vienna, Austria, June, 29, 2006. 
Interview 26-3: Gen-Ethisches Netzwerk, Berlin, February 15, 2006. 
Interview 27-3: Heilpädagogische Fakultät der Universität Köln, Research Project on 
1000fragen.de September, 9, 2005. 
 
7.3. Conferences/Meetings/Workshops (taped or taken notes) 
“Forum Biopolitik” Bundeskoordination Internationalismus (BUKO), 5-9.May 2005, Hamburg; 
(notes). 
“Partizipation und Biopolitik”, Veranstaltung des Nationaler Ethikrats, 18 May 2005, Berlin 
(notes). 
“Patented New World”, Internationale Fachtagung, Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, 2-3 June 2005, 
Berlin (notes). 
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“Ethical and Legal Issues at the Beginning of Life: Debating „Designer Babies‟”, Symposium: at 
Middlesex University, School of Health and Social Sciences, 2 February 2006 London 
(taped and partly transcribed). 
“European Biopolitics. Connecting Civil Society – Implementing Basic Values”, 17-19 March 
2005, Heinrich Böll Stiftung (taped) – and on 
http://www.boell.de/en/04_thema/4205.html. 
Youth Conference “Die nächste GENeration”, Gewandhaus Leipzig, 19 May 2006 (www.gen-
diskussion.de). 
 
167 
 
8. Acronyms 
ACGT:  Advisory Committee on Genetic Testing 
BCODP:  British Council of Disabled People 
CORE:  Comment on Reproductive Ethics 
DAA:  Disability Awareness in Action 
EU:   European Union 
GIG:   Genetic Interest Group 
GMOs: Genetically Modified Organisms 
HFEA:  Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 
HFEAct:  Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
HGA  Human Genetics Alert 
HGAC: Human Genetics Advisory Committee 
HGC:   Human Genetics Commission 
HTA  Human Tissue Act 
IMEW:  Institut Mensch Ethik Wissenschaft Berlin 
NHS:   National Health Service 
OST:   Office for Science and Technology 
PGD:   Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis 
PGS:  Pre-implantation Genetic Screening  
PND:   Prenatal genetic diagnosis 
STC:   Science and Technology Committee 
TAB:   Büro für Technikfolgenabschätzung (Office for Technology Assessment) 
 
